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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies three forms of mobility in the United States during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first chapter uses newly collected
data from Union Army widows pension files to isolate the causal effect of womens
income on their decisions about marriage. Making use of exogenous variation in the
processing time of pension applications, I show that receiving a pension caused wid-
ows to remarry at a significantly slower rate. This suggests that womens income
directly influenced marital outcomes, largely by making women more selective in the
marriage market. The second chapter explores the extent to which nineteenth century
internal migrants in the United States were motivated by the possibility of upward
occupational mobility. Drawing on the literature on contemporary migrant selection
and sorting, I argue that workers with greater potential for occupational upgrading
should have selected themselves out of counties with low skill premiums and sorted
themselves into counties with high skill premiums. Using linked data from the U.S.
Census and county-level wage data, I present results consistent with this argument.
v
The third chapter of the dissertation (co-authored with Claudia Olivetti and Daniele
Paserman) examines intergenerational income mobility across three generations be-
tween 1850 and 1930. Making use of the socioeconomic content of names, pseudo-
panels of three generations are created by grouping samples of individuals by first
name. Using G1, G2, and G3 to index generations one two and three, respectively,
we find a significant correlation between G1 and G3, controlling for G2. We also find
differences in this correlation by gender, suggesting that the process by which income
was transferred from fathers to daughters was not the same as the process by which
it was transferred from fathers to sons.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Women’s Income and Marriage Markets
in the United States: Evidence from the
Civil War Pension
1.1 Introduction
Marriage markets in the United States changed substantially over the course of the
19th century. The average female age at first marriage rose from roughly 20 during
the colonial period to a peak of 23.6 in 1890 (Haines 1996). While aggregate trends in
marriage market outcomes are well documented for this period, a virtual absence of
micro-level data following women through marriage makes it difficult to account for
these patterns. In particular, the factors affecting women’s decisions about when and
whom to marry are not well understood. A number of explanations for the observed
patterns have been proposed, including declining land availability, which increased
the the cost of establishing new households,1 and falling male-to-female ratios,2 most
notably in the aftermath of the Civil War. Much less attention has been paid to
the role of women’s economic opportunities in altering the desirability of marriage
to women.3 This paper fills this gap in the literature by presenting new evidence
exploiting shocks to the income of Union Army widows. Through the compilation
1See for example Easterlin (1971; 1976) and Haines (1996).
2For example, see Haines (1996) and Hacker (2008).
3One recent study (Hacker 2008) includes this in a set of possible correlates of first marriage
and documents a correlation between the age at first marriage and labor force participation among
unmarried women in the 1860 census. However, this paper does not address the potential endogeneity
of female labor force participation to norms of marriage or marriage market conditions.
2of a novel database, this paper also helps to rectify the scarcity of data tracing 19th
century women through marriage.
The desirability of marriage to women is largely ignored in accounts of 19th cen-
tury marriage patterns. Economists model marital outcomes as the result of a balanc-
ing of costs and benefits; any factor affecting these costs and benefits may influence
women’s choices. If outside economic opportunities for women lower the net gains
from marriage, we would expect them to substitute away from marriage and toward
these alternatives.4 This channel is considered very important for the later decades
of the 20th century, which saw a simultaneous drop in marriage rates and explosion
of female labor market opportunities. Between 1970 and 1995, the fraction of women
ages 20-24 who had ever been marriage dropped from 64 to 34 percent (Blau Kahn
and Waldfogel 2000); at the same time, female labor force participation increased
from 49 to 72 percent, and the average female-male wage ratio rose from 0.56 to 0.72
(Blau 1998). While the 19th century did not see such a radical increase in opportuni-
ties for women, industrialization in the later part of the century facilitated women’s
work (Wanamaker 2012), as did the rise of the clerical sector beginning around 1890
(Goldin 1984).
In this paper, I offer evidence that women’s income had a causal effect on their
choices about marriage during the years immediately following the American Civil
War. Using data newly collected for this project, I assess the effect of Civil War
pension income on the behavior of Union Army widows in the marriage market. The
Civil War pension provides a rare setting for studying this behavior. Under the
General Law, passed on July 14, 1862, a woman was eligible to receive a pension if
her husband served honorably in the Union Army and died as a consequence of this
service; however, she lost her right to the pension if she remarried. As such, a pension
increased the value of remaining single, but it was not correlated with individual
4See Becker (1973; 1991) for a theoretical development of this argument.
3characteristics that affect marriage market outcomes, nor should it have rendered
women more attractive to potential mates. In other words the effect of pension
income on marital outcomes should work solely through women’s preferences.5
Such a natural experiment is especially useful because establishing that women’s
income has a causal effect marital outcomes is difficult. Simply documenting a corre-
lation between economic opportunities for women and delayed marriage is insufficient
because of the interrelatedness of decisions regarding career and family. For example,
both of the following explanations for such a correlation are plausible: women marry
later because they have better labor market opportunities; or, women invest more
in improving their labor market outcomes because norms of marriage have changed.6
Moreover, labor market opportunities for women can affect their behavior through
multiple channels: women may prefer market work to home production; at the same
time, the increased income these opportunities afford may render them more selec-
tive. A social assistance program that carries a marriage penalty directly isolates
this latter channel, which is akin to an income effect. Most recent examples of such
programs are age-based or means tested.7 During the period of focus of this study,
the Civil War pension is neither of these.
Providing evidence for any mechanism driving 19th century marriage patterns is
challenging because of data limitations. The first Census tabulations of marital status
by age and sex were not published until 1890 (Hacker 2008). Moreover, samples that
follow women through marriage during this period are all but impossible to construct
from census data: a primary tool for creating linked census samples is last names, and
all women changed their last names upon marriage. The creation of a novel database
5The argument is somewhat more subtle than this because a soldier’s children could also receive
a pension. I explain this in fuller detail in a later section.
6The latter story is consistent with the work of Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2006) on
the relationship between contraception and marriage and female labor supply.
7Rosensweig (1999); Baker, Hanna and Kantarevic (2004); Brien, Dickert-Conlin and Weaver
(2004).
4following women through marriage is an important contribution of this paper. This
database has the potential to provide insight into any number of questions about
women’s behavior in marriage markets during this period.
This paper seeks to determine the extent to which exogenous income shocks altered
the relative costs and benefits associated with marriage. To illustrate how such shocks
translate into observable outcomes, I use a theoretical model of search in the marriage
market. I show that, by subsidizing the search for mates, pensions allow women to be
more selective in their search process. Thus, pensions raise both the average time to
remarriage and average match quality, conditional on remarrying at all. I show that
the same predictions hold true in a comparison between women with accepted versus
pending pension claims; this is due to uncertainty about if and when a pending claim
will be approved. To assess the extent to which pensions caused women to delay
remarriage, I make use of variation in the timing of pension decisions, or pension
processing times. Because pension amounts were standardized, I argue that this is
the most appropriate source of variation to use. I estimate a proportional hazards
model of remarriage in which the rate of remarriage is allowed to shift at the moment a
pension is granted. As such, I estimate a treatment effect of transitioning from having
a pending claim to having an accepted claim. To evaluate the effect pensions had on
match quality, I use links to the 1870 and 1880 censuses, which allow me to observe
the characteristics of women’s second husbands. I compare women who remarry with
and without pensions along several plausible dimensions of match quality, including
the second husband’s occupational status and literacy.
One concern this paper addresses is the possible endogeneity of pension processing
times to marital outcomes. This is largely due to sample selection, which is generated
by the decision to apply for a pension. Women whose pensions take a long time to
process tend to be those with ambiguous claims, and those who choose to incur
5the cost of applying for a pension even though their claims are ambiguous may be
systematically different from those who apply with straightforward claims. To address
this concern in my analysis of the relationship between pensions and the timing of
remarriage, I exploit the fact that my treatment variable is a duration variable, which
provides more information than is available in a standard cross-sectional setting. As
I explain in a later section, variation in observables and the relationship between
the hazard rates of pension receipt and remarriage provide sufficient information to
correct for correlated unobserved heterogeneity in these two risks (Abbring and Van
den Berg 2003; 2005). As an additional test, I estimate a linear version of this
model using two stage least squares. My instrument for pension processing time is
a measure of surname spelling homogeneity, calculated as the dispersion of unique
spellings within phonetic surname groups in the censuses of 1860, 1870 and 1880.
This generates variation in the difficulty of proving a soldier’s identity, which altered
the amount of time it took for a claim to be granted.
While I do not find conclusive evidence that pensions affected match quality, I do
find a significant effect of pensions on the timing of remarriage. Specifically, I find
that receiving a pension caused the rate of remarriage to drop by 40 percent, implying
an increase in the median time to remarriage of approximately three years. This is
especially striking because of the size of the pension. At eight dollars per month, the
pension was less than half the monthly income of a typical farm laborer in 1870, so
it was hardly enough to comfortably support a family. This finding lends credence to
the idea that the incremental changes in female labor market opportunities seen in
the 19th century may have contributed to the aggregate changes in marriage patterns
that occurred during this period. In addition to offering new information about the
way 19th century marriage markets worked, these results shed light on the behavior
we observe during the 20th century. In particular, they suggest that the substitution
6of economic opportunities for marriage is not an entirely new behavior brought about
by changing social norms.
1.2 Marriage and Women’s Income in Historical Context
While the literature on marriage patterns in the United States before 1890 is small
(Hacker 2008), it provides a broad picture of trends since the Colonial period. Haines
(1996) shows an increase in the female age at first marriage up to about 1890. Fitch
and Ruggles (2000) also find an increase in the female age at first marriage between
1850 and 1880; however, this increase is quite small, and seems to be concentrated in
the years following the Civil War. It is well established that, during the last years of
the 19th century, the age at first marriage began to fall, for men but more substantially
for women, and it continued to decline until the middle of the 20th century.8 Since
the 1970s, the age at first marriage for women has been steadily increasing (Blau,
Kahn and Waldfogel 2000).
Most explanations for 19th century trends in marriage focus on opportunities
rather than preferences for marriage. In contrast to Western Europe, where “couples
often delayed marriage until the prospective bridegroom inherited the family farm”
(Fitch and Ruggles 2000, p. 62), land in the United States was cheap and abundant
and did not pose an impediment to early marriage. However, as land became increas-
ingly settled, marriage patterns started to more closely resemble those in Europe.
As farmland grew scarcer and more expensive, “men were forced either to postpone
marriage, working as farmhands or manual laborers until they had saved up enough
money to set up their own farms, or to migrate to the western frontier” (Hacker 2008,
p. 312). Easterlin (1976) also links the closing of the frontier to fertility control
within marriage.9 As international and internal migration patterns changed over the
8See Fitch and Ruggles (2000) and Haines (1996), for example.
9For further elaborations of this argument, see Haines (1996), Easterlin (1971), Haines and
7course of the 19th century, declining male-to-female ratios likely contributed to the
rising age at first marriage among women (Haines 1996; Hacker 2008). This would
have been especially true in the years immediately following the Civil War.10
A small number of studies link women’s economic opportunities to delayed mar-
riage before the 20th century. Hacker (2008) offers evidence from the 1860 census that
women tended to marry later in areas in which economic opportunities for women
were greater; this is measured by local unmarried female labor force participation.
In a somewhat related study, Wanamaker (2012) links industrialization to declining
fertility in the 19th century, with a focus on fertility within marriage. Goldin (1995)
indirectly links economic opportunities to delayed marriage by noting a tendency for
women’s education and marriage to be mutually exclusive. She describes a “stark set
of alternatives between career and family” (p. 1) for women born at the end of the
19th century, noting that approximately half of college-educated women graduating
in 1910 were childless. While this references a somewhat later period, women’s col-
leges in the late 19th century were similarly labeled “spinster factories” (Monahan
1951, p. 242). Some historical writing notes a tendency for women to delay or forgo
marriage in the presence of favorable alternatives. Paraphrasing a critical 1871 ac-
count of this behavior, Calhoun (1919) writes that “the opening sphere for women’s
talents is rendering marriage less popular for women; they are reluctant to marry
a poor man; education inclines toward celibacy rather than marriage with poverty”
(p. 205). Overall, the economic literature on 19th century marriage patterns is quite
small. Moreover, data limitations severely limit its ability to provide evidence in
support of the various drivers of these patterns.
Investigations into modern marriage markets place much more stock in the role
of women’s income in altering their behavior. There is a well developed theoretical
Hacker (2006).
10See Abramitzky, Delavande and Vasconcelos (2011) for an analysis of the effect of sex ratios on
assortative matching in post-WWI France.
8literature about this mechanism. In Becker’s transferable utility model (1973, 1991),
marriage generates utility by allowing couples to exploit increasing returns through
division of labor, or by allowing both parties to consume collective goods such as
children. A marriage will occur if marital output exceeds the sum of the output
that both partners produce while single. As the gains from marriage arise from
division of labor, married women will tend to specialize in home production as long
as their market wages are lower than those of men, which has typically been the
case. Thus, “an increase in the wage rate of women relative to men would tend to
decrease the incentive to marry” (Becker 1973, p 822). Weiss (1997) notes that if
labor market returns are higher for men than for women, high-earning women will
experience relatively smaller gains from marriage than low-earning women.
Another class of model that generates this relationship between female income and
marriage rates comes from search theory. If women’s labor income functions as an
alternative to marriage, it should raise the value of being single relative to the value
of being matched. If being single increases in value, women will require more valuable
matches in order to marry. Under random matching, such an increase in reservation
match quality will lower the probability that any given proposal of marriage will be
deemed suitable; thus, it will cause women to remain single longer. It will also raise
average match qualities conditional on marrying at all.11
Most of the empirical literature on the effect of female income on marriage rates
is descriptive, largely demonstrating a negative correlation between opportunities for
women and marriage rates.12 This type of exercise is subject to several biases. For
11See Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) for a survey of basic search models. See Weiss (1997)
for a review of search models applied to marriage markets. Gould and Paserman (2003) and Loughran
(2002) use a search framework to investigate the effect of wage inequality on marriage rates.
12Keeley (1977) finds that women with high wages tend to marry later, although men with high
wages tend to marry earlier. Ruggles (1997) argues that increasing female labor market opportunities
contributed to the rise in divorce rates during the twentieth century. Weiss and Willis (1997) find
that women with high earnings are more likely to divorce, while the opposite is true of men with
high earnings. Price-Bonham and Balswick (1980) argue that widows are less likely to remarry than
9one thing, income depends on human capital investment, which may be endogenous to
preferences for marriage. A paper that deals explicitly with this causality issue is Blau,
Kahn and Waldfogel (2000), who look at the effect of city-wide marriage and labor
market conditions on marriage rates. They find that better female labor markets
tend to decrease marriage rates, while better male labor markets tend to increase
them. Still, it is not clear from this analysis that female labor market opportunities
cause women’s choices about marriage to change: areas in which these opportunities
are greater may have different norms of marriage. A different approach is due to
Choo and Siow (2006), who propose a statistic to directly measure the net gain from
marriage for a given pair of male and female “types.”13 They attempt to quantify the
net benefit from marriage for men and women using data from the 1970 U.S. Census
and Vital Statistics. They find that the net benefit of marriage declined between 1970
and 1980 for both men and women, but more so for women. This is suggestive, as
opportunities in the labor market for women grew significantly during this decade.
Other work takes a similar approach to this paper, looking at the effect of marriage
penalties on the behavior of social assistance recipients. Rosensweig (1999) studies the
effect of the AFDC program on marriage and out-of-wedlock childbearing for young
women, and he finds that AFDC benefits tend to encourage fertility outside marriage.
Baker, Hanna and Kantarevic (2004) find a significant negative effect of marriage
penalties on remarriage, which they identify through the removal of marriage penalties
from the public pension system in Canada during the 1980s. Brien, Dickert-Conlin
and Weaver (2004) find that American widows and widowers delayed remarriage until
after the age of 60 in response to the marriage penalty built into Social Security before
divorced women, as are older and more educated women with fewer children. Bahr (1979) finds that
more affluent women are less likely to remarry after divorce. See also Waite and Spitze (1981) for
an investigation into determinants of female age at first marriage.
13This statistic is the ratio of the number of matches formed by these types to the geometric
mean of the number men and women of these types that remain single.
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1979.
1.3 Institutional Background: Widows and the Civil War
Pension Law
The original Civil War pension law, called the General Law, was passed on July 14,
1862. This act provided compensation for soldiers and the dependents of soldiers who
had fought honorably for the Union and who had been wounded in such a way that
they were unable to work. Over time, this pension system expanded into a form of
old-age security for Union Army veterans and their families. Pension expenditures
grew from $29 million in 1870 to $160 million by 1910, covering almost one million
veterans and their dependents (Linares 2001). It is generally considered America’s
first large-scale social assistance program (Skocpol 1993; 1995).
Eligibility for a widow’s pension under the General Law depended three main
criteria. A widow was entitled to a pension if she did not remarry, and if her husband
had served honorably in the Union army and died of a disease or injury sustained in
the service. The qualifying widow of a private in the Union Army was entitled to eight
dollars per month plus two dollars per minor child (under the age of 16) beginning
on July 25, 1866.14 To give a sense of the size of this income, a typical daily wage for
a common laborer in the north was approximately one dollar in 1860 and two dollars
in 1870; a farm worker would typically make 11to 15 dollars per month in 1860 and
18 to 20 dollars per month in 1870, which included room and board (Margo 2000).
The pension law was amended at various times. The most significant amendment
was the act of June 27, 1890, which changed the eligibility requirements for both
veterans and widows. Under this law, a widow could claim a pension if her husband
had served honorably for at least 90 days in the Union Army, regardless of how he
14Glasson (1900; 1918); Song (2000). Officers’ widows were entitled to a larger pension than
widows, but the UA data contains only privates.
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died. However, she had to demonstrate that she was “dependent upon her daily labor
for support” (Linares 2001). Under the act of July 14, 1862, widows permanently lost
their right to a pension if they remarried. However, later changes to the General Law
altered this somewhat. As of June 7, 1888, a widow who had remarried could apply
for a General Law pension in arrears, commencing on the date of her first husband’s
death and terminating on the date of her remarriage.15 On March 3, 1901, a widow
who was eligible under the General Law but had remarried was allowed to be restored
to the pension rolls after her new husband died, provided she had never divorced this
second husband, and she was needy. It became progressively easier for remarried
widows to be restored to the rolls through the 1920s (Glasson 1900).
1.3.1 Procedures for Filing for and Collecting Pensions
The process of applying for pensions was costly and time consuming. In contrast to
soldiers who filed pension claims, widows did not need to be examined by a surgeon;
however, they were required to provide a great deal of evidence in support their
claims. A widow had to appear before a court of record. If she lived more than
25 miles from a court of record, she could appear before a pension notary stationed
in her locality (Oliver 1917). Here, she would make her declaration, which involved
filling out a form in the presence of witnesses. The instructions attached to this form
outline the information and documents she was required to furnish:
She must prove the legality of her marriage, the death of her husband, and
that she is still a widow. She must also furnish the names and ages of her
children under sixteen years of age, at her husband’s decease, and the place
of their residence... The legality of the marriage may be ascertained by the
certificate of the clergyman who joined them in wedlock, or by the testimony of
respectable persons having knowledge of the fact, in default of Record evidence.
(Widow’s Certificate No. 8,336).
15ibid
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This evidence was mailed to the pension bureau in Washington, DC, where claims
were adjudicated. This adjudication process involved obtaining the soldier’s military
record from the war department. If a widow could not prove that she was legally
married to the soldier or that his death was a direct result of his military service, her
claim would be rejected.
In many instances, claimants hired attorneys to prosecute their claims. The qual-
ity of the attorney could have a dramatic effect on the speed with which a claim was
processed; there are ample instances of claims pending for years because of attorney
neglect, a problem well known to the pension board. The 1883 annual report of the
pension commissioner condemns the behavior of these pension lawyers:
There are certain ignorant, unscrupulous, and useless persons, whose only ob-
ject seems to be, first, to procure applications from soldiers, regardless of merit,
to be filed through them, and then, while acting simply as transmitters of the
papers, assiduously dun the claimant until the ten-dollar fee is secured, and
thereafter practically abandon the case (United States Pension Bureau 1883,
p. 16).
Pensions were disbursed from agencies, located in cities and towns across the
country. There were 33 such agencies in operation in 1863; by 1872, this had ex-
panded to 57.16 These agencies grew out of an existing infrastructure for distributing
military pensions, inherited from the much smaller pension system already in place.17
Payments were initially made semiannually, but this was increased to quarterly in
1870. Vouchers were drawn up and mailed from the pensioner’s local agency. Upon
receiving this voucher, the pensioner would fill it out and return it to the agency,
which would mail back a check drawn on the U.S. treasury (Oliver 1917, p. 30).
16United States Pension Bureau 1864 and 1873. The agencies were generally considered inefficient
and expensive (Oliver 1917; United States Pension Bureau 1883), and were reduced in number by
the end of the 1870s (United States Pension Bureau 1883).
17See Glasson 1900 and 1918 for details. These pensions were for veterans (and dependents) of
the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Mexican-American War.
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1.3.2 Minors’ Pensions
If a widow remarried, she lost her right to a pension. Entitlement to the pension
then passed to the soldier’s minor children, who were allowed to receive it until the
youngest turned sixteen.18 I have argued that pensions should only affect marital
outcomes through widows’ preferences: because they terminated upon remarriage,
pensions should not make widows more desirable in the marriage market. However, if
the widow’s children were entitled to the pension when she remarried, she would, in
a sense, continue to receive it. This means that she would be bringing an additional
income stream into her new marriage, which might change the profile of matches
available to her.
While the soldier’s children were collectively entitled to the same monthly pension
as the widow, there is variation in minors’ pensions that is distinct from widows’
pensions. This means that the effect minors’ pensions had on widows’ outcomes
can be controlled for in the empirical analysis. This independent variation is due
to several features of the pension law. First of all, minors’ pensions terminated
when the youngest child reached the age of sixteen; therefore, the lifetime value of
these pensions was significantly lower than that of a widow’s pension. There was
an additional cost to obtaining a minor’s pension: the children (or their guardian)
needed to file a separate application, which took time to process. They also needed
to obtain proof of their ages and legitimacy, as well proof that their mother was no
longer eligible for the pension due to remarriage or death.
Finally, there were restrictions on the consumption of a minor’s pension. These
pensions were intended to be spent only on children’s maintenance and schooling.
Funds were paid directly to guardians, not to the children themselves; proof of
guardianship had to be provided “under seal of the Court from which their appoint-
18One pension could be issued to all the soldier’s children, which they would share.
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ment is obtained” (Widow’s Certificate No. 8,336). In some cases, the guardian was
the widow or her new husband; in others, it was a third party. Even if the guardian
was the widow or her second husband, there were steps taken to ensure that the
pension was spent on the children and not on the guardian’s consumption. In par-
ticular, the guardian had to account for the expenditure of the children’s property at
court. This requirement was laid out explicitly in many guardianship documents and
in some cases codified in law. For example, a case from Michigan requires “a true
account if the property of said ward in your hands” to be provided to the Probate
Office “within one year from this date [December 10, 1867]” (Widow’s Certificate
No. 73,022). The law pertaining to guardianship in New York state required such
an “inventory and account” annually (Legislature of New York 1837). In order to
secure the guardian’s obligations to his wards, he would post a bond with the county
probate court. The pension cited above notes that the guardian rendered “a Bond
with good and sufficient security to be approved by our said County Judge... in the
penal sum of nine hundred” (Widow’s Certificate No. 73,022). Another pension file
includes proof of guardianship that describes a bond “in the penalty of fifteen hundred
dollars conditional that the said [guardian] should faithfully, in all things, discharge
the duties of a guardian” (Widow’s Certificate No. 35,292).
Certainly, minors’ pensions would have affected widows’ outcomes, largely by
rendering children less of a detriment in the marriage market. Potential husbands may
have been more likely to propose to a woman with young children if these children
were self-supporting. However, variation in minors’ pensions that is independent
of widows’ pensions allows me to control for this effect in the empirical analysis.
Specifically, I can control for potential minors’ pensions using information on the
number and ages of each widow’s children.
15
1.3.3 Fraud
An obvious concern with using information about marital status from pension records
is accuracy. Widows had a clear incentive to hide remarriages from the pension board,
since disclosing this information would result in loss of pension. The incentive to
fabricate marriages to veterans also existed. As the 1872 annual report of the pension
commissioner remarks, “So long as pensions are to be granted upon evidence which
(except record evidence) is purely ex parte, so long frauds will continue to exist”
(United States Pension Bureau 1872, p. 13). The pension bureau was especially
concerned about widows’ claims: “The evidence to sustain a widow’s or dependent’s
case is purely ex parte. As a result of this, a very considerable percentage of those
cases are wrongfully established” (United States Pension Bureau 1872, p. 13).
If the pension authorities suspected a fraud, they would send a special examiner to
the widow’s place of residence to conduct an investigation. If found guilty of fraud,
the widow lost her pension. Fraud was usually reported by either the postmaster
who oversaw the delivery of pension vouchers and checks, or by members of the
pensioner’s community. There are a handful of examples in my sample of both sources
reporting frauds19. However, notwithstanding the pension bureau’s concerns about
19A letter of instruction to a special examiner in the case of Catherine Matthews describes
allegations of remarriage by the postmaster of Malone, New York. The examiner is instructed
to ascertain “whether the pensioner, by regular ceremony, by cohabitation, or by any other manner
has performed such an act as will constitute marriage (re-marriage) under the laws of New York”
(Widow’s Certificate No. 6,916). Another example of fraud is the case of Maria van Buren, whose
remarriage to Frank Stoffer is reported to the pension board by a close acquaintance. An excerpt
from the examiner’s report reads, “Stoffer had in his possession several letters, written in the same
chirography, with the one hereto attached, none having a signature, all about equally dirty, but
differing vastly in tone and purpose. The first a threatening message, demanding that she return to
him by 7 o’clock and at least bid him farewell ‘like a lady,’ or he would have her in the penitentiary
immediately. The next, breathing undying attachment of enormous dimensions, and asking her
forgiveness for having ‘told on her’. The third a sarcastic letter to Stoffer, and the fourth a letter of
farewell and filled with threats of vengeance for her rejection of his ‘ardent heart.’ Mrs Van Buren
acknowledged that she was living wtih Stoffer, and had done so ‘off and on when she felt like it’,
but denied that she had married him, denied that he is Van Buren, who is now, she remarked, if
not in heaven, certainly not on earth; denied that she intended to run away and professed several
times an unusually strong desire to be arrested. I was, of course, satisfied that the case was not one
16
fraud, there is little evidence that hidden remarriages were a frequent occurrence.
Women receiving pensions regularly interacted with the pension board throughout
their lives; yet, in only about 15 out of the 500 cases analyzed in this study is there
any indication of investigation into pension fraud. Moreover, only a few of these cases
resulted in the widow being stripped of her pension. Still, to address concerns about
fraud, I check marital status using links to the federal censuses of 1870 and 1880.
Unless a large number of women were engaged in an elaborate fraud involving hiding
second husbands from census enumerators, hidden remarriages or cohabitation do not
appear to pose a significant problem.
1.4 Theoretical model
The aim of this paper is to assess the effect of an independent income source on
women’s choices about marriage. In this section, I describe a theoretical model to
characterize the way in which such an income source should affect observable out-
comes by altering the relative gains women perceived from marriage. A Civil War
pension is income that a woman earns while she remains single but loses upon re-
marriage. As such, it is analogous to unemployment benefits in a search model of
the labor market.20 Thus, a simple search model of the marriage market is a natural
framework for analyzing this question. I restrict the analysis to the female side of the
market, which implicitly assumes that these pensions do not have general equilibrium
effects on marriage market conditions. This is justified if the number of pensioners is
relatively small.21
which I was authorized to further investigate without direct instruction” (Widow’s Certificate No.
23,529). She was ultimately removed from the pension rolls because of remarriage, demonstrated by
“cohabitation and recognition” (Widow’s Certificate No. 23,529).
20See Rogerson, Shimer and Wright 2005 for a review.
21In fact, the number of pensioners was relatively small. There were just over 100,000 widows
and other dependents on the pension rolls in 1872 (United States Pension Bureau 1872), and the
number of dependents on the General Law pension rolls peaked in the early 1870s (Linares 2001).
In 1870, the number of single women over the age of 17 was on the order of four million (Ruggles
17
The model is set up as follows. Unmarried women periodically receive proposals of
marriage. A match generates value for the woman, and she must determine whether
or not this exceeds the value she derives from remaining single. The value of staying
unattached incorporates whatever flow utility she gets, as well as an “option value” of
waiting for a potentially better match. If pension income raises the value of remaining
single, this will raise the minimum match quality a woman will require in order to
accept a proposal of marriage. An increase in this reservation match quality lowers
the probability that a given match will be accepted, which will tend to increase the
time spent searching. And, it will raise the average quality of a match, conditional on
being matched at all. Simply put, if a woman is able to better support herself while
single, she will be willing to wait longer for a better match.
In this model, I endogenize the frequency of marriage proposals. The effort women
spend on search in the marriage market affects their outcomes: the more effort women
allocate to search, the more frequently they receive proposals of marriage. However,
search is costly. Because pensions raise the value of being single, women with pensions
will tend to allocate less effort to the search process. This can be interpreted as an
income effect: women “spend” a portion of this additional value on mitigating search
costs.
Suppose there are two types of single women: those who receive a pension (indexed
by P) and those who do not (indexed by N).22 Married women are indexed by M.
Assume for simplicity that there is no divorce.23 A marriage generates flow utility θ,
et all 2010), putting the fraction of unmarried women on the pension rolls at no more than two or
three percent.
22For the purposes of the model, I am assuming that women with and without pensions are
otherwise identical.
23Allowing divorce does not qualitatively change the implications of the model. In any case,
divorce was relatively uncommon. Preston and McDonald (1979) estimate that around six percent
of marriages ended in divorce during the 1870s, compared to more than twenty percent in the 1950s.
Work by Cvrcek (2009) demonstrates that this underestimates the true extent of marital separation:
he estimates that ten to fifteen percent of marriages contracted during this period were disrupted,
which is still a clear minority of marriages.
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which is drawn from a distribution F (θ), and discounting occurs at a rate r. Each
state, married or single, is associated with a lifetime expected value, V. For all women,
the value of being in a marriage with match quality θ is given by:
rV M = θ
In words, this is the present discounted value of receiving utility θ forever. The
value of being single is different for pensioned and unpensioned women. Suppose
remaining single generates a flow utility s, and women with pensions receive additional
utility p. Marriage proposals have a poisson arrival rate α, which depends on search
effort. Specifically, it costs a widow c(α) in utility to obtain a rate of proposals α.
I assume that costs are increasing and convex in α, so c′(α) > 0 and c′′(α) > 0.24
Then, the value to a pensioned woman of remaining single with proposal rate α∗P can
be written
rV P = s+ p− c(α∗P ) + α∗PE[max{V M − V P , 0}] (1.1)
This is composed of two elements: the instantaneous utility a woman receives
(s + p − c(α∗P )) and a term that reflects additional value, over and above the value
of remaining single, from anticipated future proposals of marriage. It is a standard
result that these unmarried women will have a reservation match quality, θP , which
means they will accept any match carrying quality θ ≥ θP . This has the property
that V M(θP ) = V
P = θP/r. In other words, the reservation match quality is such
that the woman is indifferent between remaining single and accepting the match.
Substituting this into (1), and re-writing the expectation as an integral, we get the
24This standard assumption follows Mortenson (1986). It merely means that the marginal cost
of search is increasing.
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following equation that implicitly defines this reservation match quality:
θP = s+ p− c(α∗P ) +
α∗P
r
∞∫
θP
(θ − θP )dF (θ)
Women will choose α∗P that maximizes the value of being unmarried. The maximizing
level α∗P will solve the following first order condition:
25
rc′(α∗P ) =
∞∫
θP
(θ − θP )dF (θ)
Similarly, for women who do not receive pensions, the reservation match quality is
θN = s− c(α∗N) +
α∗N
r
∞∫
θN
(θ − θN)dF (θ)
The optimal α∗N is defined similarly to α
∗
P . Notice that α
∗
i , i ∈ {P,N}, does not
depend directly on p. Instead, it depends on θi, which in turn depends on p. It is
straightforward to show that θP is increasing and α
∗
P is decreasing in p;
26 therefore,
θP > θN and α
∗
P < α
∗
N . In other words, women with pensions should be more selective
and should spend less effort on search in the marriage market.
How are these differences manifested in observable outcomes? First, we can derive
the rate of remarriage, which depends on both reservation match qualities and search
effort. For a woman of type i ∈ {P,N}, the rate of exit from widowhood into
marriage (Hi), or probability of remarrying at a given point in time conditional on
staying single until then, can be written as
Hi = α
∗
i (1− F (θi))
This can be interpreted as the probability of both receiving a marriage proposal and
25See Mortenson (1986).
26See Mortenson (1986) or Rogerson Shimer and Wright (2005)
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accepting it. Then, because θP > θN and α
∗
P < α
∗
N , it follows that HP < HN . This
means that the average time spent as a widow will be greater for women with pensions
than without. Additionally, we have
E[θ|θ ≥ θP ] > E[θ|θ ≥ θN ]
Women receiving a pension have higher expected match qualities, conditional on being
matched. This is simply because the minimum θ for women with pensions is higher.
In the empirical section of this paper, I will find it useful to specify a third group of
women: those with a pending pension application. Suppose that, during an interval
∆, the (endogenous) probability of a woman with a pending claim receiving a proposal
of marriage is ∆α˜∗, and the probability of having a claim decided is ∆λ.27 The
probability that the decision will be favorable is given by pi. Then, the value of being
a widow with a pending pension claim can be written:
rV˜ = s− c(α˜∗) + α˜∗
(
E[max(V M − V˜ , 0)]
)
+ λ
(
piV P + (1− pi)V N − V˜
)
(1.2)
See appendix A for proof. Again, this is composed of three parts: the flow utility
while single, additional value from future marriage proposals, and additional value
from future pension rulings. Because V M is strictly increasing in θ, the right hand
side of this equation is also strictly increasing in θ. This implies that there exists a
reservation match quality θ˜ for women with pending pension applications. Then, we
have the following equation that implicitly defines this reservation match quality:
θ˜ = s− c(α˜∗) + α˜
∗
r
∞∫
θ˜
(θ − θ˜)dF (θ) + λ
r
(
piθP + (1− pi)θN − θ˜
)
(1.3)
The optimal α˜∗ will resemble that of the other two groups.
27This set-up follows Rogerson Shimer and Wright (2005).
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Proposition 1: For pi ∈ (0, 1], θN < θ˜ < θP and α∗N > α˜∗ > α∗P .
Proof: See appendix A. The intuition behind this is simple. Women with pending
claims should have higher reservation match qualities than women receiving no pen-
sion with certainty because of the possibility of future pension income. However,
they should have lower reservation match qualities than women whose claims have
already been approved because of discounting and the possibility that the pending
claim will be rejected. Again, the “income effect” coming from differences in the value
of singlehood for these three types will generate differences in optimal search effort.
1.5 Data
1.5.1 Pension and Military Records
The data used in this paper comes from three main sources, two of which are newly col-
lected from primary sources. The first data source is the Union Army (UA) database
created by the Center for Population Economics (CPE) at the University of Chicago.28
I have chosen a random sample of 500 women who were married to soldiers in the
UA database. Useful for this study, this database provides information about sol-
diers’ families, including when, where, and to whom they were married, as well as
the birth dates and names of their children. I use this information to identify women
that meet two important conditions. First, I restrict my attention to women wid-
28These data were collected as part of the project Early Indicators of Later Work Levels, Disease,
and Death, sponsored by the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation
(Federal grant number P01 AG10120; see Fogel 2000). The data are drawn from three principal
sources: the military, pension and medical records are compiled from sources at the National Archives
including military service records and Civil War pension records; data from the Surgeons Certificates
contain detailed information about veterans health status, which was used to determine pension
eligibility; further socioeconomic information is gathered by linking veterans to the Federal Censuses
of 1850, 1860, 1900 and 1910. These data have primarily been used to study health and aging in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries. See for example Costa 1997, 1995, 1993; Fogel 2004; Eli 2010.
They have also been used to analyze group dynamics in military settings (Costa and Kahn 2003,
2008). The data contain information about every soldier who enlisted in 303 randomly sampled
companies of white volunteer infantry regiments. The database contains 39,341 observations and
3,230 variables (Fogel et al. 2000).
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owed by 1880. This is because I expect such women to be most representative of the
unmarried female population; they will be relatively young and thus more plausible
marriage candidates.29 I choose 1880 as a cutoff because it facilitates the linking of
my observations to the 1880 census.30
The second restriction is that the widow had to apply for a pension within five
years of her first husband’s death. This restriction is intended to minimize sample
selection bias due to limited data availability. Ideally, one would observe the widows of
all soldiers in the UA database. However, because of the nature of this data source,
the availability of spousal information depends on actions taken by subjects. For
soldiers who died before 1880, all such information comes from dependents’ pension
applications, the vast majority of which are widows’ applications. As such, it is
extremely rare to know about widows who do not file for a pension at some point in
their lives.31 Women who first apply for a pension, say, ten years after widowhood
will be those who had not applied earlier and had not remarried during those ten
years. This will be a highly selected sample of all widows who did not file for a
pension before ten years had elapsed. Given that my sample is necessarily restricted
to applicants, there is a certain amount of selection that is unavoidable; however, I
expect including late applicants to exacerbate this problem.
29Another consideration has to do with later amendments to the pension law. Under the General
Law, the only requirement for pension eligibility was that a woman’s husband served honorably in
the Union Army and died from an injury or disease contracted in the service. However, following the
act of June 27, 1890, a widow could receive a pension regardless of how her husband died, provided
she could prove financial need. I expect financial need to be correlated with marital outcomes, more
so than the details of a widow’s first husbands death. So, it is beneficial to restrict the sample to
women who could only have applied for a pension under the General Law, at least during the years
immediately after widowhood.
30I cannot link widows to the 1890 census, because these manuscripts were lost in a fire. Linking
to the 1900 census is less useful, as most Civil War widows were well past the age at which they
could reasonably expect to remarry by 1900. The importance of census links is described later in
this section.
31Soldiers on the pension in 1898 were required to inform the pension bureau of the name of their
spouse and children. Before 1898, it is possible to have spousal information about a soldier if his
widow never filed a claim but his mother or children did; however, this is quite rare.
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The majority of the information I use in this paper comes from data that I collected
from the Civil War pension files at the National Archives in Washington, DC. The
CPE project focuses on soldiers’ outcomes, so the UA database does not contain
information about widows and children after the soldier died. After drawing my
sample, I collect information about widows’ pensions and marriage histories from
their pension files. See appendix B for details of the data collection process. Because
these data are compiled from historical records and not from surveys designed to
avoid selection bias, the source of every piece of information is important. With this
in mind, I will explain in detail where my most important variables come from.
The pension information is largely straightforward to collect, as any action a
widow took with respect to pensions is recorded in her correspondence with the
pension bureau. The case files contain all materials in a widow’s pension applica-
tion, which includes her application form and supporting evidence. If the widow was
granted a pension, her file will contain both a pension brief and a pension certifi-
cate, indicating the amount of the pension, the effective start date, the date at which
the pension was granted, the agency she was to be paid from, and the name of her
attorney.32 If the widow did not receive a pension, it is more difficult to determine
why. In later years, rejected claims contain a brief indicating the date of and reason
for rejection; however, during the years immediately following the Civil War, infor-
mation about rejection merely consists of a stamp somewhere in the file that reads
“rejected.” In such cases, it is impossible to determine the reason for or date of
rejection. Similarly, if a widow abandons her claim, we cannot be certain why or
when.
Information about a widow’s remarriage is slightly more complicated. Figure 1.1
32This information can be independently verified using the index to the pension files, which
indicates the number attached to the widow’s application and pension certificate. As these numbers
are issued chronologically, the approximate date of application and issuance of the certificate can be
inferred from these numbers.
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illustrates the possible pension and marital outcomes for women in my sample. The
first thing that occurs is the widow’s pension application. After applying, the widow
may remarry or die before her claim is adjudicated. Otherwise, she will receive a
decision from the pension board, which may be favorable or not. After receiving this
decision, the widow may or may not remarry. The outcome of a pension application is
always certain; however, in 20 percent of cases it is impossible to determine whether
or not the widow ever remarried.33
Table 1.1 lists possible sources of information about marital status and their fre-
quency by pension status. A widow’s remarriage is observable if her children file a
pension claim or she applies to be restored to the pension rolls under the act of March
3, 1901.34 A widow’s failure to remarry is observable if her death date is known, and
there is no indication of remarriage. If she is receiving a pension when she dies, her file
will often contain a card indicating that she has been dropped from the pension rolls
due to death. If not, this information may come from minors’ pension applications
or other correspondence with the pension board. Marital status is not observable if
the widow stops communicating with the pension board some time before her death.
Notice that the frequency of sources of information differs by pension status; this will
be important to the sensitivity analysis I do later on.
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics from the pension file data I have collected
(498 records in total). All women in this sample applied for a pension within five
years of widowhood and had not remarried before doing so. The average age when
widowed is 32; however, this ranges from 15 to 73. There are 397 women for whom
remarriage status is certain, meaning that I observe them either remarrying or dying
33After around 1880, the pension bureau started including records of pensioners being dropped
from the rolls for any reason. Women whose marital status is unknown are missing these records;
thus, if they were on the pension, it is likely that they died, remarried, or stopped collecting their
pensions some time before 1880.
34In some cases, a widow may have filed a claim for a pension she was not entitled to, or there may
have been some other correspondence with the pension board indicating that she had remarried.
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while single. There is no evidence that the other 101 women either remarried or died.
Of these 397 women, 55 percent remarried at some point in their lives, which implies
that the true fraction of women who ever remarried is between 44 and 64 percent. Of
the 425 women for whom this information is available, 18 percent remarried before
receiving a pension.35 On average, a woman who remarried did so 4.3 years after
her first husband’s death. This average is much lower among women who remarried
before getting a pension (2.4 years), which is unsurprising. It is, however, suggestive
that the average time that elapsed between receiving a pension and remarriage is 3.9
years, which is much greater than 2.4 years.
The average amount of time that elapsed between the soldier’s death and his
widow filing for a pension was eight months, and the median was less than four
months. The probability of ever having a General Law claim accepted was 0.86;
however, fewer than 80 percent of women were receiving a General Law pension
within five years of applying. The average processing time for a pension was more
than two years, although this is highly skewed: the median processing time is slightly
less than one year. Most women in my sample were first married during the 1850s and
were widowed during the war. These women tended to come from the Mid Atlantic
region (30 percent) or the East North Central region (41 percent). Very few come
from Southern or Western regions.
1.5.2 Census Links
I use information from the pension file data to link my observations to the federal
censuses of 1870 and 1880. These links are important because they provide informa-
tion about widows’ second marriages. In the pension file data, such information is
available in a minority of cases, which makes it difficult to evaluate the effect of pen-
35Even if I do not know whether or not a widow ever remarried, I may know that she did not
remarry with a pending claim if she communicated with the pension board subsequent to her claim
being granted.
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sion income on match quality. Another reason for linking widows to the census is that
it provides a check on the marriage information available in the pension data. For
one thing, these links allow independent verification of widows’ marital status, which
alleviates concerns about inaccuracies due to fraud. These links also help mitigate
concerns about missing data.
As explained above, although marital status is known in most instances, it is
unknown for 20 percent of my sample. A concern is that the availability of information
about marital status is not random, and this might bias my results. A remarried
widow must do one of two things to be identified in the pension data: she must have
young children who apply for a minor’s pension after she remarries; or, she must
survive long enough to apply for a pension under the act of March 3, 1901. Women
who do not remarry do not need to meet these restrictions in order to be observed.
Therefore, my sample of remarried widows may be younger and healthier than my
sample of widows who do not remarry, simply by virtue of the way the data are
collected. If the effect of the pension on marriage behavior depends on age or health,
this sample selection might bias my results.
Identifying widows with uncertain marital status through census links is a chal-
lenge: if a widow did remarry, her last name would have changed. I use an alternative
method for linking these ambiguous cases. The names and ages of children from the
widow’s first marriage are available in the pension data, so I can link these children
to the census; in principle, a child’s surname would not change if his or her mother
remarried.36 If I locate a child who is living with a married mother with a different
last name (but whose birth year and first name match the widow in my sample), I
assume that I have identified a remarried widow. See appendix B for further details.
Data collected this way will still favor women with young children; however, this will
36The availability of information about children does not impart additional bias, as all widows
were required to list minor children in their pension applications; thus, this information is available
for every widow who made a pension application.
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apply equally widows who have remarried and those who have not. These data may
generate other biases. For example, a remarried woman may be less likely to keep
her children living at home, so I might underestimate the fraction of widows who
remarry. Still, because the availability of these data does not depend on details of the
pension application process, they will be a useful complement to the pension data.
Table 1.3 presents statistics on the success rate of this procedure. The top panel
lists the fraction of widows who were linked to the 1870 and 1880 census, overall
and by marital status. The linkage rate is quite high overall, close to 60 percent in
both years. In 1870, the linkage rate is higher among widows who are known to have
remarried (69 percent) than it is among women who are known to have remained
unmarried (63 percent); in 1880, the linkage rate is higher among women known not
to have remarried (76 versus 68 percent). The fraction of widows with uncertain
marital status who were successfully linked through children from their first marriage
is much lower (18 to 27 percent); however, this partly reflects the fact that some
of these women are childless. Among women who may theoretically be linked this
way, 26 to 37 percent were located successfully.37 The vast majority of widows with
unknown marital status turned out to be unmarried: only one had remarried by 1880.
The bottom panel of table 1.3 contains the fraction of widows who were theoret-
ically “linkable” through children from their first marriage. This is to get a sense of
the effectiveness of my strategy for linking widows with unknown marital status. In
fact, a large number of widows, both married and unmarried, reside with children who
have kept their deceased father’s surname. In 1870, 88 percent of unmarried widows
and 52 percent of married widows live with such children. In 1880, these fractions
37One reason for the linkage rate for these women to fall below the linkage rate for women with
known marital status is that, for women with unknown marital status, I have little information on
place of residence in 1870 or 1880; these women have largely disappeared from the sample by this
time. Note that these linkage rates still compare favorably to other projects that create samples of
linked census data. See Ruggles et al (2010) and Ferrie (1996).
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are 80 and 44 percent, respectively. This decline in the fraction of women who are
linkable through children is likely caused by the increasing tendency for children to
leave home as they age. While at appears that linking widows through their children
does underrepresent those who have remarried, a significant fraction of such widows
can still be linked.
1.5.3 Representativeness
In order for a widow to appear in my sample, she must satisfy two conditions. First,
she must have been married to a Union Army soldier who died before 1880; second, she
must have filed an application for a pension. In this section, I investigate the extent
of the bias introduced by the decision to apply for a pension, which will be important
when considering what these results imply about all women, or even all Civil War
widows. A natural starting point is to establish the fraction of women widowed
before 1880 who ever made pension applications. Recall that spousal information
comes almost exclusively from widows’ pension applications, so I will treat making
an application and appearing in the pension data as interchangeable38.
To know for certain the fraction of women widowed by 1880 who made pension
applications, we need both a numerator and a denominator. More precisely, we need
three pieces of information: (i) the number of women widowed by 1880 who made
pension applications; (ii) the number of soldiers who died before 1880; and (iii), how
many of these soldiers were married. We know (i) but not (ii) or (iii). In order to
establish a lower bound estimate of the application rate among women widowed by
1880, it is necessary to make assumptions about missing data. Table 1.4 contains
some of these estimates. Out of a sample of 39,341, we know for certain that 7,953
soldiers died before 1880. Of these, we know that 3,102 were married because there
38As described earlier, spousal information before the early 1900s was collected through depen-
dents’ pension applications, so it was very unusual to have this information if no pension application
was submitted.
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is spousal information in the UA data; we also know that 714 were not married. If
the 7,953 soldiers whose death dates are known to be prior to 1880 constitute a fully
representative sample of all soldiers who died before 1880, it would be reasonable to
infer the application rate among women widowed by 1880 was at least 45 percent.39
However, these 7,953 soldiers are almost certainly not a representative sample
of soldiers who died by 1880, because knowledge of a soldier’s death date is highly
correlated with his widow making a pension application. To see this, notice that 95
percent of soldiers with missing death dates also have missing spousal information.
This is because information on death dates for soldiers who died prior to 1880 often
comes from widows’ pension applications. So, in order to establish a lower bound
on the fraction of widows who appear in the data, we must allow for the possibility
that some soldiers with missing death dates died before 1880. Depending on the
reference group and assumptions about the fraction of soldiers who were married, I
derive reasonable lower bounds that range from 17-46 percent.40
Using only soldiers who died during the war as a reference group provides a po-
tentially more reliable lower bound estimate of the true application rate. Information
about death dates of soldiers who died in the service can be obtained from sources
other than widows’ pension applications, such as military or hospital records. Thus,
it is more reasonable to treat these soldiers as a random sample of casualties, with
respect to widows’ pension applications. If we assume that the overall Union Army
casualty rate of 16 percent (Costa and Kahn 2008) prevailed in this sample, the lower
39This lower bound assumes that every soldier with missing spousal information was married.
40In calculations using soldiers dead by 1880 as the reference group, I assume that all soldiers
with missing death dates died before 1880, which is quite conservative. In the most conservative
calculation, I assume that all soldiers with missing marital status were married; in another, I use
an imputed marriage rate for these soldiers. This imputation is based on a regression of marital
status on age, state, and occupational class dummies using the 1860 one percent IPUMS sample.
The imputed marriage rate is the predicted fraction of UA soldiers who would have been married
in 1880 (the most conservative death date assumption for individuals with unknown death dates),
using the coefficients from the above regression.
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bound ranges from 28-46 percent, depending on assumptions about the marital status
of men with missing spousal information. Based on this calculation, a lower bound
application rate of about one half is reasonable.
While a large fraction of women widowed by 1880 made pension applications, it
seems likely that not every widow did so. The next question is: how did women who
made pension applications differ from those who did not? Establishing this is com-
plicated by the fact that women who never made pension applications do not appear
in the pension file data. However, the UA data contains links to the 1860 federal
census.41 Using these links, I infer the soldier’s marital status from the composition
of the household in which he resides.42 I compare soldiers who were married in 1860
and whose wives appear in the pension data with those whose wives do not appear.
I restrict the sample to men who died during the war, for reasons explained above.
Table 1.5 contains these results. Column (1) contains the mean of each variable
among wives who appear in the pension data, and column (2) contains the mean
among wives who do not. Column (3) presents the difference in means between these
two groups. Column (4) contains an OLS regression of an indicator for appearing
in the pension data on all of the variables in the table. These results provide strong
evidence for selection on the basis of marriage prospects or affluence. Women who
file pension claims tend to be older and to come from less wealthy households. Their
husbands are more likely to be illiterate. These husbands are more likely to hold
skilled blue collar occupations, such as craftsmen and skilled factory operatives, and
41These data strongly favor men whose wives appear in the pension data, as this information was
used to make the links. However, this is the only information I can provide here.
42I call household occupants “potential wives” if they are female, less than 15 years older or 30
years younger, and have the same last name as the soldier. This is somewhat more conservative
than the IPUMS procedure for imputing spousal relationships; this procedure uses 10 and 25 year
cutoffs, respectively (Ruggles et al 2010). If the soldier is a household head and the second household
member is a potential wife, I assume he is married. If he is not a household head, I infer marital
status from the relative position of potential wives and potential children in the household using
standard rules for imputing family interrelationships (see Ruggles et al 2010).
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are are less likely to be skilled professionals or proprietors. Notice that the regression
coefficient on the wife’s age is negative, while the coefficient on the soldier’s age is
positive and larger in magnitude. This reflects the high correlation between the ages
of husbands and wives, and can be interpreted to mean that women who were married
to older men were more likely to apply for a pension.43
These apparent differences between pension applicants and non-applicants have
no bearing on the internal validity of this study. However, they are important to keep
in mind when extrapolating the results to the general population. I will discuss this
further after presenting my empirical findings.
1.6 Pensions and the Timing of Remarriage
1.6.1 Empirical Framework
In this section, I describe my approach to evaluating the extent to which pension
income slowed the rate of remarriage among Civil War widows. This is a challenge
because pension amounts are standardized, so there is no variation in pension income
among pensioners. Moreover, it is not straightforward to compare women who had
pensions to those who did not, as I do not observe women who never make pension
applications. The are two possible sources of variation in pension income: the pension
board’s decision and the timing of this decision.
The pension board’s decision is not an ideal source of variation for a few reasons.
First, this variable is only defined for women who complete their claims. Recall from
figure 1.1 that at least twelve percent of my sample remarried while their claims were
pending. A simple comparison between women with accepted and rejected claims
will discard this potentially valuable information. Another issue is that rejections
take significantly longer to process than acceptances. It takes approximately five
43If husband’s age is omitted from the regression, the coefficient on wife’s age becomes positive
and highly significant.
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years longer to reach the “rejected” node in figure 1.1 than the “accepted” node.
Thus, my sample of rejected widows ought to look very different from the universe of
potentially rejected widows, as many of these are likely to have remarried before the
board’s decision was rendered. A final technical issue has to do with accuracy: it is
often unclear when or why a claim was rejected.
Because of these issues, I use variation in the timing of the pension board’s de-
cision, rather than the outcome, to estimate the effect of pensions on the timing
of remarriage. Specifically, I look for a treatment effect of having a pension claim
granted, or of transitioning from having a pending claim to an accepted claim. Recall
from section 4 that women with pending claims should behave differently from women
who have their pensions in hand, due to discounting and the possibility of rejection.
I estimate a proportional hazard model of both pensions and marriage, allowing the
rate of remarriage to shift at the moment a pension is granted. Variation in process-
ing times allows me to observe women with and without pensions at every point in
time, which allows me to estimate a hazard rate of remarriage that differs by pension
status.
Some of this variation is plausibly exogenous. For example, idiosyncrasies in
the postal service, clerical errors, or unexpectedly capricious behavior on the part of
pension attorneys certainly affected processing times in a random fashion. However, a
portion of the variation in processing times is likely endogenous to marital outcomes.
For example, women with poor marriage prospects may have been more invested in
getting a pension because they knew their alternatives were poor. So, those who
got pensions quickly may have tended to remarry slowly because of poor marriage
prospects, not because of a causal effect of the pension. Another concern is that
processing times are highly correlated with the quality of a pension claim: rejections
take significantly longer to process than acceptances.
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Why is this a threat to identification? If we accept that pension eligibility is
random, then the ambiguity of a claim should be similarly exogenous. However,
bias may be introduced by the decision to apply. Applying for a pension is costly:
a widow will choose to incur this cost if the benefit is great enough. The expected
benefit from applying is lower for a widow with an ambiguous claim, as the probability
of ever receiving a pension is low. Thus, women who apply with ambiguous claims
may be systematically different from women who apply with straightforward claims.
In particular, they may have worse alternatives, either financially or in the marriage
market. The direction of this bias on the timing of remarriage is unclear: women with
poor alternatives might receive fewer proposals per unit of search effort; however, they
might also be less selective.
To overcome these endogeneity problems, I use a method developed by Abbring
and Van den Berg (2003a). This is a novel approach to identifying treatment effects
in the presence of an endogenous treatment when both the treatment and outcome
are duration variables. The approach involves jointly estimating the hazard rates of
pensions and remarriage, allowing for correlation between the unobserved heterogene-
ity in these two risks. The hazard rate at time t refers to the probability of realizing
an outcome (pension or marriage) at t, conditional on not having realized it earlier.
The hazard rate of pension income is given by
θp(t|X, vp) = λp(t) exp(Xβp + vp) (1.4)
and the hazard rate of marriage is given by
θm(t|X, vm, tp) =
{
λm(t) exp(Xβm + vm) if t ≤ tp
λm(t) exp(Xβm + δ + vm) if t > tp
(1.5)
For each i ∈ {p,m}, λi is the baseline hazard function, which characterizes duration
dependence, and X is a matrix of explanatory variables that may shift the hazard
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rate. The term tp represents the time at which a pension is granted, and vi reflects
unobserved heterogeneity.
Allowing for duration dependence (λi(t)) and the effect of covariates (Xβi) is
crucial to the identification of δ. Duration dependence refers to the way in which
the hazard rate changes over time; for instance, whether marriage becomes more or
less likely as time passes. Failing to account for duration dependence will bias the
estimate of δ. For example, suppose there is negative duration dependence in the rate
of remarriage, so the probability of remarrying declines with time in the marriage
market. Then, women will appear to remarry at a slower rate upon receiving a
pension, simply because these women will have been in the marriage market longer.
Thus, we will overestimate δ. Failure to account for observables will bias the estimate
of δ to the extent that these are correlated with pension status. For example, suppose
the hazard rate of pension receipt increases with age, and the hazard rate of marriage
declines with age. If we do not control for age when estimating δ, the estimate will be
biased away from zero, as women who receive pensions quickly will tend to be older,
and these women will tend to remarry slowly.
Every concern I have just described applies to a standard proportional hazards
model. An additional issue that arises in this particular setting is the possibility
that vm and vp are correlated. For example, if vm and vp are negatively correlated,
the estimate of δ may be negative even if the true δ is zero. Correlated unobserved
heterogeneity generates bias in a similar fashion to omitted observable controls. If
women who get pensions quickly tend to have large vp, they will also tend to have
small vm, which means they are likely to take longer to remarry.
Abbring and Van den Berg (2003a; 2003b) show that this model is identified even
if vm and vp are correlated. Moreover, it is identified without exclusion restrictions
or assumptions about the functional form of either the baseline hazard or the joint
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distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms. The unobserved heterogeneity
directly affects the rate of treatment but not the precise timing of treatment. Put
another way, a high vp raises the probability of receiving a pension at time t; however,
there remains a stochastic element to which event, pension or no pension, actually
occurs at time t. The problem is disentangling this random assignment from the
non-random assignment.
To understand how this is possible, first notice that, in a simple proportional haz-
ards setting, the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is identified from variation
in observables. To see this, consider the rate of pension receipt. Suppose one woman
has a very good pension attorney (high Xβp), and a second woman has a poor pen-
sion attorney (low Xβp). Now, suppose these two women both take a long time to
receive a pension (large tp). We can infer from this that the probability that the first
woman has an ambiguous pension claim (low vp) is higher than it is for the second
woman. In general, the distribution of vp, conditional on t, depends on observables,
which allows its distribution to be pinned down.
How does this help us identify correlated unobserved heterogeneity in the rates of
remarriage and pension receipt? Using the same example, suppose that the quality
of pension attorney has no direct effect on the rate of remarriage, so women with
good and bad pension attorneys have the same Xβm.
44 This means that we should
not expect to see systematically different marital outcomes by the quality of pension
lawyer. However, recall that, conditional on t, the distribution of vp is not independent
of the quality of pension lawyer. So, if vm and vp are correlated, the distribution of vm
will similarly be dependent on pension lawyer quality. Say vm and vp are negatively
44This example is used for clarity and does not imply the necessity of an exclusion restriction
for identification. In general, as long as βm 6= βp and there is sufficient variation in the data, there
exists some X,X ′ such that Xβm = X ′βm but Xβp 6= X ′βp. This is all that is required. Also
notice that the values of βm, βp are identified using “early” parts of the sample, when vm and vp
are independent of observables. This dependency arises “later” in sample, due to selective sample
attrition.
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correlated, and recall that, fixing t, E(vp) is higher for women with bad lawyers than
it is for women with good lawyers. This means that, among women who are in the
sample at time t, those with good lawyers will tend to remarry fastest, because these
women tend to have higher vm. Similarly, if vm and vp are positively correlated,
women with bad lawyers will tend to remarry more quickly. In other words, different
joint distributions of vm and vp will be observationally distinct. Once the correlation
between vm and vp has been corrected for, the remaining difference between the
marriage rate before and after a pension is granted can be interpreted as a causal
effect of the pension.
I estimate this model by maximum likelihood. To explain the estimation process,
I define a series of functions that are elements of the likelihood function. The survival
function, or the probability of remaining a widow (m) or not having a pension (p) at
time t, is denoted Si(t), and it has the following form:
45
Si(t) = exp
(
−
t∫
t0
θi(s)ds
)
, i ∈ {m, p}
If t is a random variables denoting time an event occurs, its density is given by
fi(t) = θi(t)Si(t)
So, the likelihood of an event occurring at t depends on both the hazard function
and the survival function. For pensions, the survival function is straightforward to
define:46
Sp(t|X, vp) = exp
(
−
t∫
t0
λp(t) exp(Xβp + vp)
)
The survival function for marriage is somewhat more complicated, because it shifts
45See Lancaster (1990).
46This construction follows Abbring and van den Berg (2005), who apply this model to evaluating
the effect of unemployment insurance sanctions on the rate of transition to employment.
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at a point in time. The survival function before and after receiving a pension are
given by the following two equations, respectively:
Sm,1(t|X, vm) = exp
(
−
t∫
t0
λm(t) exp(Xβm + vm)
)
Sm,2(t|X, vm, tp) = Sm,1(tp|X, vm)× exp
(
−
t∫
tp
λm(t) exp(Xβm + δ + vm)
)
To understand the definition of Sm,2, consider the meaning of its two parts separately.
SuppressingX and vm, the first term reflects Pr(tm ≥ tp), and the second term reflects
Pr(tm ≥ t|tm ≥ tp).
There are four possible outcomes for women in the sample, which I index by
k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. A woman can remarry before she gets her pension (k = 1); she can
remarry after her claim is granted (k = 2); she can be censored before her claim is
granted, meaning that she dies or disappears from the sample (k = 3); or she can
be censored after her claim is granted (k = 4). Each of these events is associated
with a different likelihood. Conditional on her unobserved heterogeneity terms, the
likelihood contribution of woman i can be written as
Li(t) =

θm(t|X, vm, tp)Sm,1(t|X, vm)Sp(t|X, vp) if k = 1
θm(t|X, vm, tp)Sm,2(t|X, vm, tp)θp(tp|X, vp)Sp(t|X, vp) if k = 2
Sm,1(t|X, vm)Sp(t|X, vp) if k = 3
Sm,2(t|X, vm, tp)θp(tp|X, vp)Sp(tp|X, vp) if k = 4
To estimate this model, I make certain parametric assumptions about the baseline
hazard rate and the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms, vm and
vp. I attempt to make the least restrictive parametric assumptions possible. For
the baseline hazard, I use a piecewise constant function, where time is divided into
discrete “bins,” and λ(t) = λt takes on some unrestricted value for each of these bins.
I use bins of one year, with a single bin for the tail of the time distribution, extending
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from t = 8 until the last observation leaves the sample. Following eight years after
widowhood, first marriages and pensions occur with insufficient frequency to identify
hazard rates at finer intervals.
For the unobserved heterogeneity terms, I assume a discrete distribution in which
both vm and vp have two unrestricted mass points:
47 vm ∈ {vlowm , vhighm } and vp ∈
{vlowp , vhighp }. Thus, there are four possible combinations of vm and vp, each of which
is associated with a certain probability. The location of each of these mass points
and the probability of each combination of the two are estimated in the model. A
discrete distribution is considered the most flexible parametric assumption that can
be made about the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity terms, as it allows
any correlation between the two variables to be achieved; other assumptions, like
allowing unobserved heterogeneity terms to take on infinite values that follow a set
distribution, restrict these correlations.48 A discrete distribution with more than two
mass points is not feasible with the sample size I am working with.49
Intuitively, this particular about the distribution for vm and vp means that women
may be one of two “pension types” and one of two “marriage types.” Meaning, a
woman can be likely or unlikely to get a pension quickly, and she can be likely or
unlikely to remarry quickly. The main threat to identification is that “high” pension
types may tend to be “low” marriage types, and vice versa. If this is the case, then
even if pensions have no true effect on marriage rates, I might estimate such an effect
simply because women who remarry quickly also take longer to get their pensions.
Estimating a model that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity is complicated
because the heterogeneity is unobserved, which means that I cannot calculate the
correct likelihood contribution of each observation. To estimate the model, I use the
47This follows an application of this model by Abbring and Van den Berg (2005).
48Heckman and Singer (1984); Abbring and Van den Berg (2005); Van den Berg (1996).
49Notice that the number of parameters increases exponentially with each additional mass point
in the distribution of vm and vp, as any combination of these two variables must be allowed to occur.
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EM algorithm.50 This procedure does the following. I start with a vector of parame-
ters, φ0, which includes δ, αm, αp, βm, βp, v = (v
low
m , v
high
m , v
low
p , v
high
p ), and probability
weights, pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4), associated with each of the four unobserved heterogene-
ity “groups” my observations may fall into. Using these values, I construct a set of
weights for each observation:
δ0i,j =
pi0iL
0
ij∑4
k=1 pi
0
kL
0
kj
The letter j indexes the individual, and i indexes the unobserved heterogeneity group.
Given the data and parameter choices, this reflects the probability that individual j
falls into group i. I fix these weights, and then construct an expected log likelihood
function, which I maximize over φ to obtain φ1. Based on φ1, I construct a new set
of weights, δ1, and repeat the process to convergence.
1.6.2 Results
Before presenting estimates of the model described above, it is useful to get a sense of
what the hazard rates of remarriage and pension receipt look like. Figure 1.2 plots the
empirical hazard rate of both pensions and remarriage, estimated non-parametrically
using a kernel method.51 The top panel illustrates the rate of remarriage measured
before and after a pension is granted; the bottom panel illustrates the hazard rate of
pension decisions. Time is measured in years since widowhood; however, individuals
do not enter the sample until they apply for a pension. Notice that, for the first
five years, the rate of remarriage for women who have not yet received a pension
lies uniformly above that of women who have pensions. After five years, the two
50This is frequently used procedure, which was developed to deal with missing data. See Heckman
and Singer (1984) and Lancaster (1990).
51This is done using the STS package in STATA. For ease of comparison, I truncate this graph at
t = 10. This is because it becomes impossible to estimate the rate of remarriage for women without
pensions for later periods, as there are insufficient observations.
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lines are very close together. This may indicate that the pension only lowers the
rate of remarriage in the short run; however, it may also reflect differences in the
characteristics of pensioned and unpensioned women in later years. Women who are
still in the sample without pensions, say, ten years after widowhood are those who are
still trying, unsuccessfully, to get a pension after ten years. These women may have
very different characteristics, either observable or unobservable, than women who are
in the sample without pensions only a year or two after widowhood. It is also worth
mentioning that the sample of women without pensions becomes very small as time
passes. For instance, there are only 27 such women in the sample more than five
years after widowhood.
Table 1.6 contains parameter estimates for the model described above, with the
estimated effect of covariates on the rate of pension receipt listed next to their esti-
mated effect on the rate of remarriage. In column (1), I estimate the model with no
covariates or correction for correlated unobserved heterogeneity. In this specification,
the estimated effect of the pension is negative, but it is not significantly different
from zero. In column (2), I add covariates to the hazard rate of both risks, which
significantly increases the magnitude of the estimate, to -0.49 (0.19). This suggests
that selection on observables biases this effect toward zero. Recall that this bias
could go either way. Women who experience long processing times are likely to have
ambiguous claims, and women who apply with ambiguous claims may be different
from those who apply with straightforward claims. If these women are less wealthy,
for example, it may be more difficult for them to receive marriage propsals; however,
they may also be less selective. These results suggest that observable characteristics
of women with ambiguous claims tend to slow the rate of remarriage, leading to an
underestimate of the effect of the pension when these controls are omitted.
In column (3), I introduce the possibility of correlated unobserved heterogeneity
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in the rates of pension receipt and remarriage. At -0.54 (0.22), the estimated effect
of the pension changes little from the previous specification, suggesting that much
of the selection problem is captured by the controls for covariates. The estimate
from the full model can be interpreted to mean that receiving a pension lowered the
hazard rate of remarriage by approximately 40%.52 This estimate implies that, for a
woman with median characteristics, immediately granting her a pension would raise
her median time to remarriage from 4.7 to 7.8 years, an increase of more than three
years.53 This timing increase is consistent with the summary statistics from table 1.2,
although the implied medians are substantially higher than they are in this table, as
they should be. These summary statistics are calculated using women who actually
remarry. The medians implied by the model estimates incorporate information from
women who never remarry, which will tend to raise them substantially.
Other variables affect the rate of remarriage in plausible ways. Older women tend
to remarry more slowly, as do women with more children. The year of widowhood
has a negative effect on the rate of remarriage, which may reflect sample selection, as
claims become more ambiguous the farther removed is the soldier’s death from the
war. Characteristics of the widow’s first husband have some effect on marriage rates:
women who are married to older and shorter men tend to remarry more quickly. This
latter finding could reflect women’s reservation match qualities, especially if height
is positively correlated with socioeconomic status. The county male to female ratio
speeds up remarriage quite significantly, which is to be expected. The only variable
that significantly affects the hazard rate of pension income is year of widowhood,
which presumably reflects the fact that claims become more ambiguous with distance
52This comes from the fact that θPEN/θNOPEN = exp(−0.54) = 0.58, so θPEN−θNOPEN
θNOPEN
= −0.42.
53For women with pensions, this calculation is done by solving the following for tmed:
0.5 = Pr(t ≥ tmed) = S2(tmed|X, vm)
For women without pensions, I do the same calculation, replacing S2 with S1. For X, I use median
characteristics and mean regions; I integrate over vm and vp using estimates from the model.
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from the war. There are also regional differences: claims from the New England seem
to be processed significantly faster than claims from the Mid-Atlantic, the Midwest
or the South.
The parameters of λm(t) and λp(t) are also listed in table 1.6, with λm and λp
on the interval [0,1) both normalized to 1. These estimates suggest non-monotonic
duration dependence in both risks. In both cases, the hazard rate initially increases
and then falls. One can imagine plausible explanations for this pattern in the hazard
rate of marriage. The rate of remarriage may rise in the short run if women lower
their reservation match qualities as time passes, either due to revised expectations
or changing preferences for matching. However, this rate is likely to fall eventually if
part of what makes women desirable in the marriage market is fertility. In the case
of pensions, this pattern may reflect changes in the composition of claims as time
passes. Among very straightforward claims, the probability of receiving a pension is
likely to increase with processing time. However, at some point, all straightforward
claims will have been processed, leaving only ambiguous ones. The probability of ever
getting a pension with an ambiguous claim is low.
The unobserved heterogeneity terms are quite imprecisely estimated. Notice that
the two estimated values of vp are very close to one another, and the probability
weights attached to each unobserved heterogeneity group have very large standard
errors. This may indicate that unobserved heterogeneity in the rate of pension receipt
is well controlled for by covariates and the duration dependence function, leaving few
systematic unobserved differences.
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1.7 Sensitivity Analysis
1.7.1 Instrumental Variables Analysis
The hazard model described in section 6 is the most exact representation of the
relationship between the receipt of pensions and the rate of remarriage. However, a
concern is that the estimates may be sensitive to some of the parametric assumptions
made in estimation. So, as a complement to the analysis in section 6, I include a
linear analysis of the relationship between pensions and the timing of remarriage.
Using a series of time frames ranging from one to five years (τ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}),
I create an indicator variable equal to one if a widow had received a pension within
the time frame (I(tp ≤ τ)) and an indicator equal to one if she had remarried within
the time frame (I(tm ≤ τ)). I estimate the following by OLS:
I(tm ≤ τ) = α + βI(tp ≤ τ) +Xγ + u
The matrix X includes all controls used in section 6. I expect to find β < 0. Here,
the endogeneity problem is quite severe: many women who were not receiving pen-
sions within, say, three years of applying had been denied pensions because they had
remarried. I use instrumental variables to circumvent this problem.
Details of the application and review process provide potentially valid instruments
for pension income.54 The instrument that I use is based on the spelling of last names.
54This approach is similar in spirit to Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2011) who use spending
allowances of the examiners assigned to individual cases as an instrument for disability insurance
to identify a causal effect of disability insurance on labor supply. An alternative possibility follows
Eli (2010), who uses political variables as instruments for pension income. This approach uses the
observation that Union Army pensions were used to secure votes for the Republican party (Eli 2010;
and Skocpol 1993), so pension amounts would be inflated in contested congressional districts. It is
conceivable that pensions also would have been processed more quickly in politically expedient areas,
so political variables may be valid instruments in this case. I do not make use of these variables for
several reasons. For one thing, women could not vote, so expediting widows’ pensions would have
been less politically beneficial for the Republican party. Still, one could make the argument that
generosity with widows’ pensions may have generated good will among male veterans. However, the
period during which pensions were widely used as political patronage occurred later, largely in the
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As described earlier, to receive a pension a widow had to prove that she was married to
a soldier, that he served honorably in the military, and that his death was connected
to the service. This involved locating military service records, hospital records, and
marriage certificates. If there were discrepancies in the spelling of his name in these
records, additional steps were required to demonstrate that the records referred to
the same individual. In the pension files, there are examples of secondary affidavits
explaining name spelling discrepancies.
I construct an indicator of name spelling homogeneity from the one percent IPUMS
samples from 1860, 1870, and 1880. I compile a list of all household heads in each of
these years, and I group last names by codes generated using the NYIIS algorithm
(Atack and Batemen 1992). Frequently used to create linked census samples,55 this
algorithm collects names into phonetically similar groups. I construct a Herfindahl
index of the dispersion of unique name spellings within these phonetic groups. Greater
values indicate that there is little variation in name spelling; smaller values indicate
that names in this group are spelled in many different ways. I perform two tests of
the validity of this measure. First, I check whether or not a low name homogeneity
index predicts multiple spellings of the veteran’s last name in the pension data. I find
that a one standard deviation increase in this index raises the probability of observing
multiple surname spellings in the pension data by 8.5 percentage points; this is highly
significant. Second, I check whether or not a name with a high homogeneity index is
more likely to exactly match the most common spelling in its phonetic group in the
census. Again, I find that a one standard deviation increase in the index raises the
1870s and 1880s. The majority of my sample was widowed during the war and applied for a pension
before 1870. Thus, political variables ought to explain little of the variation in their pension out-
comes. I have experimented with using county-level election variables as instruments in this context,
and they are unable to explain a satisfactory amount of variation in pension outcomes. Granted,
county-level variables are an approximation: the appropriate unit of analysis is the congressional
district. Still, my sample is predominantly rural, so the approximation should be a good one.
55Ferrie 1996; Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson 2010.
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probability of such a match by 25 percentage points, which is also highly significant.
A concern is that this measure may not be exogenous to marital outcomes. Names
that belong largely to immigrants may be spelled in multiple ways; immigrant status
is likely endogenous to marital outcomes. Names that belong to lower socioeconomic
status families may be frequently misspelled if the literacy rate is low among these
families. Because there is no information on nativity or literacy in the pension data, I
cannot control for these variables without restricting my sample to individuals linked
to the census. However, I can control for average literacy, immigrant status and
socioeconomic status, measured as the occupational income of the household head,56
by phonetic name group in the IPUMS data. I include these controls to preserve the
validity of the instrument.
Table 1.7 contains first stage results. For all possible values of τ , name homo-
geneity strongly predicts receiving a pension, even conditional on the immigration,
occupational income, and literacy controls added from the census. The first stage F
statistics are not quite as high as one would like, ranging from 3.18 to 7.16; however,
they are substantially higher than the F statistics for any other potential instrument.
The relationship between pension status and other explanatory variables is broadly
consistent with results on the rate of pension receipt from section 6.
Table 1.8 contains both OLS and 2SLS results. The OLS estimate is negative
for all values of τ , but only significant at the five percent level when τ ≥ 3. The
2SLS estimates are also everywhere negative, but they are close to one in magnitude,
and the standard errors are quite large. The estimates are only significantly different
from zero when τ ≥ 4. Because the first stage F statistics point to the possibility
that the instrument is weak, I also present 95 percent Anderson-Rubin confidence
intervals for the effect of the pension, which are robust to weak instruments.57 In
56See section 7 for an explanation of this variable.
57To calculate this confidence region, I use the condivreg command in Stata.
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most cases, these confidence regions do not include zero. Given their imprecision,
it is difficult to attach significance to the size of the 2SLS estimates. However, this
analysis provides some corroborating evidence that the causal effect of pensions on
the timing of remarriage is negative.
1.7.2 Alternative Sample Restrictions
An additional concern is that the results may be sensitive to the source of information
on remarriage. Recall that knowledge of a widow’s remarriage is contingent on her
communicating in some way with the pension board. Specifically, I observe a widow’s
remarriage if her children file a minors’ claim, or if she files a new claim under the
act of March 3, 1901. If the source of information is distributed differently among
women who remarry before and after obtaining a pension, and if the source of this
information is correlated with marital outcomes, this might bias my results. As an
example, recall from table 1.1 that minors’ pension applications are the source of
evidence for remarriage in 64 percent of cases that occur before a pension is granted
and 84 percent of cases that occur after a pension is granted. This means that my
sample of women who remarry before receiving a pension may be disproportionately
composed of childless women who lived to 1901. These women may be younger and
healthier by construction, and thus better marriage prospects.
I use two alternative sample restrictions to address this concern. First, I restrict
the sample to women who have children under the age of 16 when they are widowed,
and I stop following these women once their youngest child turns 16. So, the sample is
restricted to women whose marital status might be known through a minor’s pension
application. Second, I discard any information that comes from a source other than a
General Law pension claim, either widow or minor. Thus, any woman whose marital
status is known only from a pension application under the law of March 3, 1901
becomes an observation with missing marital status.
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Panels A and B of figure 1.3 plot the empirical hazard rate of remarriage by pension
status, in similar fashion to figure 1.2, under these two sample restrictions. While
the overall picture looks similar, as time passes the rate of remarriage for women
without pensions starts to lie solidly below that of women with pensions. This could
reflect the fact that the sample size is substantially reduced by these restrictions.
It may also indicate that the effect of the pension on women’s behavior is simply
smaller for those with small children, so differences by pension status shrink when
the sample is restricted to these women. However, we cannot rule out the possibility
that differences in the source of information on remarriage are biasing the estimated
effect of the pension away from zero.
The model described in section 6 is estimated under these sample restrictions, and
the results appear in table 1.9. The baseline results, with and without a correction for
correlated unobserved heterogeneity, are repeated in panel A. Panels B and C contain
results from the sample restrictions outlined above. As seen in panel C, the results are
not sensitive to the omission of information from pension applications under the act
of March 3, 1901. When the sample period is restricted to years in which the widow
has a minor child, the estimate remains negative; however, it decreases in magnitude
relative to the baseline, and the standard errors increase. In panel B, we can only
say with about 80 percent certainty that the coefficient is different from zero. Still,
these results broadly support the finding of a negative effect of the pension, even if
the estimate becomes noisier under one of the sample restrictions.
Panel C of figure 1.3 and panel D of of table 1.9 impose a different sample re-
striction. These use only women who are successfully linked to the census of 1870
and/or 1880. These data provide independent verification of the information on mar-
ital status in the pension files. Women have an incentive to lie to the pension board
about marital status; however, there should be no such incentive to lie to census
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enumerators. By including only women whose marital status can be verified in the
census, I mitigate accuracy issues that stem from pension fraud. Another benefit of
the linked data is that it allows me to observe potentially important demographic
variables such as birthplace and literacy. As seen in figure 1.3 and in table 1.9, the
results are not sensitive to restricting the sample to women linked to the census, or to
including controls for immigration and literacy. Panel D of figure 1.3 and panel G of
table 1.9 restrict the sample to women widowed during the war years. Dying during
the war is arguably more random than failing to recover from a non-life-threatening
injury or disease contracted during the war, so it is worth verifying that the results
are robust to this sample restriction. The restriction has little effect on the estimate.
Finally, I estimate OLS and 2SLS models that are similar to those in the previous
subsection, restricting the sample to women who are linked to the census of 1870 or
1880 through children from their first marriages. As explained earlier, it is desirable
to use an alternative way of identifying remarried widows, as the source of marriage
information in the pension data may generate artificial differences between widows
who remarry and those who do not. Table 1.10 contains results from regressions of
an indicator for being remarried in the census on an indicator for having received a
pension within five years of applying.58 These are similar to the regressions presented
in table 1.8. In column 1, I use links to the 1870 census; in column 2, I use links to the
1880 census; and in column 3, I pool both years and cluster standard errors by widow.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 repeat these specifications using two stage least squares, where
the instrument is the name homogeneity index used earlier. This instrument explains
a reasonable amount of variation in pension status for the sample linked to the 1880
census, but it performs very badly for the sample linked to the 1870 census. This
suggests that much of the variation being explained by the instrument is coming from
58I also try this with different time frames, and the results are similar.
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women widowed in the later part of my sample.59 Still, while the number of women
linked in this fashion is small, and the estimates are often noisy, these results broadly
support the basic findings. The coefficient on pension income is always negative, and
the 2SLS estimate is significant at the ten percent level when the 1880 census is used.
1.8 Pensions and Match Quality
1.8.1 Empirical Framework
If pension income raises the minimum match quality women are willing to accept, it
should increase the average quality of the matches they make, conditional on being
matched at all. I use links to the federal censuses of 1870 and 1880 to evaluate this
empirically. In principle, I would like to measure match-specific quality; however,
this is not observable. Instead, I attempt to measure the “quality” of the second
husband, controlling for the “quality” of the widow. I use four plausible measures of
quality available in the linked census data. The first is the occupational income of
the second husband, measured using the 1900 occupational wage distribution, with an
imputed wage for farmers, assigned to 1950 occupational codes.60 Another measure
is literacy of the second husband. I also use the squared difference between the age
of the husband and wife, the idea being that people of closer age may be better
matched. Finally, I use an indicator equal to one if the second husband is present in
the household.
Using my sample of remarried widows who have been linked to the census, and I
59The backlog of claims at the pension office grew over time, so it is possible that variation in
processing time stemming from name spelling ambiguity was amplified in later years. See Oliver
(1917). In fact, when I re-do the analysis in table 1.8 using only war dead, the first stage F statistic
declines substantially.
60Occupational wages are taken from Preston and Haines (1991) and the farmer’s wage is imputed
from the 1900 census of agriculture using a procedure from Abramitzky Boustan and Eriksson (2010)
and Olivetti and Paserman (2012).
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estimate the following by OLS:
Qhusb = β0 + β1PEN + γX + u
The variable PEN is an indicator for the marriage having taken place after the
widow received a pension, and Qhusb is a measure of match quality. The matrix X
contains explanatory variables including the widow’s age, literacy, immigrant status,
the woman’s age at widowhood, age at remarriage, characteristics of the woman’s first
husband from enlistment records, and county-level and region controls. I also include
the number of children from the widow’s first marriage and the potential amount
of pension income these children could receive on the date of remarriage; these are
both interacted with pension status. I do this to control for the role minors’ pensions
may have played in making these women more attractive to potential mates. What
remains should capture the effect of the pension on women’s selectivity in choosing a
husband.61
I pool all married women linked to 1870 and 1880 in order to maximize the sample
size. In some cases, women are linked to both the 1870 and 1880 census, so these
individuals appear twice in the sample. With this in mind, I cluster standard errors
by widow.
1.8.2 Results
Table 1.11 contains results from the regression model describe above. These results
offer little evidence that marriages that occur after a pension is granted look different
from marriages that occur before a pension is granted. With the exception of hus-
61Notice that I do not do this in the previous section. This is because I expect the effect of
minors’ pensions on the timing of remarriage to go in the opposite direction. If minors’ pensions
make women more desirable in the marriage market, they should receive more proposals per unit of
search effort, tending to increase the rate of remarriage. Experimenting with interacting the effect of
the pension with the number of children or potential minor’s pension suggests that including these
does not change the results. For ease of exposition, I do not include these in table 1.6.
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band’s literacy, the relationship between pension status and each measure of match
quality has the anticipated sign; however, these estimates are very noisy. Because the
OLS estimates do not suggest a relationship between pensions and match quality, I
do not present additional results that correct for potential endogeneity of pensions to
marital outcomes, as I do in the previous section.62
Is this conclusive evidence that pensions had no effect on match quality? Not
necessarily. One possibility is that the measures of match quality I am using are
very rough approximations, and a much larger sample size would be required to
say anything conclusive about the effect of pensions on these measures. It is also
possible that the achievable range of variation in match quality was quite small. If
marriage markets are segmented by socioeconomic class, it may be difficult for a low
socioeconomic status woman to marry a high socioeconomic status man, no matter
how selective she is. Moreover, my sample is largely rural, which means that marriage
markets are quite small. This would also tend to decrease the range of variation in
match quality that is possible for individuals.
These measures also fail to capture other aspects of match quality that we expect
to be important. For example, it matters how much a woman and her potential
husband like each other, or how this potential husband relates to her children. In a
small number of cases, the case files include descriptions of physical and emotional
abuse of the part of second husbands, which is likely underreported. Differences in
match quality along dimensions such as these will fail to be included in this analysis.
On the other hand, these results may be informative about the precise mechanism
behind the results from section 6. I have described two channels through which an
increase in the value of being unmarried may affect the rate of remarriage: it is
expected to increase a woman’s reservation match quality and to lower her optimal
62Attempting to use an instrumental variables approach, with the instrument described in the
next section, yielded similarly noisy results. These are omitted here for the sake of brevity.
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level of search effort. These results might indicate that the latter channel is more
important. In fact, this is consistent with recent empirical investigations into the
effect of unemployment insurance on post-employment outcomes.63 In any case, the
evidence presented in this section is inconclusive, and further investigation is required
here.
1.9 Implications and Discussion
This paper’s most robust and important finding is that receiving a pension had a
causal effect on the timing of remarriage for Union Army widows who filed for a
pension. Having a claim granted lowered the rate of remarriage by 40 percent. This
implies that a typical widow who immediately received a pension would tend to
remarry three years later than an identical widow with no pension. This is a striking
result, for which I provide context and interpretation in this section.
The main issue is generalizability. Namely, is it reasonable to infer that allocating
this modest amount of income to all single women in the late 19th century U.S. would
have raised the median age at first marriage by three years? Perhaps not. Interpreting
the results in the context of the model, it seems that pensions did cause women to
raise reservations match qualities or lower search effort. However, the size of this shift
may very well depend on other parameters of the model: the distribution of match
qualities, a woman’s flow utility while single, her discount rate, etc. This effect is
estimated using a sample of women who apply for pensions, and I have shown evidence
that these women are different from those who do not make pension applications. I
also find a significant interaction effect with age at widowhood (not shown): with each
additional year of age, the effect of the pension increases in magnitude by 0.07 (0.02).
My sample of pension applicants seems to be older on average than non-applicants,
63See Card, Chetty and Weber (2007) and van Ours and Vodopivec (2008).
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and they are certainly older that the average unmarried woman by virtue of the fact
that they have been married before. It is possible that the response among women
in the general population would be more muted.
On the other hand, my estimates are generated by a comparison between women
who have been granted a pension and women who are still waiting for a pension.
The rationale behind this approach is that there is uncertainty about if and when the
pension claim will be granted, so discounting and the possibility of rejection should
generate differences in behavior. However, if the data allowed a comparison between
women with a pension and women with no possibility of a pension, the differences
may be starker. Another interesting point to note is that the probability of rejection,
at about 14 percent, is quite low. So, the results likely reflect a high discount rate,
which suggests liquidity constraints. Again, this may point to different effects in
a more representative sample: women in my sample appear to be less wealthy on
average, so liquidity constraints may have been more binding.
It is probably also important that my sample consists of widows and not never-
married women. Preferences for marriage may have been different for these two types
of women. Historical literature suggests that widows, if financially viable, may have
been less constrained by social norms in their ability to take part in public organiza-
tions, such as charities or other benevolent associations.64 If women value this kind of
freedom, preferences for marriage may have been lower for widows. However, widows
may have been more financially constrained than never-married women, especially
if they had small children; this may augment their preferences for marriage. The
fact that they had been previously married may also signal greater a preference for
marriage.
While the composition of my sample makes it difficult to extrapolate the magni-
64See Reinhart, Tacardon and Hardy (1998) and Boylan (1986) for discussions of the different
roles for widows, as opposed to never-married women, in these organizations.
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tude of this effect to the population of unmarried women, it does offer evidence that
women responded to economic alternatives when making decisions about marriage.
This is informative about changes in first marriage that occurred over the course of
the 19th century, and also across regions. While this pales in comparison to the rev-
olution in female labor market opportunities that occurred more recently, there were
increases in women’s work opportunities during this century, largely due to indus-
trialization. There were also regional differences in opportunities for women, which
have been shown to be correlated with delayed marriage (Hacker 2008). A major con-
tribution of this paper is to demonstrate that economic opportunities had a causal
effect on women’s behavior. This is especially important because of the multitude of
potential drivers of the patterns we observe in the 19th century.
1.10 Conclusion
This paper documents the effect of pension income on the marital outcomes of Union
Army widows during the late 19th century. While there is little evidence that women
receiving pensions married systematically “better” husbands, my results suggest that
receiving a pension significantly lowered the rate of remarriage. I argue that this effect
can be presumed to work through widows’ preferences for mates, suggesting that
American women during this period did respond to outside economic opportunities
when making decisions about marriage. This gives new insight into the functioning
of marriage markets during this period. It also provides an early example of the kind
of behavior we observe on a greater scale at the end of the 20th century.
The results of this paper demonstrate that women’s economic incentives mattered
for marriage market outcomes in the 19th century. As such, my findings suggest that
factors affecting the gains from marriage for women are important to understanding
differences in behavior over time and in different regions. This paper has focused on
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the role of economic alternatives in reducing preferences for marriage; however, fu-
ture work might look into how women responded to events that raised the gains from
marriage. Over the course of the 19th century, marriage became a significantly better
‘deal’ for women. Divorce laws were gradually liberalized, allowing women to escape
from bad marriages if necessary (Doepke and Tertlit 2008). Laws allowing married
women to independently engage in business and to hold property were enacted, with
almost all states adopting such laws by 1895 (Doepke and Tertlit 2008; Fernandez
2009). Women’s inheritance laws were also amended to allow widows greater owner-
ship and control of their spouses’ assets (Hirsch 2009). Understanding the way women
responded to these and other developments will be key to understanding patterns of
marriage in the 19th century.
1.11 Appendix
1.11.1 Proofs
Proof of equation (2).
Suppose the arrival rate of pension decisions is λ, the arrival rate of marriage propos-
als if α, and the probability of an acceptance is pi. Take ∆ to be an arbitrarily small
period of time, and note that, for search effort c(α), the probability of receiving a
marriage proposal during this interval is α∆; similarly, the probability of receiving a
decision from the pension bureau is λ∆. Call V S the expected value of being single,
which will be a weighted average of the value of being single in each potential state
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Now, suppose ⇡ = 0. Call ✓˜0 the reservation match quality for those with pending
claims when ⇡ = 0. Then, ✓˜   ✓˜0. So, if ✓˜0   ✓N , then ✓˜ > ✓N for ⇡ > 0.
If ⇡ = 0, then the reservation match quality for women with pending claims
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The left hand side of this equation is strictly increasing in ✓˜ and the right hand side
is strictly decreasing in ✓˜, so it has a unique solution. I will show that ✓˜ = ✓N and
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Re-arranging, dividing by  , and taking the limit as  ! 0, we get (2).
Proposition 1. For ⇡ 2 (0, 1], ✓N < ✓˜ < ✓P and ↵⇤N > ↵˜⇤ > ↵⇤P .
Proof. Throughout, I use the well known result that
R1
✓i
(✓   ✓i)dF (✓) =
R1
✓i
(1 
F (✓))d(✓) First notice that ✓˜ is strictly increasing in ⇡:
@✓˜
@⇡
=   ↵˜
⇤
r
(1  F (✓˜))@✓˜
@⇡
+
 
r
(✓P   ✓N))
@✓˜
@⇡
=
 (✓P   ✓N)
r + ↵˜⇤(1  F (✓˜)) > 0
Now, suppose ⇡ = 0. Call ✓˜0 the reservation match quality for those with pending
claims when ⇡ = 0. Then, ✓˜   ✓˜0. So, if ✓˜0   ✓N , then ✓˜ > ✓N for ⇡ > 0.
If ⇡ = 0, then the reservation match quality for women with pending claims
becomes
✓˜ = s  c(↵˜⇤) + ↵˜
⇤
r
Z
✓˜
(1  F (✓))d(✓) +  
r
(✓N   ✓˜)
The left hand side of this equation is strictly increasing in ✓˜ and the right hand side
is strictly decreasing in ✓˜, so it has a unique solution. I will show that ✓˜ = ✓N and
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α˜∗ = α∗N solve both this equation and the first order condition:
θN = θ˜ = s− c(α∗N) +
α∗N
r
∫
θN
(1− F (θ))d(θ) + λ
r
(θN − θN)
= s− c(α∗N) +
α∗N
r
∫
θN
(1− F (θ))d(θ)
= θN
The first order condition defining α˜∗ is rc′(α˜∗) =
∫∞
θ˜
(1 − F (θ))d(θ), which is set up
the same way as the condition defining α∗N . Thus, θ˜ = θN and α˜∗ = α
∗
N satisfy this
condition as well. So, when pi = 0, θ˜ = θN . Therefore, for pi > 0, θ˜ > θN .
Now, define θ˜1 = θ˜ when pi = 1. If θP > θ˜
1, then θP > θ˜ for every pi ≤ 1. When
pi = 1:
θ˜ = s− c(α˜∗) + α˜
∗
r
∫
θ˜
(1− F (θ))d(θ) + λ
r
(θP − θ˜)
Suppose θ˜ ≥ θP . Because the optimal α∗ is decreasing in reservation θi (see below),
it follows that α∗P ≥ α˜∗. Two inequalities follow from this: First,
1
r
∫
θ˜
(1− F (θ))d(θ) ≤ 1
r
∫
θP
(1− F (θ))d(θ)
And, from convexity of c(α), we get the following inequality:
−c(α˜∗) ≤ −c(α∗P ) + c′(αP )(α∗P − α˜∗)
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This implies the following:
θ˜ = s− c(α˜∗) + α˜
∗
r
∫
θ˜
(1− F (θ))d(θ) + λ
r
(θP − θ˜)
≤ s− c(α˜∗) + α˜
∗
r
∫
θ˜
(1− F (θ))d(θ) + λ
r
(θP − θP )
≤ s− c(α˜∗) + α˜
∗
r
∫
θP
(1− F (θ))d(θ)
≤ s− c(α∗P ) + c′(α∗P )(α∗P − α˜∗) +
α˜∗
r
∫
θP
(1− F (θ))d(θ)
= s− c(α∗P ) +
1
r
∞∫
θP
(1− F (θ))dθ(α∗P − α˜∗) +
α˜∗
r
∫
θP
(1− F (θ))d(θ)
= s− c(α∗P ) +
α∗P
r
∫
θP
(1− F (θ))d(θ)
= θP − p < θP
This is a contradiction. So, it must be that, when pi = 1, θP > θ˜, which further
implies that θP > θ˜ for all pi ≤ 1. Therefore, for all pi ∈ (0, 1], θN < θ˜ < θP .
The result that α∗P < α˜
∗ < α∗N follows from the fact that α
∗ is decreasing in
reservation match quality. Recall that, for reservation match quality θi, α
∗ is defined
by the following condition:
rc′(α∗) =
∞∫
θi
(1− F (θ))d(θ)
Then, ∂α∗/∂θi is given by:
∂α∗
∂θi
=
−(1− F (θi))
rc′′(α∗)
< 0
This follows from the convexity of search costs.
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1.11.2 Data
Data Collection
In this section, I describe the process by which I collected the data for this project.
The most important effort is the collection of pension records from the National
Archives in Washington, DC. Using the indices to the Civil War pension files available
on ancestry.com and fold3.com, I compile a list of all pension applications made and
certificates issued on behalf of soldiers married to the women in my sample. Then, I
request these files from the National Archives. In approximately 90 percent of cases,
these files are successfully located, and I am able to collect digital images of them.
Files that could not be located had either been taken out by another use (37% of
cases), or the file number was incorrectly recorded, and the record puller was unable
to find it (63% of cases). Where possible, I make use of digital images of widows’
pensions from the website fold3.com. This website is in the process of uploading
images of accepted widows’ pensions, which they are doing chronologically. It is
not possible to make exclusive use of this resource for several reasons. First, this
project is expected to take several years to complete. Second, they do not include
rejected pension applications. Third, they do not include minors’ pensions. If a widow
remarried and her children applied for the pension, her file would be consolidated
with theirs, and the entire file would be classified as a minor’s pension. So, it would
be excluded from the fold3.com project. In total, 30 percent of my sample can be
collected from this resource.
Because of the importance of these variables to the paper, I describe the source
of information on pension outcomes and marriages in the body of the text. However,
there are other important variables collected from the pension files. Other available
information includes the widow’s age and place of residence, as she had to furnish this
information in her pension application. If a remarried widow applied to be restored
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to the pension rolls under the act of March 3, 1901, her file will contain further
information about her second husband. For example, she had to provide proof of her
husbands death, which usually meant furnishing a death certificate. In some cases,
these death certificates contain the age, birthplace, and occupation of the husband.
The second source of information consists of links to the census of 1870 and 1880. I
perform these links manually using the genealogy website ancestry.com. When marital
status is certain, I search for the widow using the appropriate surname. If I am unable
to find her, I search for the children from her first marriage. If her marital status is
uncertain, I search only for her children. Whenever there is insufficient information to
distinguish between two candidate links, I discard the observation. However, because
of the detailed information available in the widow’s pension application, including
place of residence, this is a rare occurrence. I am able to make very high quality links
in most cases.
A concern is that being linked to the federal census may not be random. Table
1.12 contains OLS regressions of an indicator for a widow being linked to the census
on explanatory variables from the pension data. For each census year, the sample is
comprised of women who are widowed by that year and who are not known to have
died. The only significant determinant of linkage to the 1870 census is the number of
children from the widow’s first marriage; this is unsurprising, as information about
family members is used to create these links. Age and time since widowhood have no
significant effect on linkage to the 1870 census. Neither do pension status, measured
by an indicator equal to one if the widow had received a pension within five years
of applying, or the region in which the widow’s first husband enlisted. The omitted
category is the northeast.
The number of children from the widow’s first marriage also significantly increases
the probability of her being linked to the 1880 census. Women whose husbands died
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more recently are also more likely to be linked, as are women whose husbands enlisted
in the midwest or the south (relative to those who enlisted in the northeast). The
former result can likely be explained by the fact that information about women whose
husbands died closer to 1880 is more current; women widowed earlier are more likely
to have died, which might not have been recorded in the pension data: death records
for pensioners were not consistently kept before the 1880s. Linking women from the
midwest and the south may be more successful because I am using information about
place of residence from the pension file data. Women residing in smaller towns or
counties are less likely to have multiple positive matches, so these women may be
less likely to go unlinked. This may be more of a problem in 1880 than 1870 because
fewer women are residing with linkable children in 1880, so residential information is
more important in this census year.
Tables 1.13 and 1.14 present further descriptive information about the linked data.
In table 1.13, widows linked to the census are compared with nationally representative
samples of women from IPUMS by marital status. Mean characteristics from the
IPUMS data are presented unadjusted and re-weighted to obey the same distribution
of five-year birth cohorts as the analogous sample from the linked widows data. Table
1.14 conveys information about the household composition in the linked widows data
by year and marital status.
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Variables 
Variable Source Notes 
   Date of first 
husband’s death 
Union Army database 
(UA; Fogel et al. 2000) 
Based on dependents’ pension 
applications or military death records 
Date of pension 
application 
Widows’ pension (WP; 
Salisbury) 
Date at which widow filled out 
pension declaration form; if missing, 
date at which pension application 
received by pension bureau 
Date of pension 
receipt WP 
Date of issuance on pension 
certificate; if missing, date of pension 
approval on pension brief 
Date of remarriage WP 
Based on marriage certificates or 
affidavits rendered in support of 
minors’ pension application or 
application for widow to be restored to 
the pension rolls under a later act 
Date of death WP 
Base on pension drop cards, or death 
records filed in support of minors’ 
pension application 
Age at widowhood WP 
Deduced from widow’s first pension 
declaration, in which age and date of 
application are both provided. 
Number of children UA 
Equal to number of children under the 
age of 16 when widow first filed for 
pension 
Potential minor 
pension UA 
Calculated as $8/mo until youngest 
child turns 16, or $8/mo plus $2/mo 
for each child under 16 if widowed 
after July 25, 1866 
No pension attorney WP 
Equal to one if the widow did not hire 
an attorney at the time of filing her 
first claim 
Washington pension 
attorney WP 
Equal to one if the widow first hired 
an attorney from a Washington firm at 
the time of filing her first claim 
First husband: height UA Soldier’s height at enlistment 
First husband: log 
occupational wage 
UA; Preston and Haines 
(1991); United States 
Census of Agriculture 
(1900) 
Based on soldier’s occupation at 
enlistment 
First husband: age at 
death UA 
Based on implied birth year from age 
at enlistment 
	 63 
County of residence WP County listed on first pension application form 
County male-to-
female ratio 
Haines and ICPSR 
(2010) 
Weighted mean of male-to-female 
ratio in 1860, 1870 and/or 1880, 
depending on date of application 
County percent urban Haines and ICPSR (2010) See above 
County population 
density 
Haines and ICPSR 
(2010) See above 
Name homogeneity 
index 
Ruggles et al. (2010); 
Atack and Bateman 
(1992) 
Herfindahl index of concentration of 
unique spellings within phonetic 
surname groups among household 
heads in 1 percent IPUMS sample 
from 1860–1880.  Phonetic groups 
created using NYIIS algorithm. 
Last name: mean 
occupational income 
Ruggles et al. (2010); 
Preston and Haines 
(1991); United States 
Census of Agriculture 
(1900) 
Mean occupation status of household 
head, calculated using 1900 wage 
distribution, by phonetic name group 
in IPUMS 1 percent sample from 
1860–1880.  
Last name: mean 
immigrant status Ruggles et al. (2010); 
Mean immigrant status of household 
head by phonetic name group in 
IPUMS 1 percent sample from 1860–
1880. 
Last name: mean 
literacy Ruggles et al. (2010); 
Mean literacy of household head by 
phonetic name group in IPUMS 1 
percent sample from 1860–1880. 
Last name: mean 
farm residence Ruggles et al. (2010); 
Mean farm status of household head 
by phonetic name group in IPUMS 1 
percent sample from 1860–1880. 
Literacy 
Linked widow sample 
(Salisbury); 
Ancestry.com 
Literate in census of 1870 or 1880 
Immigrant status Linked widow sample; Ancestry.com Immigrant in census of 1870 or 1880 
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1.13 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Sources of Information on Marital Status in Pension File
Data
Group: Without General Law Pension With General Law Pension
Source of Information:
Minor's application after remarriage 64% 84%
Widow's application under late law 30% 11%
Other communication 6% 5%
N, remarried 77 141
Dropped from pension rolls 0% 81%
Minor's application after death 52% 13%
Widow's application under law of 1890 48% 0%
Other communication 0% 6%
N, never remarried 26 153
N, unknown 14 87
N, total 117 381
Never Remarried
Unknown
Remarried
Table 1. Source of Information on Marital Status in Pension File Data, by Pension 
Status
This table summarizes the sources of information about widows' remarriage status, separately by pension 
status. Sample includes women widowed by 1880 and who applied for a pension within five years of 
widowhood. 
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics from Pension File Data
Variable: Mean Median SD Min Max N
Pension Variables
     Applied within 1 year 0.817 1.000 0.387 0.000 1.000 498
     Time to first application 0.674 0.285 0.958 0.014 5.767 498
     General law claim accepted 0.865 1.000 0.342 0.000 1.000 498
     Processing time of accepted gen law claim 2.280 0.906 4.583 0.112 50.500 431
Age/Marriage Variables
     Age widowed 31.867 30.000 9.410 15.000 73.000 487
     Age at first marriage 20.838 20.000 5.025 9.000 48.000 474
     Age at remarriage 32.080 31.000 7.641 18.000 65.000 213
     Number of children (first marriage) 2.566 2.000 2.240 0.000 13.000 498
     Husband died during war years 0.721 1.000 0.449 0.000 1.000 498
     Remarried 0.549 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 397
     Remarried without pension 0.181 0.000 0.386 0.000 1.000 425
     Time to Remarriage:
        All 4.305 3.348 3.708 0.230 26.036 215
       Remarried with pending claim 2.392 1.838 1.866 0.230 8.778 76
       Remarried after pension 5.351 4.096 4.038 0.915 26.036 139
       Time to remarriage following pension 3.911 2.573 3.956 0.047 25.463 134
Calendar Years
     First marriage 1854.6 1856 7.820 1822 1879 489
     Widowhood 1865.6 1864 4.526 1862 1879 497
     Remarriage 1868.9 1867 5.124 1863 1889 215
     Pension application 1866.2 1864 5.044 1862 1883 498
     Pension certificate 1869.0 1866 9.145 1862 1928 451
Region of Residence
  New England 0.129 0.000 0.336 0.000 1.000 488
  Mid Atlantic 0.303 0.000 0.460 0.000 1.000 488
  East North Central 0.410 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 488
  West North Central 0.090 0.000 0.287 0.000 1.000 488
  South Atlantic 0.023 0.000 0.149 0.000 1.000 488
  East South Central 0.041 0.000 0.198 0.000 1.000 488
  West South Central 0.002 0.000 0.045 0.000 1.000 488
  Mountain 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 488
  Pacific 0.002 0.000 0.045 0.000 1.000 488
Table 2. Summary Statistics from Pension File Data
Sample includes women who were widowed before 1880 and who applied for a pension within five years of widowhood. Sample drawn from 
Union Army Database (Fogel et al 2000). Data collected from Civil War pension files at the National Archives in Washington, DC.
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Table 1.5: Characteristics of Wives Identified in 1860 Census Links:
Soldiers who died during war
OLS regression
Mean: Wife 
observed in 
pension data
Mean: Wife not 
observed in 
pension data
(1) - (2)
Dependent variable=1 if 
wife observed in 
pension data
Wife's age 29.4890 26.8571 2.6320*** -0.0096***
(8.5129) (8.1493) (0.002)
Soldier's age 33.0864 26.5940 6.4920*** 0.0193***
(8.4058) (8.2747) (0.002)
Wife literate 0.9109 0.9323 -0.0200 0.0064
(0.285) (0.2521) (0.048)
Soldier literate 0.9153 0.9699 -0.0560** -0.0845*
(0.2786) (0.1714) (0.050)
Wife immigrant 0.1359 0.2045 -0.0680** -0.0880*
(0.3429) (0.4049) (0.051)
Soldier immigrant 0.1542 0.1805 -0.0280 0.0107
(0.3614) (0.386) (0.048)
HH head personal property 0.1708 0.6727 -0.5000*** -0.0226
   ($1,000) (0.2903) (2.6348) (0.014)
HH head real estate 0.4900 1.4727 -0.9840*** -0.0205***
   ($1,000) (1.0522) (4.3341) (0.008)
Soldier farmer 0.3051 0.3083 -0.0040
(0.4608) (0.4635)
Soldier professional or proprieter 0.0336 0.0677 -0.0360* -0.0518
(0.1803) (0.2521) (0.067)
Solder skilled worker 0.2088 0.0752 0.1320*** 0.1106***
(0.4067) (0.2647) (0.035)
Soldier laborer 0.2146 0.2632 -0.0480 0.0064
(0.4108) (0.442) (0.032)
Solder no occupation 0.0073 0.0075 -0.0002 0.1013
(0.0852) (0.0867) (0.142)
Urban county 0.1441 0.1870 -0.0440* -0.1707***
(0.2455) (0.2938) (0.057)
NE 0.4131 0.3534 0.0600 0.0000
(0.4928) (0.4798) (0.000)
MW 0.5153 0.6165 -0.1000** -0.0506*
(0.5001) (0.4881) (0.028)
SO 0.0657 0.0301 0.0360 0.0649
(0.2479) (0.1714) (0.057)
N 685 133 801
Table 5. Characteristics of Wives Identified in 1860 Census Links.                                           
Soldiers who died during the war
t test for equality of means
Sample of soldiers in UA data who died during the war, are linked to the 1860 census, and who appear to be married 
based on the composition of their household in 1860. Regression model includes a constant, and R2=0.175
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Table 1.6: Determinants of the Hazard Rate of Remarriage and Pen-
sion Receipt
Outcome: Remarriage Pension Remarriage Pension Remarriage Pension
Effect of pension -0.1923 -0.4867** -0.5361**
(0.1602) (0.1935) (0.2213)
Age at widowhood -0.0967*** 0.0065 -0.1147*** 0.0065
(0.0157) (0.0103) (0.0213) (0.0105)
Number of Children -0.1327** -0.0359 -0.1600** -0.0359
(0.0605) (0.0364) (0.0784) (0.0371)
Year of widowhood -0.0463* -0.0694*** -0.0679** -0.0697***
(0.0255) (0.0169) (0.0312) (0.0170)
Time to pension application -0.0346 -0.0998 -0.0504 -0.1032
(0.1206) (0.0967) (0.1460) (0.0968)
Potential minor pension at widowhood 0.1149 0.1402 0.1184 0.1407
(0.1613) (0.1174) (0.1902) (0.1188)
No pension attorney 0.1884 0.2669 0.3276 0.2680
(0.3196) (0.2484) (0.3516) (0.2491)
Washington pension attorney 0.0358 0.0859 -0.0642 0.0851
(0.2125) (0.1700) (0.2986) (0.1730)
First husband: age at death 0.0278* -0.0132 0.0248 -0.0133
(0.0153) (0.0126) (0.0173) (0.0128)
First husband: log occupational wage 0.1280 -0.1646 0.2955 -0.1629
(0.4251) (0.2881) (0.4562) (0.2951)
First husband: height (feet) -0.7049** 0.1418 -0.9165** 0.1417
(0.3543) (0.2696) (0.4221) (0.3077)
County male-to-female ratio 2.1664** -0.0439 2.2800* -0.0377
(1.0528) (1.1809) (1.1672) (0.9914)
County percent urban 0.2710 0.3678 0.3360 0.3681
(0.3611) (0.2828) (0.3927) (0.2723)
County population density -0.0310 -0.0177 -0.0322 -0.0177
(0.0208) (0.0112) (0.0229) (0.0113)
Mid Atlantic 0.2804 -0.7319*** 0.4838 -0.7345***
(0.2674) (0.2078) (0.3866) (0.2088)
East North Central 0.2525 -0.6505*** 0.4748 -0.6539***
(0.2608) (0.2149) (0.3659) (0.2127)
West North Central 0.5323 -0.3906 0.9626* -0.3948
(0.3622) (0.2943) (0.5185) (0.2990)
South -0.4368 -0.7574** -0.3212 -0.7615**
(0.4183) (0.2971) (0.5355) (0.3008)
! for years:
  [1,2) 1.5122 1.0519*** 1.8779 1.1925*** 3.4782 1.1982***
(0.4158) (0.1409) (0.5721) (0.1748) (1.8574) (0.1767)
  [2,3) 1.5575 0.6498*** 2.3504* 0.8273*** 5.9411 0.8340***
(0.4432) (0.1191) (0.7447) (0.1708) (4.3221) (0.1736)
  [3,4) 1.5361*** 0.4793*** 2.7242*** 0.7398*** 7.7541 0.7470***
(0.4538) (0.1154) (0.9048) (0.1996) (6.2593) (0.2030)
  [4,5) 1.2324*** 0.3610*** 2.5961*** 0.7981*** 7.8301 0.8094***
(0.3906) (0.1091) (0.9380) (0.2683) (6.6760) (0.2740)
  [5,6) 0.9929*** 0.2130** 1.9935** 0.3428* 6.2107 0.3480*
(0.3388) (0.0890) (0.8000) (0.1837) (5.5455) (0.1871)
  [6,7) 0.5071** 0.1742** 1.3197** 0.3158 4.2473 0.3211
(0.2172) (0.0885) (0.6135) (0.1923) (4.0310) (0.1970)
  [7,8) 0.6036** 0.1464* 1.2622** 0.3824 4.1337 0.3885
(0.2489) (0.0855) (0.6110) (0.2329) (3.9533) (0.2385)
  [8. ") 0.0808*** 0.2443*** 0.2095*** 0.5012*** 0.7081 0.5099***
(0.0256) (0.0526) (0.0781) (0.1412) (0.6612) (0.1456)
vlow    (constant in columns 1-2) -2.4050*** -0.4650*** 0.3372 0.6750 -0.2168 0.6105
(0.2192) (0.0891) (3.4815) (2.6406) (3.7550) (2.6362)
vhigh 3.3428 0.7443
(3.4592) (2.7011)
#1
#2
#3
#4
Log Likelihood
Observations
Table 6. Determinants of the Hazard Rate of Remarriage and Pension Receipt
(2) (3)(1)
Hazard coefficients are reported. Sample: women who applied for a pension within five years of husband's death. Column (3) includes a correction for correlated unobserved 
heterogeneity, and does not include a constant as this is not identified separately from one of the mass points in the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms; columns 
(1) and (2) make no such adjustment, and include a constant. Age at widowhood and all widows' pension variables (including county of residence) are taken from the pension file 
data collected by the author. First husband characteristics come from the UA data and are based on enlistment variables; occupational wages measured using 1900 occupational 
wage distribution assigned to 1950 occupational codes, with an imputed wage for farmers (Preston and Haines 1992; Abramitzky Boustan and Eriksson 2010; Olivetti and 
Paserman 2012). County-level variables are taken at the time of pension application; they are the weighted average of these variables at the decadal censuses preceding and 
following the date of pension application (Haines and ICPSR 2010). On the time interval [0,1), the hazard rate of both risks is normalized to one (this is necessary because I 
include a constant in the model). The variables vlow and vhigh are the two mass points in the distributions of vm and vp. The variables #1-#4 are the estimated probability of each 
unobserved heterogeneity event.
0.5817
(0.7635)
0.3364
(0.7946)
0.0589
(0.1364)
0.0229
(0.1043)
-1140.0844
429
-1141.420
429
-1377.486
482
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Table 1.7: First Stage Results: Effect of Name Homogeneity Index on
Pension
(3) (5) (7) (9) (11)
VARIABLES pen1 pen2 pen3 pen4 pen5
Name homogeneity index 0.1660* 0.2014** 0.1670** 0.1933** 0.2061***
(0.091) (0.087) (0.082) (0.077) (0.074)
Age at widowhood -0.0081* 0.0029 0.0033 0.0009 0.0030
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of children 0.0025 -0.0107 -0.0095 -0.0098 -0.0145
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Year of widowhood -0.0297*** -0.0345*** -0.0393*** -0.0393*** -0.0387***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Time to pension application -0.0777** -0.1107*** -0.0882*** -0.0653** -0.0737***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025)
Potential minor pension -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No pension attorney 0.0628 0.0791 -0.0060 -0.0056 -0.0229
(0.103) (0.097) (0.090) (0.084) (0.082)
Washignton pension attorney -0.1599** -0.0647 -0.0504 0.0092 0.0372
(0.069) (0.066) (0.062) (0.059) (0.057)
First husband: height -0.1080 0.0285 0.0704 0.0238 -0.0288
(0.111) (0.108) (0.103) (0.099) (0.096)
First husband: log occupational wage 0.0792 0.2034 0.2714** 0.0027 -0.0079
(0.141) (0.135) (0.127) (0.120) (0.116)
First husband: age at death 0.0063 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0016 0.0010
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
County male-to-female ratio 0.4369 0.0476 -0.1043 -0.1993 -0.1620
(0.455) (0.431) (0.401) (0.374) (0.363)
County percent urban 0.1287 0.1933* 0.1307 -0.0260 -0.0529
(0.122) (0.117) (0.109) (0.104) (0.101)
County population density -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Last name: mean occupational income 0.2845 0.3510 0.3417 0.3826 0.3658
(0.440) (0.421) (0.391) (0.366) (0.361)
Last mean: mean immigrant status -0.0097 -0.1688 -0.0866 -0.0180 -0.0476
(0.150) (0.143) (0.134) (0.127) (0.123)
Last name: mean literacy -0.3253 -0.3456 -0.4106 -0.1187 -0.1211
(0.422) (0.404) (0.380) (0.358) (0.347)
Constant 54.2775*** 61.6002*** 70.0858*** 71.6802*** 71.0150***
(13.329) (12.627) (11.748) (11.155) (10.834)
Observations 368 362 356 348 347
R-squared 0.219 0.245 0.270 0.269 0.281
First stage F statistic 3.18 5.26 4.35 6.73 7.16
Table 7. First Stage Results: Effect of Name Homogeneity Index on Pension
Name homogeneity index is Herfindahl index of unique surname spellings within phonetic name groups, calculated 
using household heads from IPUMS 1 percent samples, 1860-1880. See notes to table 6 for description of sample and 
remaining variables.
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Table 1.9: Sensitivity of Estimates to Sample Restrictions
Model: Simple Full
Effect of Pension on Marriage Rate -0.4867** -0.5361**
(0.1935) (0.2213)
Log-Likelihood -1141.420 -1140.0844
Observations 429 429
Effect of Pension on Marriage Rate -0.2782 -0.2967
(0.2111) (0.2406)
Log-Likelihood -943.556 -941.6477
Observations 339 339
Effect of Pension on Marriage Rate -0.3980* -0.5024**
(0.2100) (0.2427)
Log-Likelihood -1023.468 -1021.626
Observations 429 429
Effect of Pension on Marriage Rate -0.4777** -0.4915**
(0.2181) (0.2428)
Log-Likelihood -896.135 -893.9608
Observations 302 302
Effect of Pension on Marriage Rate -0.4675** -0.4597*
(0.2206) (0.2449)
Log-Likelihood -892.845 -890.5271
Observations 302 302
Effect of Pension on Marriage Rate -0.4635** -0.4751**
(0.2191) (0.2320)
Log-Likelihood -902.990 903.314
Observations 348 348
All specifications include the full set of controls from table 6; see notes to this table for 
explanation. The top panel replicates the baseline results. Panel B restricts the analysis to 
years in which the widow has a child under the age of 16. Panel C discards information that 
comes from applications under the law of March 3, 1901. Panel D restricts the sample to 
women who are successfully linked to the census of 1870 or 1880. Panel E poses a similar 
restriction, but includes imigrant and literacy controls available in the census data.
Table 9. Sensitivity of Estimates to Sample Restrictions
Panel C. Limit to Information from General Law 
Pension Applications
Panel A. Baseline
Panel B. Limit to time with minor children
Panel D. Linked Only
Panel E. Linked Only: immigrant and literacy 
controls
Panel G. Husband died during war
80
Table 1.10: Pensions and the Timing of Remarriage: Widows Linked
to Census through Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model:
Year: 1870 1880 Pooled 1870 1880 Pooled
=1 if pensioned w/in 5 years -0.2304** -0.1561 -0.1511* -3.2024 -0.7379* -1.1183
(0.112) (0.098) (0.079) (5.137) (0.433) (0.776)
Age at widowhood -0.0226*** -0.0255*** -0.0244*** -0.0156 -0.0219*** -0.0203***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.021) (0.008) (0.007)
Number of children -0.0743*** -0.0356* -0.0516*** -0.1451 -0.0377* -0.0646***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.016) (0.134) (0.020) (0.021)
Year of widowhood -0.0130 -0.0097 -0.0087 -0.0422 -0.0338* -0.0469
(0.030) (0.009) (0.008) (0.088) (0.019) (0.031)
Time to pension application -0.0574 -0.0690* -0.0693** -0.3429 -0.1072** -0.1444*
(0.061) (0.040) (0.028) (0.524) (0.052) (0.082)
Potential minor's pension 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
No pension attorney 0.0465 -0.1756 -0.0592 0.2369 -0.2592 -0.0664
(0.133) (0.153) (0.113) (0.460) (0.164) (0.177)
Washington pension attorney -0.0014 0.0672 0.0329 0.2398 0.1187 0.1132
(0.108) (0.108) (0.078) (0.492) (0.130) (0.123)
First husband: height -0.0745 0.0061 -0.0114 -0.4418 0.0254 -0.0158
(0.191) (0.184) (0.155) (0.777) (0.195) (0.179)
First husband: log occupational income 0.2998 0.2280 0.2371 0.7901 0.2782 0.3190
(0.215) (0.195) (0.179) (1.020) (0.211) (0.330)
First husband: age at death 0.0075 0.0111 0.0089 0.0128 0.0116 0.0105
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008)
Coutny male-to-female ratio 0.5028 0.8729 0.8098* -4.0906 1.0195* 0.5259
(1.016) (0.549) (0.452) (8.294) (0.596) (0.634)
County percent urban 0.0597 0.1430 0.1198 -1.2462 0.1867 -0.0013
(0.228) (0.196) (0.179) (2.319) (0.203) (0.243)
County population density -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Literate -0.1888* 0.1791 -0.0370 -0.3085 0.1809 -0.0697
(0.102) (0.124) (0.080) (0.321) (0.139) (0.089)
Immigrant 0.0499 -0.0900 -0.0522 0.5253 -0.1118 -0.0137
(0.134) (0.117) (0.063) (0.879) (0.127) (0.102)
Year=1880 0.0209 0.0457
(0.041) (0.053)
Constant 23.7010 16.5803 15.0851 85.0484 61.4020* 86.9513
(56.548) (16.361) (14.425) (170.098) (36.525) (58.893)
Observations 147 158 305 144 153 297
R-squared 0.328 0.352 0.306
First stage F statistic 0.333 7.917 4.008
Dependent variable: Remarried in Census
OLS 2SLS
Table 10. Pensions and the Timing of Remarriage: Widows Linked to Census Through Children
Sample includes women linked to the census of 1870 or 1880 who are residing with a child from their first marriage who has kept his or her 
deceased father's last name. In columns (3) and (6), both census years are pooled and standard erorrs clustered by widow. See notes to table 6 
for a detailed description of the variables and the notes to table 8 for a description of the instrument used in columns 4-6.
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Figure 1·1: Possible Outcomes for Widows in Sample
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Figure 1·2: Empirical Hazard Rate of Remarriage and Pension Deci-
sion
Figure 2. Empirical Hazard Rate of Remarriage and Pension Decisions
Panel A plots the nonparametric empirical hazard rate of remarriage, separated by pension 
status, and etimated using kernal method (STS package in STATA). Panel B does the same 
for the hazard rate of pension receipt. The picture is cut off at t=10 because the rate of 
remarriage cannot be estimated for women without pensions at t>10.
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Chapter 2
Selective Migration, Wages, and
Occupational Mobility in Nineteenth
Century America
2.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the connection between occupational and geographic mobility
in the United States between 1850 and 1880. During this period, internal migration
was more common than it was at the turn of the 20th century (Rosenbloom and
Sundstrom 2003). Between 20 and 25 percent of white native-born Americans were
residing outside their state of birth (Hall and Ruggles 2004), a figure that masks
considerable within-state migration. Internal migration in the nineteenth century
was also fundamentally different from such migration in the United States today.
In particular, many migrants moved from settled to unsettled parts of the county.
For this reason, the opportunities available to them in their destinations would have
looked different from those at home.
The concept of opportunity on the frontier has informed much of the work on
internal migration during this period.1 For example, Ferrie (1997) finds evidence
that frontier migrants between 1850 and 1870 were negatively selected, providing some
empirical support for the hypothesis that migrants to the American West were largely
unskilled laborers seeking to escape less attractive working conditions in the more
1See the following section for a review.
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urban East. An implication of this hypothesis is that migration was associated with
career mobility. The iconic example is the urban wage worker who became a farmer;
however, differences in the industrial composition of regions, or in the availability
of skilled workers, may have affected opportunities in the non-agricultural sector as
well. Kim (1998) shows that overall economic activity in the United States was more
specialized by region in 1870 and 1880 than it was by the late 1980s, which implies that
job prospects varied geographically. This idea adds a level of complexity to a simple
migration model, which predicts a positive relationship between average wages and
in-migration. Migrants may have maximized income in a way that we cannot observe
through data on average wages if the possibility of upward occupational mobility
factored into their decisions.
In this paper, I explore the extent to which the prospect of occupational upgrading
motivated internal migration in the United States in the nineteenth century. In par-
ticular, I consider the capacity for upward mobility as a “skill” by which migrants may
have selected and sorted themselves, and I analyze the effect this had on migration
patterns. Accounts of the settlement of the United States are littered with references
to the qualities that are thought to have enabled this settlement: resourcefulness,
adaptability, or perseverance, for example. Lebergott quotes an 1818 description of
the American work force, which lauds the “versatility of [the American laborer’s]
talent (1964, p. 8).” In reference to the particular qualities that enabled success
on the frontier, Goodrich and Davison quote an 1853 description of a new colony in
Minnesota, which reports that “none but the persevering ones [are] staying... Most
of those who left were mechanics and artisans, principally from New York City, who
knew nothing about farming or the wants of a new settlement (1936, p 98).” While
these characteristics are difficult to quantify, one might expect them to be associated
with a propensity for upward occupational mobility.
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Drawing on the modern migration literature, I argue that if migrants selected and
sorted themselves on the basis of upgrading potential, there should be a systematic
relationship between wage profiles in home and destination counties and migrants’
propensity for occupational mobility. Workers who were likely to transition into
skilled occupations should have selected themselves out of places in which the return
to skill was low and sorted themselves into places in which the return to skill was high.
One reason we should expect to see this is that the return to occupational upgrading
was higher in areas with greater returns to skill. Another possibility is that large skill
premiums signal opportunities for upgrading: these may reflect relatives shortage of
skilled workers. By and large, counties with large skill premiums were less urban,
which could mean that skilled labor was in shorter supply. It could also mean that
demand for skilled labor was higher, if these places lagged behind urban areas in
the adoption of new production technologies that favored unskilled labor over skilled
artisan labor.2 These counties should have been most attractive to workers who were
best able to take advantage of the opportunities that existed there.
To evaluate this hypothesis, I take a sample of linked census data and combine
it with county-level wage data. I measure occupational mobility by an individual’s
change in log occupational income over the course of a decade, and I measure the skill
premium in a county as the log ratio of carpenters’ to laborers’ wages. I show that
the return to migration, in the sense of occupational upgrading, was increasing in the
destination county skill premium and decreasing in the home county skill premium.
This suggests that migrants from counties with small skill premiums were positively
selected in terms of upgrading potential. Conditioning on migrating, I find that
workers who moved to places with large skill premiums were more likely to upgrade
than those who moved to places with small skill premiums. Again, this suggests
that migrants sorted themselves based on upgrading potential. I close by offering
2See Atack Bateman and Margo (2000)
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suggestive evidence for my interpretation of this result.
2.2 Related Literature
2.2.1 Migration, Selection, and Sorting
Work on internal migration in the United States in the nineteenth century focuses on
two questions. One is the relationship between wage levels and migration patterns.
The well-known Easterlin paradox (Margo 1999) posits that internal migration moved
in the “wrong” direction, in the sense that it did not tend to follow high per capita
incomes; migration tended to flow East to West, even though average incomes were
higher in the East. Lebergott (1964) finds a weak relationship between average wages
and state population growth during the nineteenth century. As long as cross-state
differences in population growth are driven by migration, this suggests a weak migra-
tion response to regional wage differentials. He claims that “migrants suboptimized”
(Lebergott 1964, p 76), in that sense that they failed to take advantage of potential
wage gains in different parts of the country. These puzzles can be explained in part
by regional price differences: real wages tended to be higher in the West than in the
East (Coelho and Shephard 1976; Margo 1999).
Another strain of research on internal migration in the United States focuses on
characterizing frontier migrants.3 This is broadly motivated by the Turner “safety
valve” hypothesis: the presence of the frontier relieved pressure on eastern labor
markets, as unskilled urban wage workers could go west as working conditions in the
urban East deteriorated. An implication of this hypothesis is that frontier migrants
were disproportionately drawn from the lower tail of the occupational distribution,
a proposition that was impossible to test before the emergence of large samples of
linked census data. Using a sample of males linked between the 1850, 1860 and
3See Steckel (1983) and Shaefer (1985), for example.
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1870 federal censuses, Ferrie (1997) finds some evidence that frontier migrants were
negatively selected; in other words, they tended to be unskilled workers with lower
potential for wealth acquisition than stayers in the East. Stewart (2005) uses linked
census data to show that households who moved to the frontier between 1860 and
1870 tended to be poorer, less literate, and less likely to own land than households
who did not migrate. Galenson and Pope (1989) find evidence of significant economic
opportunity on the farming frontier, looking specifically at Appanoose county, Iowa.
They find that the return to frontier migration, measured by wealth acquisition, was
highest for early settlers. Abramitzky Boustan and Eriksson (2010) find evidence of
negative selection of Norwegian immigrants to the United States around the turn of
the twentieth century.
There is a well developed literature on the relationship between home and des-
tination wage profiles and the characteristics of migrants, particularly during recent
periods. This literature addresses differences in the skills of movers and stayers from
a given home area (selection) and differences among migrants to various destination
areas (sorting). Borjas (1987) argues that migrant selection accounts for part of the
observed wage differential between immigrants and native born Americans, as immi-
grants from countries with higher levels of wage dispersion than the United States
tend to be negatively selected. Borjas, Bronars and Treo (1992) focus on migrant
sorting within the United States. They argue that skilled individuals sort themselves
into states with high earnings variance, as the return to skill is highest in these places.
Grogger and Hanson (2008) address both selection and sorting of migrants. They find
that skilled migrants are selected out of countries with a small gap between skilled
and unskilled wages and sorted into countries where this gap is large. They also find
that international migrants tend to be positively selected in general, so immigrants
on average are more skilled than stayers.
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The concepts of migrant selection and sorting based on wage profiles may be rele-
vant to internal migration in nineteenth century America. For one thing, it suggests a
more nuanced approach than coarsely distinguishing “East” from “West”. As Leber-
gott notes, “there have been many ‘Wests’ (1964, p. 13).” Selection implies that
a person who migrates from Massachusetts to Minnesota will differ from one who
migrates from Michigan to Minnesota, for example. Similarly, sorting implies that a
person from Massachusetts who migrates to Michigan will be differently skilled than
one who migrates to Minnesota. The modern literature on migrant selection measures
skill as educational attainment, a function of wages, or an aptitude test score. As
described earlier, other skills reflecting potential for occupational upgrading ought to
be more relevant during the period of focus of this study.
2.2.2 Occupational Mobility
Other work explores the nature of occupational mobility in nineteenth century Amer-
ica. Today, a sizable human capital investment is needed to ascend most job ladders.
However, there is (anecdotal) evidence that this was not true of 19th century Amer-
ica. Lebergott quotes several contemporary accounts of the ease with which unskilled
workers could perform tasks which, in Europe, were restricted to those with par-
ticular training: “Every man can use an axe, a saw and a hammer. Scarcely one
who cannot do any job of rough carpentering, and mind a plough or a wagon.4” A
Swedish immigrant in the 1850s describes “a person I have seen going about work-
ing as a mason [who] served for a couple of months as an assistant in a drug store
in Milwaukee, whereupon he laid aside the trowel, got himself some medical books,
and assumed the title of doctor.5” He remarks that “the speed with which people
here change their life-calling and the slight preparation generally needed to leave one
4Lebergott page 6, quoting Cobbett 1818
5p 120, quoting Olsson 1950
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calling for another are really surprising, especially to one that has been accustomed
to our Swedish guild-ordinances.” More recent work by Ferrie (2005) and Long and
Ferrie (2005) has shown that intergenerational occupational mobility was higher in
the United States than in Britain through the early 20th century.
Other work has assessed the determinants of occupational mobility in different
sectors of the American economy during the mid to late 19th century. Ferrie (1996b)
looks at occupational mobility among European immigrants before the Civil War. He
traces migrants from passenger ship lists between 1840 and 1850 to federal censuses in
1850 and 1860. He finds that many immigrants who held skilled occupations in their
home countries worked as unskilled laborers immediately after emmigrating; however,
these immigrants were likely to transition out of unskilled jobs by 1860. Immigrants’
labor market performance also varied by country of origin and literacy, for example.
Other work has focused explicitly on mobility in agriculture. The agricultural
ladder consists of wage workers, sharecroppers (in the south), tenants, and own-
ers.6 The prevalence of different tenancy arrangements differed by region and over
time; however, farming hierarchies existed even in the antebellum north where land
was supposedly freely available7Atack (1988) finds that 16 percent of northern farms
were operated by tenants in 1860. Many contemporaries considered wage labor and
tenant arrangements stepping stones into self-employed farming, and there is some
evidence that this was the case.8 And, there is evidence that individuals engaged in
these various arrangements differed by age, immigrant status, schooling, and wealth,
among other dimensions. Alston and Ferrie (2005), using data from Jefferson County
Arkansas between 1890 and 1938, find that age and education tended to increase
mobility among tenant farmers (but not farm laborers), and inheritance tended to
6One can also distinguish between share tenants and cash tenants, and owners and part owners.
See Atack (1988, 1989), Atack and Bateman, Alston and Ferrie (2005), Alston and Kauffman (1997).
7.
8See Atack (1988, 1989).
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increase upward mobility across the board. Overall, they find that the rate of upward
mobility among farm laborers was comparable to that in the nonfarm population.
To summarize, mobility was common during this period, and it varied by individual.
This supports the characterization of aptitude for upward mobility as an important
individual skill.
2.2.3 Wages
There is a literature on the evolution of wages in the United States, beginning in the
colonial period. While real wage growth during the antebellum period kept pace with
productivity growth on average, it was uneven across time and space (Margo 2000, p
4). The South consistently lagged behind the North (Margo 2000), and the Midwest
had higher real wages, though lower nominal wages, than the Northeast for much of
the nineteenth century (Coelho and Shepherd 1976; Margo 1999). There is not much
evidence of regional convergence until after the Civil War (Rosenbloom 1996).
There is also a large literature on patterns of wage inequality in the United States.
Lindert (1976) summarizes this overall pattern as follows:
Throughout the antebellum period, starting around 1820, wide earnings
gaps opened up, skill premia were on the rise, and wealth concentration
accelerated. In short, skilled labor, professional groups, and urban wealth
holders prospered much faster than farm hands and the urban unskilled.
A dramatic change in northeastern America’s income distribution was
largely complete by 1860 or 1880. After the Civil War, earnings and total
income inequality fluctuated around historically high levels with one last
secular inequality surge, at least in urban America, appearing from the
1890s to World War I (Lindert 1976, pp 5-6).
The trend in wage inequality can be attributed largely to changes in America’s in-
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dustrial structure: Atack, Bateman and Margo (2000) attribute a growth in wage
inequality between 1850 and 1880 to in increase in the number of unskilled workers
in large firms, which tended to pay lower wages during this period.
This paper will rely on geographic variation in wage inequality within the United
States. There is less evidence about this in the existing literature. In the following
section, I will present very casual evidence that skill premiums tended to be higher
in less urban counties. In theory, this would be consistent with the relative supply of
skilled workers being greater in more urban areas. It would also be consistent with
rural areas lagging behind urban areas in the adoption of new industrial technologies,
thus causing the demand for skilled artisan labor in these areas to exceed that of
urban areas.
2.3 Data
This paper uses data from three major sources. The first two are nationally repre-
sentative samples of individuals in two consecutive decades, constructed from census
data; the 1850-60 sample is from Joseph Ferrie,9 and the 1870-80 sample is from
IPUMS.10 The third is a sample of county-level wage data from Robert Margo11
covering 1850, 1860, and 1870.
The IPUMS sample links observations in the 1880 complete-count database to
observations in the 1870 one percent sample. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints recently digitized 100 percent of the 1880 census manuscripts; IPUMS
finalized its version of these data in January of 2010. Links to the 1870 census are
based on six variables: birth year, place of birth, last name, first name, race, and age.
These variables were chosen because, in theory, they should be identical across years
9See Ferrie (1996a) for details.
10Ruggles et al (2010)
11See Margo (2000).
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(or they should differ predictably, as does age). However, the linking procedure allows
some variability in name and age, as these variables may be reported with error. For
example, names are often misspelled or abbreviated; people may also use nicknames
or diminutives in one year but not another. The procedure involved searching within
a seven-year age window for possible matches based on sex, race and birthplace,
then assessing the quality of the match based on age and name similarity.12 This
procedure yielded 20,782 links between 1870 and 1880. Of course, the links are only
probable links which adds a dimension of measurement error, but an attempt is made
to minimize this error.
The 1850-60 sample is from Joseph Ferrie. It is constructed by matching individ-
uals in the 1850 one percent IPUMS sample with individuals listed in the index to the
1860 census. Once individuals are located in both censuses, original manuscripts from
the 1860 census were obtained. Names are matched using the NYIIS algorithm,13 and
possible matches are discarded if they violate certain criteria. For example, any indi-
vidual with more than ten potential matches is discarded. This procedure generated
4,938 matches.
These individual-level samples are used to identify migrants and to determine
demographic characteristics (age, nativity, literacy), geographic characteristics (urban
and farm status, etc), and occupation. Both samples contain an occupation variable
that uses 1950 occupational codes. Because the census did not collect information
on income before 1940 or information on wealth after 1870, occupation is the only
available measure of success on the labor market. I use occupational wages from 1900
to measure upgrades and downgrades. These are compiled by Preston and Haines
(1991), based on the 1901 cost of living survey. Following Olivetti and Paserman
12Software used was Freely Extensible Biomedical Record Linkage (FEBRL) created by Peter
Christen and Tim Churches. Jaro-Winkler distance algorithm was used to assess the similarity of
name variables. See Ruggles et al (2010).
13See Atack and Bateman (1992) for a description of this procedure.
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(2012), I assign a 1900 income value to each 1950 occupational code. The income of
farmers is imputed from the 1900 Census of Agriculture, using a method that follows
Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson (2011) and is used in Olivetti and Paserman
(2011). I use alternative occupational rankings, most of which are based on the 1950
wage distribution, as a robustness check.14
There are several challenges associated with measuring occupational mobility in
this way. First, the wage distribution from 1850-1880 was not identical to that in
1900, so some job changes that were not actually upgrades will be coded as such. This
procedure will be especially sensitive to the placement of farmers in the distribution,
as many people moved to and from the farm sector during the period in question.
Moreover, it fails to capture the difference in status between farm owners and tenants,
as these two types are given the same 1950 occupational code. For the 1850-60 sample,
I use information about real estate wealth to distinguish farm owners from tenants,
but I cannot do this for the 1870-80 sample because this information was not collected
in 1880. This procedure is also subject to error in the original coding of occupations.
For example, suppose a farm laborer does not change occupations between 1850 and
1860, but he is coded as a farm laborer in 1850 and a common laborer in 1860. He will
be treated as an upgrader even though his occupation has not changed. I attempt
to limit this error by re-assigning “laborers” who live on farms the status of farm
laborers.
The county-level wage data is from Robert Margo. These data come from the
1850, 1860 and 1870 Censuses of Social Statistics. Data on average wages paid to
common laborers, farm laborers, carpenters and domestics, as well as the cost of
board, were collected for each minor civil division in these census years. Day wages
to laborers are reported with and without board; farm laborers’ wages are reported
by the month, while domestics’ wages and board are reported by the week. These
14These variables are provided by the Census, and are described further below.
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data are aggregated to the county level. They are available for 1265 counties in 20
states in 1870, and 1022 counties in 20 states in 1850.15
I use day wages to laborers (excluding board) as the primary measure of unskilled
wages, and I use carpenters’ wages as the sole measure of skilled wages. For the 1850-
60 sample, the wage in 1850 is taken to be the migrant’s pre-move expectation of the
wage in the county to which he migrates. For the 1870-80 sample, I use the 1870 wage.
It is important to use a measure of wages that pre-dates migration because migration
should have an independent effect on wages. To approximate migration costs, I use
two variables: distance migrated and a measure of railroad access. Railroad access is
measured as the fraction of a given county located within fifteen miles of a railroad.16
County population is taken from Haines and ICPSR (2010).
The sample is restricted to white males age 15-60 who are unskilled blue collar
workers or farm laborers in the first year I observe them. I include only those who
reported an occupation and resided in a county with available wage data in both
periods. There are 2,036 such people. The first two columns of table 1 compare all
unskilled workers to unskilled workers for whom I have wage data. The two samples
are largely similar; however, the restriction that wage data be available in both years
seems to bias the sample against interstate migrants. While 22 percent of the full
sample moved states over the course of a decade, only 10 percent of my sample with
available wage data did so. To address this issue, I use a second sample of migrants
alone, and I only impose the restriction that they have available wage data in the
second year I observe them. Columns 3 and 4 of table 1 show summary statistics for
15Wage data is available for the following states: Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois
(1870), Indiana, Michigan, Iowa, Nebraska, Virginia, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi (1850), North Carolina (1850), South Carolina (1850), Texas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Wash-
ington, and DC. I have added Kansas and South Carolina in 1870 to the sample using manuscripts
published by ancestry.com
16Data provided by Robert Margo. See Atack, Bateman, Haines, and Margo (2010) for further
information.
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this group and a full national sample of migrants. These compare more favorably.
Table 2 contains summary statistics for wages in 1850 and 1870. As other literature
has found, nominal laborers’ wages tended to be higher in the Northeast than in the
Midwest or the South; however, real laborer’s wages were higher in the Midwest than
in the Northeast. Interestingly, both real and nominal carpenters’ wages were highest
in the South. The skill premium was highest in the South in both years, and it grew
uniformly across the U.S. between 1850 and 1870. Table 3 compares rural and urban
wages across the United States and within regions. In general, counties with a nonzero
urban population had higher nominal wages than entirely rural counties. However,
real wages tended to be higher in rural counties. Skill premiums were uniformly
higher in rural counties, especially in 1850.
2.4 A Motivating Result
An important hypothesis of this paper is that internal migrants in the United States
during the nineteenth century were motivated by the prospect of upward job mobility.
Before examining this idea more closely, I evaluate whether, on average, migration
and occupational mobility were associated. Table 4 contains results from regressions
of my measure of occupational upgrading on an indicator equal to one if the individual
is a migrant, using a full sample of men and a sample of men who are unskilled workers
in the first year I observe them. While the coefficient on migrant status is positive and
significant when no controls are included, it becomes insignificant for all workers when
demographic controls are added, and insignificant for unskilled workers alone when
geographic controls (including region fixed effects) are added. Notice also that the R
squared in the regression is never more than 0.12, suggesting that there is substantial
unexplained variation in occupational upgrading. In the rest of the paper, I explore
the possibility that this heterogeneity reflects unobserved propensity in occupational
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upgrading, and that selection and sorting on the basis of this skill can explain some
of the migration patterns we observe among unskilled workers.
2.5 Empirical Approach
If internal migrants selected and sorted themselves on the basis of upgrading potential,
there should be a relationship between “skill” (occupational mobility) and wages that
is similar to what we observe in the modern migration literature. Namely, those
most likely to upgrade occupations should be selected out of counties with small skill
premiums sorted into counties with large skill premiums. Empirically, we should
see a migration premium (in terms of occupational income) that is increasing in the
destination skill premium and decreasing in the home skill premium. And, when we
compare migrants, the incidence of upgrading should be higher in places with larger
skill premiums.
To evaluate this, I estimate the following equation:
∆ log Yocc = β0+β1MIG+β2 logWhome+β3MIG×logWhome+β4MIG×logWdest+γX+u
(2.1)
where Yocc is occupational income, W is the county-level skill premium, and X is
a matrix of individual and county-level variables, including region fixed effects. To
understand the expected signs of these coefficients, consider three counties, A B and
C, with WC > WB > WA. Selection implies that a mover from A to B is more likely
to upgrade than a stayer in A, and a stayer in B is more likely to upgrade that a
stayer in A. Selection also implies that a mover from A to C is more likely to upgrade
that a mover from B to C. Sorting implies that a mover from A to C is more likely to
upgrade than a mover from A to B. The following table summarizes the differences
in expected occupational upgrades for these groups:
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Group 1 Group 2 E[∆ log Y 1occ]− E[∆ log Y 2occ]
Stayer B Stayer A β2(logWB − logWA)
Mover A to B Stayer A β1 + β3 logWA + β4 logWB
Mover A to C Mover B to C −(β2 + β3)(WB −WA)
Mover A to C Mover A to B β4(WC −WB)
The relationships described above imply the following about the signs of these coef-
ficients. The fourth row implies β4 > 0, and the first row implies β2 > 0. The third
row implies that β3 + β2 < 0, which means β3 < 0. Then, as predicted, the second
row implies a migration premium that is decreasing in the home county skill premium
and increasing in the destination county skill premium.
Restricting the sample to individuals with wage data in their homes and destina-
tions biases the sample against inter-state migrants. To address this, I use a sample
of migrants alone, and I only require that wage data be available in their destination
counties. Grogger and Hanson (2008) argue that, among migrants, sorting should be
independent of wage profiles at home. With this in mind, I estimate
∆ log Yocc = α0 + α1 logWdest + γX + u (2.2)
Here, I expect to find α1 > 0.
One concern is that, while migrant sorting implies α1 > 0, the reverse is not
true. Because we do not observe upgrading potential, we cannot be sure that the
observed relationship between wages and upgrading is due to sorting and not solely
to geographic differences in opportunity reflected in wage profiles. Moreover, this
relationship could be generated by a different process. For instance, say we can write
the actual change in occupational income as the expectation plus an error:
∆ log Y = E
[
∆ log Y
]
+ e
Suppose workers select counties completely at random. If large skill premiums induce
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effort toward upgrading, we may observe more upgrading among migrants in counties
with large skill premiums even though counties are chosen randomly. Put another
way, the correlation between logW and ∆ log Y might reflect a relationship between
logW and e, and not between logW and E[∆ log Y ]. If this is the case, it would
be difficult to argue that migrants chose destinations with occupational mobility in
mind.
I will address this by using the gap between an older relative’s occupational income
and the migrant’s occupational income in the first year I observe him as a proxy for the
migrant’s expected occupational upgrade. The idea is that a person’s expected career
trajectory is related to that of the other members of his family. So, the occupation
of his father (or grandfather, or older brother) is a reasonable measure of what he
expects his occupation to be in the future. This reflects expectations alone because
it will not be induced by destination county wages. If individuals with large gaps
between their relative’s and their own occupations tend to choose counties with high
skill premiums, this hints at the presence of sorting. To evaluate this, I regress the
skill premium in a migrant’s destination county (measured before the move) on the
gap between his older male relative’s log occupational income and his own. I focus on
migrants because I do not want the results to be confounded by children inheriting
land or businesses from their fathers; for example, a young man who works on his
father’s farm might report an upgrade from “farm laborer” to “farmer” because he
has inherited his father’s land, not because he is a particularly skilled agricultural
worker. The problem with this approach is that, because so many of my observations
are household heads in both decades, it reduces my sample size to 248 observations.
So, these results will be presented as “suggestive evidence.”
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2.6 Results
2.6.1 Basic Results
I estimate equation (1) by OLS using a sample of workers who were unskilled blue
collar workers or farm laborers in 1850 or 1870. Table 5 shows the results from
these regressions, adding a series of demographic, county-level, and state controls. If
migrants who were able to upgrade occupations were selected out of counties with low
skill premiums and into counties with high skill premiums, we should see home county
skill premiums exerting a positive effect on upgrading for stayers and a negative effect
on upgrading for migrants; and, we should see destination county skill premiums
positively affecting upgrading for migrants. By and large, this appears to be the
case. However, notice that skill premiums only have a positive effect on upgrading
for stayers when geographic and state controls are excluded.
These results can be summarized in the same way as the theoretical coefficients
above, taking hypothetical counties A, B, and C with WC > WB > WA. Using col-
umn (4) of table 5, in which geographic controls are included in the regression, the
coefficients imply the following differences in expected occupational upgrade by home
and destination county:
Group 1 Group 2 E[∆ log Y 1occ]− E[∆ log Y 2occ]
Stayer B Stayer A 0.0579(logWB − logWA)
Mover A to B Stayer A 0.0031− 0.1960(∗) logWA + 0.1823(∗∗) logWB
Mover A to C Mover B to C 0.1381(WB −WA)
Mover A to C Mover A to B 0.1823(∗∗)(WC −WB)
These predicted differences all have the anticipated sign. However, notice that sorting
appears more significant than selection. In the first row, skill premiums do not sig-
nificantly affect differences in upgrading among stayers. And, the negative coefficient
on log WA in the second row of the table is only significant at the 10 percent level.
As mentioned earlier, restricting the sample to individuals with both home and
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destination wage data biases the sample against interstate migrants. In table 6, I
include individuals with wage data in their destination counties alone, and I restrict
the analysis to migrants. Notice that the strongly positive and significant coefficient
on the destination skill premium is robust to including all covariates. So, the corre-
lation between the skill premium and occupational upgrading does not seem to be
driven by differences in the composition of migrants who choose different counties,
or by county or state-level factors that may have jointly affected wages and job op-
portunities. For example, because so many upgraders are farm laborers who become
farmers, one might worry that the observed relationship is driven by some correlation
between land values or availability and wages. However, the significant coefficient
remains even when controlling for these things.
These results mask large differences across time. Table 7 contains results estimated
separately by year. The results are more robust for the 1870-80 sample than they are
for the pooled sample, and the results for the 1850-60 sample are not at all robust.
While differences between these two decades are not the focus of this paper, one story
that may explain this discrepancy is increasing national labor market integration over
the course of this period. Rational responses to wage differentials are symptomatic
of a labor market that operates well across space. There is evidence that such a
labor market did not emerge in the United States until the 1870s.17 Differences in
the linking procedure might also explain some of these differences, although it is not
clear how.
One major concern is that farm laborers who become farmers comprise an over-
whelming majority of the upgraders in my sample. This raises several concerns: one
is that the imputed farmer’s income that I use is intended for owner-occupier farm-
ers, which is not an appropriate level of income to assign to tenant farmers. While
I can infer tenancy in the 1850-60 sample by the absence of real estate wealth, I am
17Rosenbloom 1996.
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unable to do this for the 1870-80 sample because this information was not collected
in 1880.18 And, this coarse distinction between tenant and owner classifies all “ten-
ants” the same way, which neglects variation in income caused by different tenancy
arrangements. Sharecroppers, for example, were worse off than share tenants, who
were worse off than cash tenants.19 Moreover, one worries that moves into farming
are not directly comparable to moves into other occupations. Becoming a farmer may
have been considered a good in and of itself, in part because it was associated with
land acquisition and not just labor income. Table 8 excludes individuals who were
farmers in either period. The results are robust to this exclusion.
I test the sensitivity of my results to my particular measure of the skill premium.
The Census of Social Statistics provides alternatives to day laborer’s wages as a
measure of unskilled wages. The data also contain information on common laborer’s
wages including board and monthly farm wages (which included board). Table 9
repeats the analysis using these other two wage measures, which broadly confirms
the baseline results.
Another concern is the use of the 1900 occupational wage distribution to measure
occupational upgrades. This imposes two characteristics on job changes: whether or
not it is an upgrade (ordinal) and the size of the upgrade or downgrade (cardinal).
Both of these restrictions may not be valid for this sample. I use coarse indicators
of upgrading and downgrading to verify that the results hold when the size of the
occupational income gain is not imposed by the 1900 occupational wage distribution.
Table 10 contains the results from regressions that use an indicator for upgrading
instead of the actual change in log occupational income. The indicator used in the
18I assign farm tenants in 1850 and 1860 the status of farm laborers. Atack (1988) argues that, “to
the extent that the rental market functioned well, landlords were able to capture much of the surplus
over and above labor returns that were generated by the tenant. As a result, tenants probably did
little better than farm laborers and may have even been worse off to the extent that they bore
increased income risk.” (p. 23-24).
19See Atack (1988, 1989), Atack and Bateman, Alston and Ferrie (2005).
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first four columns is equal to one if the person upgrades; the indicator used in the
last four columns is equal to one if the person moves up an occupational class.20 The
standard errors become larger in the last four columns of the table, but the estimate
remains significant in all but one specification.
The results may also be sensitive to the ranking of occupations. To address this
possibility, I define ∆ log Y using different occupational rankings available in the
IPUMS data. These are the median 1950 occupational wage, the Duncan socioe-
conomic index, the Siegel occupational prestige score, and the Nam-Powers-Boyd
occupational status score. The Duncan index is a composite index based on average
occupational earnings and educational attainment.21 The relative weights given to
these two variables are based on a regression of occupational prestige rankings from
the 1947 National Opinion Research Center survey on earnings and education for a
small number of occupations. The NPB score is also a composite of earnings and
education, but these two measures are given equal weight.22 The Siegel prestige score
is based on a series of National Opinion Research Center surveys from the 1960s; it
uses no information on average earnings or education.23
Figure 1 plots the distribution of each occupational ranking using the one percent
IPUMS sample from 1870. The baseline measure and the Duncan index rank farmers
above both farm and common laborers but below carpenters. The Nam-Powers-Boyd
index and the 1950 occupational wage both rank farmers below common laborers.
The Siegel prestige score ranks farmers above carpenters and farm laborers above
common laborers. Table 11 includes results that assign changes in occupational in-
come according to these different rankings. This supports the main finding for every
ranking except the Siegel prestige score, where the coefficient is still positive but not
20i.e. If he becomes a skilled craftsman, a farmer, or a white collar worker.
21See Duncan (1961) for details
22See Nam and Boyd (2004).
23See Siegel (1971).
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robust to including all controls.
In general, it seems that unskilled blue collar workers who were able to ascend the
occupational ladder chose counties in which carpenter’s wages were high relative to
laborer’s wages. This results is robust to including various controls and altering the
definition of the skill premium and occupational upgrading.
2.6.2 Suggestive Evidence for Sorting
In the preceding analysis, I demonstrated the robustness of the positive correlation
between county skill premiums and occupational upgrading among migrants. This
relationship remains intact when I control for observable variables that might jointly
affect average wages and the opportunity for occupational advancement; the results
are also robust to changing the definition of upgrading and skill premiums. Still,
this does not necessarily mean that occupational mobility was something migrants
explicitly considered when deciding where to move.
For example, a positive estimate of α1 could be generated by the following. Sup-
pose migrants choose counties at random. Then, if a migrant lands in a county
with high skilled relative to unskilled wages, he may expend greater effort toward
upgrading, thus generating the relationship observed in the data.
To address this problem, I take a subsample of migrants who were not household
heads in the first period (but were related to the household head), and I use the
difference between the head’s log occupational income and the migrant’s as a proxy
for the migrant’s expected occupational income growth. I regress the destination skill
premium on this proxy, the idea being that migrants who are more likely to upgrade
should be drawn to counties with high skill premiums. Unfortunately, this procedure
completely cuts out the 1850-60 sample, as virtually none of these resided with an
older working relative in 1850.24 And, it reduces the sample of migrants with wage
24This is likely due to the way this sample is constructed. Because observations are located in
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data to 248. Still, I will present these results as suggestive that induced effort toward
upgrading cannot explain all of my results.
Table 12 contains results a regression of the change in log occupational income
on the difference between the household head’s log occupational income and the
migrant’s. The first four columns use only the 248 migrants with wage data, and
the last four columns use everyone. There is a very strong and positive relationship
between the change in occupational income and the proxy variable; in fact, these
covariates explain approximately one third of the variation in occupational upgrading.
Table 13 contains results from a regression of destination skill premiums on my
proxy variable. While the coefficient is not significant in all specifications, the results
suggest that at least some selection and sorting can explain the relationship between
upgrading and skill premiums. While the results I have presented in this section
are only suggestive, there does not seem to be overwhelming evidence that the basic
results are driven by reverse causality.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper explores the relationship between geographic and occupational mobility
in nineteenth century America. One might expect these to be closely connected;
however, a straightforward analysis of the data suggests no relationship between mi-
gration and occupational upgrading. I offer evidence that this masks heterogeneity
among migrants: those who were better able to upgrade occupations seem to have
sorted themselves into counties with high skill premiums. I also present suggestive
evidence to argue that reverse causality cannot explain this result.
This selection and sorting of migrants might shed light on puzzles identified in
previous work. Lebergott (1964) finds a surprisingly weak relationship between pop-
the 1860 census using the index to the census manuscript, all men in this sample had to have been
household heads in 1860.
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ulation growth and average wages at the state level, arguing that migrants failed
to take full advantage of potential wage gains. Others have found frontier migra-
tion puzzling because of the “Easterlin paradox” that Midwestern per capita incomes
were lower than those in the Northeast,25 although this can be explained in part by
regional price differences.26 In fact, these observations seem to mask a tendency for
some workers to seek upward occupational mobility instead of higher average wages;
workers who migrated from counties with low skill premiums to counties with high
skill premiums tended also to end up in counties with lower real laborers’ wages.
Conversely, those who opted for counties with lower skill premiums tended to end up
in counties with higher real laborers’ wages.
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2.9 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics, 1850-1860 and 1870-1880
Laura Salisbury, "Selective Migration, Wages, and Occupational Mobiltiy in Nineteenth Century America," July 11, 2011. 
Sample: All Unskilled
Unskilled workers with 
home and destination 
wage data
Unskilled Migrants Unskilled migrants with destination wage data 
Age 27.273 27.413 25.695 25.664
Literate 0.912 0.9 0.911 0.915
Immigrant 0.129 0.118 0.208 0.215
Unskilled laborer 2 0.465 0.469 0.455 0.472
Farmer 2 0.369 0.375 0.344 0.315
Occupational upgrade 0.638 0.631 0.662 0.651
Occupational downgrade 0.115 0.108 0.124 0.117
Moved counties 0.394 0.319 1 1
Moved states 0.224 0.104 0.568 0.508
Number of county-years, t 1546 824 933 594
Number of county-years, t+10 1680 893 982 529
Obs per county-year, t 2.761 2.471 1.805 1.54
Obs per county-year, t+10 2.541 2.28 1.715 1.73
Northeast, t 0.475 0.497 0.444 0.466
Midwest, t 0.273 0.216 0.318 0.292
South, t 0.235 0.287 0.211 0.223
West, t 0.017 0 0.027 0.02
Northeast, t+10 0.447 0.477 0.371 0.462
Midwest, t+10 0.301 0.242 0.39 0.318
South, t+10 0.228 0.28 0.193 0.216
West, t+10 0.025 0.001 0.046 0.003
t=1870 0.599 0.558 0.479 0.438
N 4269 2036 1684 915
Table 1. Summary Statistics, 1850-60 and 1870-80
Notes: Data from IPUMS (2010), Ferrie (1996), Margo (2000). Sample consists of men between the ages of 15 and 60 in year t 
(1850 or 1870) who report an occupation in both years and who work in unskilled jobs in year t. Unskilled workers are defined 
as farm laborers or unskilled blue collar workers. In the 1850-60 sample, farmers who report zero real estate wealth are defined 
as farm laborers. Occupational upgrades and downgrades are coded using the 1900 occupational wage distribution with an 
imputed wage for farmers (Preston and Haines 1991; Abramitzky Boustan and Eriksson 2010).
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Table 2.3: Urban versus Rural Wages by Region, 1850 and 1870
Wage Region Mean (urban) Mean (rural) Urban - rural P value (urban=rural) N (urban) N (rural)
Carpenter (nominal) USA 1.472 1.518 -0.046 0.345 100 904
northeast 1.314 1.340 -0.025 0.414 47 89
midwest 1.395 1.413 -0.018 0.763 14 143
south 1.688 1.564 0.125 0.151 39 672
Laborer (nominal) USA 0.894 0.752 0.142 0.000 100 893
northeast 0.895 0.872 0.023 0.311 47 89
midwest 0.880 0.819 0.061 0.184 14 143
south 0.897 0.721 0.176 0.000 39 661
Carpetner (real) USA 5.440 6.940 -1.500 0.000 100 881
northeast 4.883 5.609 -0.727 0.000 47 89
midwest 6.212 6.718 -0.506 0.254 14 143
south 5.835 7.172 -1.337 0.002 39 649
Laborer (real) USA 3.310 3.403 -0.093 0.379 100 879
northeast 3.312 3.642 -0.330 0.001 47 89
midwest 3.895 3.892 0.003 0.992 14 143
south 3.098 3.262 -0.165 0.318 39 647
Skill premium USA 1.679 2.100 -0.421 0.000 100 886
northeast 1.477 1.548 -0.072 0.013 47 89
midwest 1.602 1.760 -0.158 0.046 14 143
south 1.951 2.250 -0.299 0.010 39 654
Wage Region Mean (urban) Mean (rural) Urban - rural P value (urban=rural) N (urban) N (rural)
Carpenter (nominal) USA 2.749 2.668 0.081 0.056 251 1007
northeast 2.650 2.587 0.063 0.501 77 33
midwest 2.814 2.863 -0.050 0.195 113 313
south 2.755 2.530 0.225 0.012 61 640
Laborer (nominal) USA 1.582 1.288 0.294 0.000 251 1005
northeast 1.781 1.691 0.090 0.155 77 33
midwest 1.658 1.653 0.005 0.856 113 313
south 1.192 1.058 0.134 0.003 61 639
Carpetner (real) USA 5.407 6.452 -1.045 0.000 251 1003
northeast 4.653 4.844 -0.191 0.326 77 32
midwest 5.400 5.571 -0.171 0.120 113 313
south 6.372 6.988 -0.616 0.045 61 637
Laborer (real) USA 3.047 3.000 0.047 0.434 251 1002
northeast 3.121 3.161 -0.041 0.732 77 32
midwest 3.175 3.203 -0.028 0.685 113 313
south 2.716 2.883 -0.167 0.199 61 637
Skill premium USA 1.827 2.244 -0.417 0.000 251 1003
northeast 1.523 1.557 -0.034 0.604 77 33
midwest 1.724 1.780 -0.056 0.212 113 313
south 2.400 2.521 -0.121 0.210 61 637
Table 3. Urban Versus Rural Wages by Region, 1850 and 1870
1850
1870
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Table 2.5: Effect of Migration and Wages on Occupational Mobility,
1850-60 and 1870-80
Laura Salisbury, "Selective Migration, Wages, and Occupational Mobiltiy in Nineteenth Century America," July 11, 2011. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant -0.0240 -0.0122 0.0163 0.0031
(0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053)
Skill premium (home) 0.2994*** 0.2452*** 0.0762 0.0579
(0.053) (0.052) (0.058) (0.059)
Migrant X Skill premium (home) -0.2899*** -0.2710*** -0.2288** -0.1960*
(0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.100)
Migrant X Skill premium (dest) 0.3799*** 0.3241*** 0.2128*** 0.1823**
(0.076) (0.077) (0.080) (0.084)
Age -0.0042*** -0.0035*** -0.0035***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Immigrant -0.1763*** -0.1242*** -0.1243***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Literate 0.0478 0.0675** 0.0692**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Married -0.0970*** -0.0881*** -0.0850***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Population density (home) 0.0066* 0.0022
(0.003) (0.004)
Percent urban (home) -0.2949*** -0.2350***
(0.045) (0.076)
Railroad access (home) 0.0212 -0.0056
(0.033) (0.050)
Land availability (home) -0.0938 -0.1183
(0.071) (0.112)
Log farm value per acre (home) -0.0475 -0.0006
(0.080) (0.125)
Midwest (home) 0.0925*** 0.0325
(0.028) (0.060)
South (home) 0.1265*** 0.0422
(0.036) (0.079)
West (home) -0.1274** 0.2656
(0.052) (0.182)
Population density (dest) 0.0064**
(0.003)
Percent urban (dest) -0.0712
(0.079)
Railroad access (dest) 0.0393
(0.053)
Land availability (dest) 0.0365
(0.109)
Log farm value per acre (dest) -0.0646
(0.130)
Northeast (dest) 0.3932**
(0.181)
Midwest (dest) 0.4597***
(0.175)
South (dest) 0.4884**
(0.199)
West (dest) 0.0000
(0.000)
Distance Migrated 0.0058
(0.008)
1870-1880 -0.0076 -0.0021 0.0170 0.0168
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Constant 0.2066*** 0.3682*** 0.4870*** 0.1066
(0.032) (0.056) (0.128) (0.223)
Observations 2,035 2,018 2,018 2,018
Adjusted R-squared 0.0347 0.0920 0.124 0.124
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Skill premium is the log ratio of carpenter's 
to laborer's wage at the county level. Standard errors clustered at the destination 
county level. See Tables 1 and 2 for details.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: change in log occupational income
Table 6. Effect of Migration and Wages on Occupational Mobility, 1850-60 
and 1870-80
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Table 2.6: Effect of Destination Skill Premium on Occupational Mo-
bility among Migrants, 1850-60 and 1870-80
Laura Salisbury, "Selective Migration, Wages, and Occupational Mobiltiy in Nineteenth Century America," July 11, 2011. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Destination skill premium 0.3081*** 0.2359*** 0.2135*** 0.1976** 0.2735***
(0.061) (0.064) (0.074) (0.083) (0.094)
Home skill premium -0.0563
(0.096)
Age -0.0047** -0.0052** -0.0054** -0.0040
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Immigrant -0.1999*** -0.1775*** -0.1767*** -0.2323***
(0.035) (0.040) (0.039) (0.044)
Literate 0.0630 0.0687 0.0621 0.0176
(0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.052)
Married -0.0464 -0.0298 -0.0275 -0.0665
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.051)
Distance migrated 0.0074 0.0059 0.0104
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Population density (home) -0.0028 -0.0021 -0.0015
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Population density (dest) 0.0049 0.0053 0.0053
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Percent urban (home) -0.2288*** -0.2077*** -0.1738**
(0.074) (0.075) (0.088)
Percent urban (dest) 0.0712 0.0785 0.0103
(0.081) (0.082) (0.098)
Railroad access (home) -0.0382 -0.0266 -0.0019
(0.049) (0.049) (0.057)
Railroad access (dest) 0.0212 0.0261 0.0227
(0.053) (0.054) (0.065)
Land availability (home) -0.2200* -0.2408** -0.1800
(0.115) (0.119) (0.137)
Land availability (dest) 0.0669 0.0553 0.0437
(0.111) (0.118) (0.126)
Log farm value per acre (home) 0.0272 -0.0142 0.0155
(0.116) (0.122) (0.152)
Log farm value per acre (dest) -0.1245 -0.1408 -0.1014
(0.126) (0.130) (0.154)
Midwest (home) 0.0689 0.0138
(0.048) (0.065)
South (home) -0.0524 0.0265
(0.060) (0.080)
West (home) 0.1389 0.0000
(0.205) (0.000)
Northeast (dest) -0.0647 0.4890**
(0.079) (0.201)
Midwest (dest) -0.0629 0.5072***
(0.065) (0.186)
South (dest) 0.0000 0.4945**
(0.000) (0.212)
West (dest) -0.4563*** 0.0000
(0.170) (0.000)
1870-1880 0.0159 0.0089 0.0301 0.0124 -0.0110
(0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.038) (0.049)
Constant 0.2136*** 0.3780*** 0.5907*** 0.7333*** 0.0806
(0.035) (0.079) (0.215) (0.226) (0.348)
Observations 914 908 897 897 645
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0261 0.0813 0.0899 0.0914 0.0961
Table 7. Effect of Destination Skill Premiums on Occupational Moblity among 
Migrants, 1850-60 and 1870-80
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Skill premium is the log ratio of carpenter's to 
laborer's wage at the county level. Standard errors clustered at the destination county level. 
See Tables 1 and 2 for details.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: change in log occupational income
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Table 2.8: Effect of Destination County Skill Premium on Occupa-
tional Mobility, 1850-60 and 1870-80: Excluding Farmers
Laura Salisbury, "Selective Migration, Wages, and Occupational Mobiltiy in Nineteenth Century America," July 11, 2011. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year
Destination skill premium 0.0930 0.0493 0.0315 0.1164 0.2945*** 0.2795*** 0.2955** 0.3654***
(0.093) (0.117) (0.121) (0.140) (0.085) (0.091) (0.115) (0.118)
Constant 0.4581*** 0.4880 0.4561 0.0885 0.3390*** 0.6353** 0.6992* 0.7895
(0.097) (0.341) (0.354) (0.485) (0.115) (0.299) (0.402) (0.494)
Demographic controls X X X X X X X X
Geographic controls X X X X X X
Region controls X X X X
Home county wage X X
Observations 513 506 506 376 395 391 391 269
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0749 0.0727 0.0688 0.0675 0.0989 0.102 0.117 0.143
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Destination skill premium 0.1857** 0.2751*** 0.2519** 0.2898**
(0.089) (0.104) (0.117) (0.136)
Constant 0.2530** -0.1580 0.0528 -0.1763
(0.100) (0.285) (0.305) (0.390)
Demographic controls X X X X
Geographic controls X X X
Region controls X X
Home county wage X
Observations 624 616 616 443
Adjusted R-squared 0.0566 0.0829 0.0827 0.0734
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wage concept
Destination skill premium 0.1107*** 0.1164** 0.1006* 0.1225** 0.1168*** 0.1119** 0.0999* 0.1669***
(0.037) (0.049) (0.051) (0.060) (0.042) (0.050) (0.053) (0.062)
Constant 0.2427** 0.3571 0.0960 0.4873 0.1948 0.3601 0.5495** 0.4242
(0.119) (0.263) (0.306) (0.358) (0.144) (0.260) (0.278) (0.375)
Demographic controls X X X X X X X X
Geographic controls X X X X X X
Region controls X X X X
Home county wage X X
Observations 906 895 895 643 890 880 880 625
Adjusted R-squared 0.0791 0.0868 0.0894 0.0889 0.0807 0.0892 0.0915 0.0956
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Skill premium is the log ratio of 
carpenter's to laborer's wage at the county level. Sample excludes workers 
who become farmers in year t+10 (1860 or 1880) Standard errors 
clustered at the destination county level. See Tables 1 and 2 for details.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9. Effect of Destination County Skill Premiums on Occupational 
Mobility, 1850-60 and 1870-80: Excluding Farmers
Dependent variable: change in log occupational income
1850-1860 1870-1880
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Skill premium is the log ratio of carpenter's to laborer's wage at the county level. 
Standard errors clustered at the destination county level. See Tables 1 and 2 for details. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8. Effect of Destination Skill Premiums on Occupational Mobility Among Migrants, By Year
Dependent variable: change in log occupational income
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10. Effect of Destination County Skill Premiums on Occupational Mobility, 1850-60 and 1870-80: Different Wage 
Measures
Dependent variable: change in log occupational income
Laborer including board Farm laborer
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Skill premium is defined two ways: first, as the log ratio of "real" carpenter's wage 
(deflated by the cost of board) to laborer's wage including board; second, as the log ratio of the real carpenter's wage to the 
farm wage (which includes board). Standard errors clustered at the destination county level. See Tables 1 and 2 for details.
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Table 2.11: Effect of Destination County Skill Premium on Occupa-
tional Mobility, 1850-60 and 1870-80: Different Occupational Status
Measures
Laura Salisbury, "Selective Migration, Wages, and Occupational Mobiltiy in Nineteenth Century America," July 11, 2011. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Upgrade indicator:
Destination skill premium 0.1626** 0.1810** 0.1852** 0.2400*** 0.2163*** 0.1407* 0.1270 0.1842*
(0.067) (0.076) (0.083) (0.092) (0.072) (0.085) (0.090) (0.103)
Constant 0.6817*** 0.4533** 0.6233** -0.2060 0.3665*** 0.3797 0.5505** -0.3485
(0.085) (0.229) (0.244) (0.385) (0.088) (0.242) (0.262) (0.402)
Demographic controls X X X X X X X X
Geographic controls X X X X X X
Region controls X X X X
Home county wage X X
Observations 908 897 897 645 908 897 897 645
Adjusted R-squared 0.0649 0.0661 0.0755 0.0735 0.0485 0.0630 0.0690 0.0727
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Occupational Status Measure:
Destination skill premium 0.1664** 0.2330*** 0.2543*** 0.3791*** 0.4176*** 0.5000*** 0.5017*** 0.7488***
(0.075) (0.082) (0.094) (0.107) (0.149) (0.167) (0.190) (0.218)
Constant 0.2967*** 0.4391* 0.5898** -0.2853 0.6589*** 1.1939** 1.5202*** -0.2652
(0.095) (0.251) (0.264) (0.401) (0.192) (0.514) (0.543) (0.775)
Demographic controls X X X X X X X X
Geographic controls X X X X X X
Region controls X X X X
Home county wage X X
Observations 908 897 897 645 908 897 897 645
Adjusted R-squared 0.0434 0.0506 0.0490 0.0520 0.0634 0.0803 0.0799 0.0784
Occupational Status Measure:
Destination skill premium 0.1496** 0.1051 0.0553 0.1027 0.2177** 0.2953** 0.2350* 0.3700***
(0.063) (0.071) (0.076) (0.088) (0.109) (0.116) (0.126) (0.143)
Constant 0.3767*** 0.3989* 0.3570 0.1224 0.5235*** 0.5296 1.0037*** -0.8864
(0.072) (0.205) (0.272) (0.325) (0.136) (0.357) (0.388) (0.567)
Demographic controls X X X X X X X X
Geographic controls X X X X X X
Region controls X X X X
Home county wage X X
Observations 907 896 896 645 908 897 897 645
Adjusted R-squared 0.0343 0.0571 0.0697 0.0590 0.0385 0.0583 0.0684 0.0614
Table 12. Effect of Destination County Skill Premiums on Occupational Mobility, 1850-60 and 1870-80: Different 
Occupational Status Measures
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Skill premium is the log ratio of carpenter's to laborer's wage at the county level. Standard 
errors clustered at the destination county level. See Tables 1 and 2 for details.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11. Effect of Destination County Skill Premiums on Occupational Mobility, 1850-60 and 1870-80: Coarse 
Indicators
Dependent variable: Indicator for occupational upgrade
=1 if upgrades =1 if moves up occupational class
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Skill premium is the log ratio of carpenter's to laborer's wage at the county level. The 
1950 occupational wage is the median wage paid to workers in a given occupation in 1950; the Nam-Powers-Boyd index and 
the Duncan index are composites of wages and educational attainment from 1950, weighted differently; the Siegel score is 
based on opinion surveys from the 1960s. Standard errors clustered at the destination county level. See Tables 1 and 2 for 
details.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: change in log occupational status measure
1950 occupational wage Nam-Powers-Boyd Index
Siegel Prestige Score Duncan Index
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Table 2.13: Effect of Older Male Relative’s Occupation on Choice of
Destination County, 1870-1880
Laura Salisbury, "Selective Migration, Wages, and Occupational Mobiltiy in Nineteenth Century America," July 11, 2011. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample:
Log relative's/own occupational income 0.6384*** 0.6358*** 0.6414*** 0.6410*** 0.7212*** 0.7193*** 0.7007*** 0.6985***
(0.059) (0.062) (0.067) (0.067) (0.042) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048)
Constant 0.1104*** 0.0194 0.4225 0.5268 0.0969*** 0.0502 0.1742 0.3169
(0.034) (0.147) (0.354) (0.413) (0.025) (0.103) (0.231) (0.310)
Demographic controls X X X X X X
Geographic controls X X X X
Region controls X X
Observations 250 250 248 248 480 480 440 440
Adjusted R-squared 0.315 0.320 0.308 0.324 0.378 0.384 0.378 0.380
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log relative's/own occupational income 0.1352*** 0.1021** 0.0400 0.0271 0.0801*
(0.040) (0.044) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041)
Constant 0.5460*** 0.8089*** 1.2933*** 0.6110** 0.9451***
(0.024) (0.097) (0.233) (0.268) (0.353)
Demographic controls X X X X
Geographic controls X X X
Region controls X X
Home county wage X
Observations 250 250 248 248 172
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0456 0.100 0.286 0.420 0.440
Table 13. Relationsip between Occupational Mobility and Older Male Relative's Occupation, 1870-1880
Dependent variable: change in log occupational income
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Skill premium is the log ratio of carpenter's to laborer's wage at 
the county level. Sample is restricted to men who live with an older, employed male relative in year 
1870 (none meets this restriction in the 1850-60 sample). Sample expanded to include workers who 
begin in skilled jobs to increase sample size. Standard errors clustered at the destination county level. 
See Tables 1 and 2 for details.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 14. Effect of Older Male Relative's Occupation on Choice of Destination County, 1870-80
Dependent variable: destination county skill premium
Migrants with wage data All Migrants
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is restricted to men who live with an older, employed male relative in year 1870 (none meets 
this restriction in the 1850-60 sample). Sample expanded to include workers who begin in skilled jobs to increase sample size. See Tables 
1 and 2 for details.
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Figure 2·1: Placement of Select Occupations in Different Occupa-
tional Rankings in 1% 1870 IPUMS sample
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Chapter 3
Intergenerational Mobility across Three
Generations in the Nineteenth Century:
Evidence from the U.S. Census (with
Claudia Olivetti and Daniele Paserman)
3.1 Introduction
Recent remarks made by Alan Krueger, President of the Council of Economic Advis-
ers, have reignited economists’ interest in intergenerational mobility. How is economic
status transmitted across generations? How much does one’s childhood environment
matter for economic outcomes? The research to date (see Solon, 1999 and Black and
Devereux, 2011 for extensive surveys) has mostly focused on the estimation of the
father-son intergenerational elasticity, the parameter that measures the effect of a
proportional increase of income in the father’s generation on the income of the son’s
generation. These studies have often assumed that the intergenerational transmission
of income follows an AR(1) process, an assumption driven primarily by lack of data
linking more than two generations. However, this assumption may not hold in reality,
for a number of reasons. As modeled in Solon (2013), grandparents may make inde-
pendent human capital investments in grandchildren. Even if grandparents do not
have a direct effect on children’s outcomes, the inclusion of multigenerational effects
may serve to rectify attenuation bias stemming from the mis-measurement of single
generation effects. For instance, in the presence of discrimination or “ethnic capital,”
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a parent’s individual income may provide an incomplete picture of the transfer made
from one generation to the next. This may also be true if socioeconomic status is
measured with error.1
Identifying these multigenerational effects has important implications about the
persistence of income inequality over time. Most existing estimates place the inter-
generational elasticity for the US at between 0.4 and 0.5. If the process of intergener-
ational income transmission is AR(1), this implies that a given shock to income will
fade out relatively quickly: the third order autocorrelation coefficient is between 0.064
and 0.125. Clearly, a higher order autoregressive process would imply a much slower
regression to the mean. In other words, the degree of persistence of socioeconomic
status across generations could be a lot higher than what we believe.
In this paper, we attempt to overcome the limitations of existing studies by es-
timating intergenerational elasticities across three generations for the United States
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. We apply and extend the methodology
originally developed by Olivetti and Paserman (2012) in order to measure intergener-
ational elasticities between fathers (G1), children (G2) and grandchildren (G3). The
key to the methodology is the construction of synthetic cohorts, or pseudo-panels,
where individuals are grouped by their first names. Specifically, intergenerational
correlations between fathers and sons are calculated as the correlation between the
average outcomes of individuals with a specific first name in a given year and the
average outcomes of the fathers of individuals with that name 20 or 30 years ear-
lier. Extending this idea, the correlation between fathers and grandsons (i.e., the
second-order autocorrelation) can be calculated as the correlation between the av-
erage income of fathers of children with a given first name, and an estimate of the
average income of sons of children with that first name.
The intuition for why this methodology works can be explained using a simple ex-
1See Solon (2013) for a theoretical treatment of each of these possibilities.
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ample. Assume that the only possible names for boys in generation G2 are Adam and
Zachary. Moreover, assume that in generation G1, high socioeconomic status parents
are more likely to name their child Adam, while Zachary is more common among low
socioeconomic status parents. In a society with a high degree of intergenerational
mobility, we would not expect the adult Adams to have much of an advantage on
the adult Zacharys. Moreover, in the next generation (G3) the sons of Adam should
be almost indistinguishable from the sons of Zachary. Therefore, the correlation in
average income of people with a given name, their fathers and their sons will be a
good measure of intergenerational mobility.
One important advantage of this methodology is that it applies equally well to
women: just replace Adam and Zachary in the previous example with Abigail and Zoe,
and use husband’s income as the measure of women’s socioeconomic status. Olivetti
and Paserman (2012) used this methodology to provide the first estimate of intergen-
erational mobility between fathers and daughters in the late 19th and early 20th Cen-
turies. In the case of three generations, the methodology will allow us to estimate four
different channels of intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status: fathers-
sons-grandsons, fathers-sons-granddaughters, fathers-daughters-grandsons and fathers-
daughters-granddaughters. Thus our analysis has the potential to uncover differ-
ent mechanisms through which gender differentials in intergenerational mobility may
arise.
Using data from the 1850 to 1930 US Census 1% sample, we find evidence of
a strong second-order autoregressive coefficient for the process of intergenerational
transmission of income. That is, even after controlling for the income in generation
G2 (“father’s income”), the income of generation G1 (“grandfather’s income”) has a
large and positive effect on the income of generation G3 (“grandson’s income”). This
finding suggests that traditional estimates of intergenerational mobility that assume
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a first-order autoregressive process for income may substantially understate the true
extent of intergenerational persistence in economic status.2 In addition we find ev-
idence of a gender differential in the strength of the correlation between the three
generations. Our results indicate that the intergenerational elasticity between grand-
fathers and grandchildren is stronger if G2 is a male. We discuss a three generation
dynastic model in which there is tension between G1’s and G2’s preferences over G2’s
(and G3’s) consumption. This framework can rationalize our findings if the timing
of intergenerational transfers is gender specific; for example, if parents assign dowries
to their daughters and leave bequests to their sons.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
methodology as well as the data used for the analysis and some measurement issues.
The main results and some robustness checks are presented in Section 3.3. Finally,
Section 3.4 presents a simple dynastic model, which we use to provide a possible
interpretation for our findings.
3.2 Methodology and Data
We use data from the 1850 to 1930 US Census 1% samples from IPUMS (Ruggles et
al., 2010). Even though IPUMS has recently released a set of Linked Representative
Samples that link records from 1880 complete count database to each one of the 1850-
1930 on percent Census samples, these data do not allow individuals to be linked
across more than two generations. Moreover, these data cannot be used to connect
married women to their fathers. Therefore, it is necessary to use our synthetic-cohort-
based methodology to create a data set with information on economic status across
three generations. The core idea, as described in the previous section, is to use first
2Another possible interpretation is that this finding reflects measurement error, as noted by
Gary Solon in remarks made at the PSID Conference on Inequality across Multiple Generations,
Ann Arbor, September 2012.
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names to construct the synthetic cohorts.
Linking generation G1 to generation G2
To link individuals from generations G1 and G2, we follow the same approach used in
Olivetti and Paserman (2012). Assume that we observe G1 and G2 in two separate
cross-sections. The first is at time t, that is, the Census year in which G1 individuals
are adults and G2 individuals are children, and the second is at time t+ 20, that is,
the census year in which G2 individuals are adults (20 years later in this example).
Our strategy is to base our intergenerational links on individuals’ first names, which
are available for both adults and children in each cross-section.
Define y˜j,t as the average log earnings of G1 fathers of children named j and y˜j,t+20
as the average log earnings of G2 adults named j. One can then merge the two cross
sections by first names, and then estimate the income elasticity across generations
G1 and G2 by a weighted least squares regression of y˜j,t+20 on y˜j,t. The weights are
equal to the frequency counts of first names in the sample of G2 adults.3
Olivetti and Paserman (2012) show that if names carry information about eco-
nomic status, this estimator will be informative of the underlying parameters govern-
ing the process of intergenerational mobility. In addition, they conduct a numerical
exercise to show that the estimated intergenerational elasticity is not sensitive to the
characteristics of the name distribution (the degree of concentration of names, and
the extent to which names carry economic content). Therefore, they argue that the
observed trends in estimated intergenerational mobility are unlikely to be driven by
changes in the parameters governing the name distribution, but rather reflect more
fundamental changes in the parameters that govern the income transmission process
across generations (the returns to human capital, the degree of inheritability of traits,
3This “means-on-means” regression is similar to the synthetic cohort approach pioneered by
Browning et al. (1985) and Attanasio and Weber (1995). In our case, the synthetic cohorts are
defined on the basis of both first names and age.
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and the degree of assortative mating in the marriage market).
Linking generation G2 to generation G3
Linking generations G2 and G3 is slightly more complicated. We would like to know
the average log earnings of G3 children born to G2 fathers named j. However, as the
earnings of G3 are observed when these individuals are adults, we can no longer link
them to their fathers. Therefore, we proceed as follows. First, we calculate qj,k as
the fraction of children (G3) named k of fathers (G2) named j. This value is taken
from Census year t+ 20, in which G2 individuals are adults, and G3 children still live
at home with their parents. Second, we calculate y˜k,t+40, the average log earnings of
G3 adults named k (this average is calculated from Census year t + 40). Finally, we
calculate y˜j,t+40 as:
y˜j,t+40 =
∑
k
qj,ky˜k,t+40
In other words, the average log earnings of the children of G2 parents named j are
a weighted average of the name-specific average log earnings of G3 adults, with the
weights equal to the fraction of G3 individuals with that name among all the children
of G2 parents named j. For example, suppose that adults named Adam in year t+20
have children named David, Edward and Fred. The income assigned to G3 for the
group of adults named “Adam” is the weighted average, with weights 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, of the
average income at time t + 40 of all the G3 individuals named David, Edward and
Fred, respectively.
One can then merge this cross section to the one linking G1 and G2 by first
names, then obtain an estimate of the income elasticity across the three generations
by running a weighted least squares regression of y˜jt+40 on y˜j,t+20 and y˜j,t, where the
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weights are equal to the frequency counts of first names in the sample of G2 adults.
The description above was presented in terms of the father-son-grandson relation-
ship. It is easy to see, however, that the methodology can be applied to fathers-son-
granddaughters, fathers-daughters-grandsons, and fathers-daughters-granddaughters.
Therefore, we will be able to analyze gender differentials in the transmission of eco-
nomic status across multiple generations.
Data and Measurement Issues
Data with individual names is available from IPUMS for every decadal Census from
1850 to 1930, with the exception of 1890. This means that we can calculate our
three-generation measures of intergenerational mobility for two triplets observed at
a distance of 20 years from one another (1860-1880-1900, and 1880-1900-1920); and
for two triplets of observations observed at a distance of 30 years from one another
(1850-1880-1910 and 1870-1900-1930). This gives us a unique long-run perspective
on the transmission of economic status across generations.
A challenge that applies to all computations of historical intergenerational elastic-
ities is to obtain appropriate quantitative measures of socioeconomic status. Because
income and earnings at the individual level are not available before the 1940 Census,
we are constrained to use measures of socioeconomic status that are based on indi-
viduals’ occupational status. While this contrasts with the current practice among
economists, who prefer to use direct measures of income or earnings if available,
there is a long tradition in sociology to focus on occupational categories (Erikson and
Goldthorpe, 1992). One of the advantages of the IPUMS data set is that it contains a
harmonized classification of occupations, and several measures of occupational status
that are comparable across years. For our benchmark analysis, we choose the OCC-
SCORE measure of occupational standing. This variable indicates the median total
income (in hundreds of dollars) of persons in each occupation in 1950.
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A second challenge arises from our methodology for measuring generation G3
occupational income. As explained above, the income of children of generation G2
is computed as a weighted mean of mean incomes by first names. This implies that
the distribution of income for G3 is more compressed than that of G1 and G2. As
we demonstrate below, this produces an even stronger attenuation bias in the OLS
estimate. Therefore, in most of our analysis we use percentile rank of mean log
occupational income as a way to get around this problem.
3.3 Results
In this section, we present our estimates of intergenerational income elasticities across
three generations. Panel A of table 1 presents these estimates when we use the log
occupational income score as our dependent variable. The first column shows that
the intergenerational elasticity between the 1860 and 1880 cohorts is about 0.37, a re-
sult in line with that obtained in Olivetti and Paserman (2012). Column 3 regresses
the log occupational scores of G3 males on those of their grandfathers (G1). The
coefficient is substantially smaller, but still highly statistically significant. Column
4 includes the income of both G1 and G2 males on the right hand side. Both co-
efficients are statistically significant, with the coefficient on G2 income about three
times as large. The statistically significant coefficient on G1 income implies that the
intergenerational income transmission process is better characterized as an AR(2),
and ignoring the second order autoregressive term will lead to overstating the extent
of long-run mobility across generations.
One concern with the results above is that the estimated elasticities appear to be
substantially smaller when we use grandson’s income as the dependent variable. This
problem is illustrated in column 2, where we estimate the simple one-generation in-
tergenerational elasticity using the 1880 and 1900 cohorts. Here, the generations are
136
linked by the first names of the older generation, meaning that average log earnings of
the younger generation must be calculated as the weighted average of name-specific
log earnings, as described previously. This procedure may introduce substantial mea-
surement error, potentially biasing the estimated elasticity toward zero. In addition,
the distribution of G3 earnings, being calculated as an average of averages, tends to
be very compressed. This may in itself lead to a downward bias in the estimates.
To overcome these problems, we re-estimate the regressions, but now using the log
earnings percentile rank as the dependent variable. This should at least alleviate the
problem of excessive compression of the distribution of the dependent variable. The
results are presented in panel B of table 1. Columns 1 and 2 show the one-generation
estimates of intergenerational mobility. The coefficient in column 1 indicates that
going from the bottom to the top percentile of earnings in generation G1 is associ-
ated with an increase of about 50 percentiles in the earnings of generation G2. The
coefficient is somewhat smaller for the 1880-1900 generations, but at least has the
same order of magnitude. Column 3 links G3 to G2, and Column 4 adds the link to
G1. As in panel A, we find that G1’s earnings rank has a large and significant effect
on the earnings rank of G3, even after controlling for the earnings rank of G2.
Table 2 presents percentile rank regressions of G3 earnings on the earnings of G1
and G2, using all possible gender combinations and both decade triplets in which the
distance between generations is 20 years (1860-1880-1900; 1880-1900-1920). In the
top panel, we show results using both decade triplets and genders for G3 when G2
is male; the bottom panel repeats this analysis using G2 females. Several patterns
emerge from this exercise. First, there is a slight upward time trend in the coefficient
on G1 earnings, indicating that the effect of grandparents’ earnings on grandchildren’s
earnings is increasing over time.
Differences in the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity by gender can be seen in this
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table. First of all, holding the decade and the gender of G3 constant, the effect of
G1 earnings is greatest when G2 is male. To see this, compare the top and bottom
panels of each column in table 2. The coefficient on G1 earnings is always substantially
larger in the top panel. What this means is that earnings are more strongly related
to paternal grandfathers than maternal grandfathers. Second, holding year and the
gender of G2 constant, the coefficient on G1 earnings is larger when G3 is female. This
can be seen from a comparison between columns (1) and (3) and between columns
(2) and (4) in the top panel, and between these same columns in the bottom panel.
In other words, grandfathers and granddaughters have more closely related earnings
than grandfathers and grandsons.
Table 3 repeats the analysis in table 2 using decade triplets separated by 30-year
intervals (1850-1880-1910; 1870-1900-1930). These coefficients do not systematically
differ in magnitude from those in table 2. However, this table offers little evidence
of an upward time trend. The gender differences seen in table 2 are less pronounced
here; however, by and large, they are still present.
One concern we have is that comparisons by gender may be sensitive to the way our
samples are constructed. For example, we measure a woman’s socioeconomic status by
the earnings of her husband. This means that all women in our sample are married,
whereas men need not be married to be included. Then, we may be measuring
differences in intergenerational income transmission by marital status rather than
gender. Another concern is that G1 individuals need to have children ages 0-15 in
order to appear in the sample; the same is not true of later generations.
To ensure that our results are not being driven by these details of our sample
construction, we redo the analysis imposing different restrictions on G2 and G3. The
restrictions we impose on G2 are (i) Men must be married; (ii) Men and women
must be married with children ages 0-15; (iii) Men and women must be married with
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children ages 0-15, and their children must have names that are linked to the sample
of G3 adults. We also impose restrictions (i) and (ii) on G3. We calculate the G1-G3
intergenerational elasticity for each of 12 combinations of these sample restrictions
(including the baseline of no restrictions). The results, using the 1860-1880-1900
sample, are reported in appendix table 1.
To clearly summarize these results, we compile all G1-G3 intergenerational elas-
ticities estimated under different sample restrictions in each decade triplet. There
are 192 such estimates. We regress these on indicators for the decade in which G2’s
earnings are measured (1880 or 1900), the interval that separates generations (20 or
30 years), the gender of G2, the gender of G3, and categorical variables indicating
which sample restrictions are imposed. Standard errors are clustered at the specifi-
cation level. We report these results in table 4. The positive time trend does not
stand up to the above sample restrictions, nor does the finding that the relationship
between grandfathers and granddaughters is stronger than the relationship between
grandfathers and grandsons. However, the finding that the correlation between G1
and G3 is greater when G2 is male persists. We consider this our main finding so far.
3.4 Model
In order to interpret our findings, we present a simple three-generation dynastic model
of consumption and human capital investment. The key ingredient of the model is
that there is a tension between the desired allocation of consumption across the three
generations between the decision-makers in generations 1 and 2. This tension derives
from the fact that each generation discounts heavily the utility of future generations
relative to its own utility, but the discount factor between any two future generations
is relatively low. In other words, each generation is characterized by quasi-hyperbolic,
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or β−δ preferences.4 The investment in the third generation’s human capital depends
on whether the second generation is able to reoptimize over the allocation of resources
between G2 and G3, or whether it must follow the allocation chosen by G1. We
conjecture that, because of the structure of marriage markets in the 19th Century
and the timing of transfers across generations, second generation daughters (and
their husbands) may have been more likely to reoptimize, thus inducing the lower
elasticity between first and third generation’s income when the second generation is
female.
Formally, we consider a three-generation dynasty. Each generation derives utility
from its own consumption and from that of the following generations. Therefore:
U1 (c1, c2, c3) = ln (c1) + βδ ln (c2) + βδ
2 ln c3
U2 (c1, c2) = ln (c2) + βδ ln (c3)
U3 (c3) = ln (c3)
We assume throughout that β < 1, reflecting the fact that each generation puts
more weight on its own utility relative to future generations’ utility; and δ < 1,
reflecting the fact that the weight placed on more distant generations’ utility also
declines. Notice that for G1, the discount factor between its own utility and that
of G2 is βδ, while the discount factor between G2 and G3’s utility is only δ. This
captures the fact that the discount rate between the present and any period in the
future is higher than the discount rate between any two periods in the distant future.
Each generation can allocate its income Yt between its own consumption ct and
4Quasi-hyperbolic preferences have been made popular in recent years to model the intra-
personal self-control problems in consumption and savings decisions and other contexts (Laibson,
1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005). However, one of the first
applications of β−δ preferences (Phelps and Pollak, 1968) was to an intergenerational growth model
very much like the one considered here.
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investment in the following generation’s human capital, It+1. Generation t + 1’s
income is a function of generation t’s investment:
Yt+1 = RIt+1.
To solve for the optimal allocation of resources across generations, we consider
two alternative possibilities. In the first case, G1 decides on how to allocate resources
for all three generations. In the second case, G2 can reoptimize and decide on the
allocation of resources from that point onwards. G1’s decision takes into account
G2’s decision, and decides how much to consume and how much to invest in the next
generation as a best response to G2’s actions. In the language if the quasi-hyperbolic
discounting literature, the first case corresponds to that of an agent who can perfectly
commit to the full sequence of decisions made in period 1, while the second case
corresponds to that of a sophisticated agent. We label the optimal consumption
choices made by the two agents
{
cCOMMt
}3
t=1
and
{
cSOPHt
}3
t=1
, respectively; and the
resulting income levels
{
Y COMMt
}3
t=1
and
{
Y SOPHt
}3
t=1
.
We are interested primarily in the incomes of G2 and G3, and how they correlate
with G1’s income. The following proposition holds:
Proposition 1. (a) If G1 can commit to all future decisions, the incomes of G2 and
G3 will be, respectively
Y COMM2 =
Rβδ (1 + δ)
1 + βδ + βδ2
Y1
and
Y COMM3 =
R2βδ2
1 + βδ + βδ2
Y1;
(b) If G1 cannot commit to all future decisions, the incomes of G2 and G3 will be,
resepctively
Y SOPH2 =
Rβδ (1 + δ)
1 + βδ + βδ2
Y1
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and
Y SOPH3 =
R2β2δ2 (1 + δ)
(1 + βδ + βδ2) (1 + βδ)
Y1.
Proof. When G1 can commit to all future resource allocations, he will simply solve
the following straightforward maximization problem:
max
c1,c2,c3
ln(c1) + βδ ln(c2) + βδ
2 ln(c3) s.t. Y1 = c1 +
c2
R
+
c3
R2
This generates the following optimal choices of c1, c2, and c3:
c1 =
1
1 + βδ + βδ2
Y1
c2 =
βδR
1 + βδ + βδ2
Y1
c3 =
βδ2R2
1 + βδ + βδ2
Y1
Part (a) follows from the fact that Y3 = c3 and Y2 = c2 +
Y3
R
.
When G1 cannot commit to future resource allocations, he will anticipate G2’s
resource allocation decision and make his decisions accordingly. Taking Y2 as given,
G2 will solve the following:
max
c2,c3
ln(c2) + βδ ln(c3) s.t. Y2 = c2 +
c3
R
The solution to this problem yields the following optimal choices of c2 and c3:
c2 =
1
1 + βδ
Y2
c3 =
βδR
1 + βδ
Y2
Then, G1’s optimization problem can be written:
max
c1,Y2
ln(c1) + βδ ln
( Y2
1 + βδ
)
+ βδ2 ln
(βδRY2
1 + βδ
)
s.t. Y1 = c1 +
Y2
R
The solution to this problem for Y2 is
Y2 =
Rβδ(1 + δ)
1 + βδ + βδ2
Y1
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The value of Y3 follows from the solution for c3 given above, and from the fact that
Y3 = c3.
Proposition 1 also allows one to calculate the relationship between the incomes of
the different generations. Let η2,1 and η3,1 be, respectively, the slope coefficients
in regressions of Y2 and Y3 on Y1. It follows directly from the proposition that
ηSOPH2,1 =η
COMM
2,1 and η
SOPH
3,1 < η
COMM
3,1 .
The intuition for the second result is straightforward. If G1 can commit to a given
consumption path for all three generations, it will allocate resources between G2 and
G3 in a relatively egalitarian way: from its perspective, G3’s utility is discounted only
by a factor δ relative to G2’s utility. On the other hand, if G2 can reoptimize given
its allocation, it will put much more weight on its own consumption, as the discount
factor that it applies between its own utility and G3’s utility is βδ.5
How do these results relate to our findings on how the strength of the G1-G3
intergenerational elasticity depends on the gender of the middle generation? There is
a literature that examines the relationship between marriage institutions, postmarital
location rules and property rights. Botticini and Siow (2003) argue that in virilocal
societies, where married daughters leave their parental nest and married sons do
not, altruistic parents will leave dowries to their daughters and bequests to their
sons to mitigate a free-rider problem. Other papers focus on the role of marital
arrangements, with men remaining immobile and specializing in farm production and
women moving to new households, for consumption smoothing and agency problems
(see for example, Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989, based on data on rural India, and
Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2005, on rural Ethiopia). While dowries were relatively
uncommon in North America in the 19th Century,6 a quick examination of census
5The result that the second generation’s income is identical under both allocation rules is less
interesting, and depends on the specific functional form of the utility function (logarithmic utility).
6Botticini and Siow (2003) document that in late 18th Century Connecticut, between 46 and 67
percent of married daughters were assigned, inter vivos transfers from their family of origin, likely
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data reveals a tendency for young married couples to reside with husbands’ rather
than wives’ parents.7 During the period of focus of this study, only 10-12 percent
of married couples under 35 resided in the same household a parent; however, that
parent was significantly more likely to belong to the husband. This is especially true
of agricultural families: young couples residing with a parent were twice as likely to be
living with the husband’s parents rather than with the wife’s parents. This may also
mask a tendency for families to reside in the same locality as the husband’s parents,
even if they do not reside in the same household. As such, it is possible that transfers
from parents to daughters were more likely to occur at marriage than were transfers
from parents to sons, even if formal dowries were unusual.
We conjecture that the timing of intergenerational transfers may affect the ability
of G2 to decide on the allocation of consumption between itself and G3. Specifically,
assume that G2 daughters receive transfers from their parents upon marriage. Since
19th Century women relinquished control of their assets to their husbands, it seems
likely that the G1 patriarch would have little say over the allocation of resources
between G2 and G3. On the other hand, G2 sons were more likely to receive a
bequest, upon G1’s death. The fact that G1 could withhold the transfer of resources
to his male offspring implies that it was also easier for G1 to monitor the allocation
of resources between G2 and G3, and therefore guarantee that the investment in the
grandchild’s human capital would be sufficiently high.8 If families were more likely
to locate near paternal than maternal grandparents, it may also be that the direct
human capital transfer from parental grandparents to grandchildren was greater.
at the time of their marriage. However, by 1820’s, only 40 percent received such transfers.
7These tabulations are based on the 1 percent IPUMS samples from 1880 and 1900.
8For more on the timing of transfers across generations, see Botticini and Siow (2003), Rosen-
zweig (1988), Rosenzweig and Stark (1989).
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have estimated intergenerational elasticities across three genera-
tions for the US spanning the late 19th and early 20th Century. We find that the
intergenerational income process exhibits a strong second-order autoregressive coef-
ficient. We also find that the grandfather-grandchild intergenerational elasticity is
larger when the middle generation is male, and we rationalize these findings using a
simple three-generation dynastic model where there is a tension between G1’s and
G2’s preferences over G2’s consumption, and the timing of transfers is gender spe-
cific. These results can have important implications for our understanding of the
persistence of socioeconomic status over the long run.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Intergenerational Income Elasticities for Three Genera-
tions: Levels and Percentile Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 1880 G2 male 1900 G3 male 1900 G3 male 1900 G3 male
1860 G1 0.369 0.0535 0.0298
(0.0295) (0.0105) (0.0112)
1880 G2 male 0.0764 0.0642
(0.0109) (0.0118)
Constant 1.837 2.754 2.821 2.703
(0.0857) (0.0316) (0.0304) (0.0370)
Observations 874 882 875 874
R-squared 0.152 0.053 0.029 0.061
1860 G1 0.456 0.243 0.120
(0.0288) (0.0318) (0.0350)
1880 G2 male 0.328 0.270
(0.0321) (0.0363)
32.53 28.89 33.91 25.14
Constant (1.784) (1.976) (1.972) (2.251)
Observations 874 882 875 874
R-squared 0.224 0.106 0.063 0.118
Panel A: Log occupational income
Panel B. Percentile rank of log occupational income
Table 1. I tergenerational Income Elasticities for Three Generations                                                       
Levels and Percentile Rank
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Table 3.2: Intergenerational Elasticities Across Three Generations:
Percentile Rank Regressions at 20 Year Intervals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES G3 Male 1900 G3 Male 1920 G3 Female 1900 G3 Female 1920
G1 0.120 0.191 0.218 0.227
(0.0350) (0.0324) (0.0367) (0.0310)
G2 Male 0.270 0.296 0.231 0.183
(0.0363) (0.0342) (0.0378) (0.0327)
Constant 25.14 19.38 23.65 25.06
(2.251) (1.938) (2.348) (1.850)
Observations 874 1,161 848 1,171
R-squared 0.118 0.170 0.140 0.137
G1 -0.0218 0.0479 0.151 0.176
(0.0292) (0.0237) (0.0283) (0.0239)
G2 Female 0.298 0.379 0.397 0.401
(0.0324) (0.0253) (0.0311) (0.0256)
Constant 31.14 22.60 19.55 16.20
(1.729) (1.477) (1.658) (1.474)
Observations 1,146 1,675 1,132 1,627
R-squared 0.090 0.176 0.259 0.266
Table 2. Intergenerational Elasticies Across Three Generations:                                                                                                                                                                             
Percentile Rank Regressions at 20 Year Intervals
Table 3.3: Intergenerational Elasticities Across Three Generations:
Percentile Rank Regressions at 30 Year Intervals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES G3 Male 1910 G3 Male 1930 G3 Female 1910 G3 Female 1930
G1 0.0902 0.195 0.106 0.215
(0.0308) (0.0288) (0.0302) (0.0276)
G2 Male 0.321 0.305 0.186 0.282
(0.0357) (0.0326) (0.0360) (0.0313)
Constant 24.66 19.07 32.76 20.72
(2.150) (1.842) (2.168) (1.772)
Observations 996 1,250 970 1,265
R-squared 0.123 0.184 0.066 0.193
G1 0.0845 0.0875 0.156 0.0489
(0.0286) (0.0240) (0.0284) (0.0240)
G2 Female 0.258 0.354 0.359 0.472
(0.0341) (0.0264) (0.0343) (0.0262)
Constant 29.09 23.25 21.20 20.01
(1.962) (1.544) (1.961) (1.540)
Observations 958 1,414 935 1,388
R-squared 0.101 0.180 0.204 0.255
Table 3. Intergenerational Elasticies Across Three Generations:                                                                                                                                                                             
Percentile Rank Regressions at 30 Year Intervals
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Table 3.4: Summary of G1-G3 Intergenerational Income Elasticities
under Different Sample Restrictions: Percentile Rank Regressions
Dependent variable: Intergenerational income elasticity: G1-G3
Year (G2)=1900 0.0198
(0.0203)
Interval = 30 years -0.0278
(0.0203)
G2 Male 0.0458**
(0.0203)
G3 Male -0.0262
(0.0203)
Sample restrictions:
   G2 married -0.0185**
(0.00639)
  G2 married w children 0-15 -0.0168**
(0.00723)
  G2 married w children, linked to G3 sample -0.00426
(0.00886)
  G3 married 0.0153**
(0.00549)
  G3 married w children 0-15 0.0174*
(0.00897)
Constant 0.129***
(0.0243)
Observations 192
R-squared 0.369
Table 4. Summary of G1-G3 Intergenerational Income Elasticities under Different Sample Restrictions                                                     
Percentile Rank Regressions
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